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1943-10-25 The loss of Mitchell FR178 NO-W 'Nona' (Bakker)

Crash site: Lanvéoc-Poulmic airfield, 4.4260W/48.2895N, Finistère, France

Crash cause: enemy Flak

1. The attack

Aircraft of 320 (Dutch) Squadron RAF Bomber Command, flying from RAF Lasham, on 25/10/1943, crashed near Brest, actually on Lanvéoc-Poulmic airbase, Finistère, France. Target was the Base Aéronavale Poulmic, East of Lanvéoc, hangars in the East corner of the airfield. Two Squadrons were involved, 13 Mitchells from leading 320 Sqn, and 11 from 98 Sqn, escorted by 5 Spitfire and 4 Typhoon Squadrons. Rendez-vous over Dodman Point at 11.000 ft. Navigation & bomb aiming was led by C. Waardenburg, in Wing Commander Lynn's leading Mitchell, the FR170 NO-G. Time over target 14.20h, altitude 12.500-13.000 ft. 104 bombs of 500 lbs were to be dropped. There were slight clouds over target at 6.000 ft. Visibility was excellent with about 25 miles.

Group composition

1st group

1. FR170 NO-G: W/Cdr. Lynn DFC, Ovl 3 Waardenburg, Sgt Vltg Telegr Van Leeuwen, F/O. Pritchard

2. FR151 NO-C: Ovl Nienhuis, Off Zwnr 3 Oele, Sgt Vltg Telegr Prinsen, Kpl Vltg Sch Born

3. FR146 NO-G: Ovl 2 Van Lessen, Ovl 3 Borgerhoff Mulder, Vltg Telegr VAn der Puil, Sgt Vltg Sch Van der Wee

4. FR165 NO-S: Ovl 2 De Groot, Ltz 2 Kosten, Kpl Vltg Telegr Antonie, Sgt Vltg Sch Knapp

5. FR173 NO-J: Sgt Vl Schrijvers, Off Zwnr 3 Keizer, Sgt Vltg Telegr De Ruiter, Sgt Vltg Sch Rauws

6. FR159 NO-N: Sgt Vl Kok, Sgt Overwijn, Sgt Vltg Telegr De la Haije, Kpl Vltg Sch Koning

7. FR143 NO-A: Sgt Vl Bevelander, Sgt Wnr Birzak, Sgt Vltg Telegr De Vries, Sgt Vl Hoenson

2nd group

1. FR178 NO-W: Hfd Off Vl 2 Bakker, Off Zwnr Van Pelt, Sgt Vltg Telegr Bolk, Off Vl 3 S.D. Van Haaften

2. FR169 NO-L: Sgt Vl Maas, Sgt Wnr Claassen, Sgt Vltg Telegr Pennock, Kpl Vl Sch Jonker

3. FR162 NO-P: Ovl 2 Roosenburg, Ovl 2 Bongaerts, Sgt Vltg Telegr Hamelink, Sgt Vltg Sch Kauwenberg

4. FR141 NO-B: Sgt Vl Laamens, Sgt Wnr Van Wijngaarden, Sgt Vltg Telegr De Bruin, Kpl Vltg Sch Van Gelderen

5. FR166 NO-R: Sgt Vl Bank, Sgt Vl Van Dijken, Vltg Telegr Kaufman, Kpl Vltg Sch Schot

6. FR174 NO-K: Sgt Vl Emmens, Sgt Vl Van Berkum, Sgt Vltg Telegr De Vries Humel, Kpl Vltg Sch Roukema

Results

Bomb explosions were seen between and on the Southern hangars. Heavy explosions were seen of ammo dumps blowing up.

FR178 received a direct Flak hit during the bombing run, at approx. 14.30 hours, at 13.000 ft. The aircraft caught fire immediately, and disintegrated on exploding in the air. Four man crew, all KIA. CO. Bakker was leading Group Nr. 2. Flak was heavy and accurate, and got a direct hit on Sgt. C.J. Bank's aircraft. Shortly after that, CO Bakker's aircraft was hit.

Source: Mindef CAD Archief BDZ Inv. Nr. 101, 320n Sqn ORB

The initial burial site is reported as Lanvève, Finistère, by J.P. Kloos in '320 Squadron Memorial', page 164. Source is a German list of burials, coded No. 188, R.H. 3272. Unfortunately, Mr. Kloos no longer has this document.

Source: Jan Kloos, 2/9/2005

A town or cemetery by the name of Lanvève does not seem to exist in France. This could be Lanverre, Finistère, according to a French list with Dutch casualties buried in France. Source: CAD-MvD 5.050.5220/300

We have been unable to find an exact match for that place name either. However, the Lanvéoc Cemetery South wall shows the same masonry pattern in a photograph taken shortly after the war of the Bakker crew graves, as in a photograph taken early 2006, see below. We have to assume that this is one of the many mixups of place names. The Bakker crew were buried initially close to the crash site, which was common practice during the War, the closest site being Lanvéoc Communal Cemetery.

Corporal air gunner Leendert Jonker received multiple serious injuries by Flak shell fragments. He flew with the Maas/Claassen/Pennock crew in Mitchell FR169 NO-L. Pilot Jan Maas managed to land the heavily damaged aircraft at Exeter. Cpl. Jonker's elbow joint was virtually shot off. That his arm could be saved was considered a miracle of surgery at the time.

Michael Bowyer has described events as follows:

'Twenty-four aircraft of 98 and 320 Squadrons were despatched to bomb the Brest/Lanvioc Poulmic airfield. All went well until 320 began to lead them in on the bomb run. To the surprise of 98's leader the Dutchmen were flying straight and level despite the Flak which was soon accurate. There was suddenly a tremendous flash as Sgt. C. J. Bank's machine received a direct hit. Then another, as Cdr. Bakker's Mitchell dis-integrated in a welter of fragments and flame. Roosenburg found that his hydraulics were out of action, instruments too, and that oil was streaming from his starboard engine. Worse, he had an arm wound. He managed to hold the aircraft level long enough for the bombs to be dropped. Soon after he found he had lost 3,000 feet, wrestled to regain control and steered for home alone. He skidded to a belly landing at Portreath.

The tremendous force of the explosions had thrown the aircraft of the leader, J. H. Maas, on to its back, then it too received a direct hit between the radio operator's position and the dorsal turret. At once the machine went into a dive from which recovery was miraculously made since the controls were badly damaged. The air gunner (this is Leendert Jonker) had been seriously wounded and was given immediate first aid. Then all movable gear was taken to the rear of the Mitchell until trim was adjusted. Crippled, it staggered back to Exeter for an excellent landing despite two tyres punctured and extensive structural damage. There was a major enquiry into what had gone wrong. It was the considered opinion of the survivors that the leader might have sooner begun evasive action, and that the second box was too close to the first. Nevertheless the raid was not a failure, for 98 Squadron had scored accurate bombing on ammunition stores, hangars and dispersals.'

Source: Michael J.F. Bowyer, 2 group R.A.F. A Complete history, 1936-1945 Offensive Crescendo p. 336. The leader was Bakker, not Maas.

Actually the direct attack path, flying Southeast from the sea to the airbase, was the obvious one. No need to fly circles that would only announce to the enemy that an attack was imminent. This direct flight path led the attacking force over a fortress on a rock at the shore. This fortress was build by the French in 1878, and it still has a military function today. As evidenced by the strange combination of outer perimeter walls of mediaeval appearance, that enclose 20th Century concrete blocks with antennae. It was the obvious place for the Germans to locate anti-aircraft guns. But the presence of Flak guns here has not been confirmed. In any case, Flak batteries were all over the place, and six German Naval Flak batteries, each with four guns of 75 to 105mm caliber, covered the direct attack path, see map below. These batteries were part of the German air defence of 'Festung Brest' under Kapitän zur See Richter, with five Marine Flak Abteilungen totalling 17 batteries with four guns each, and four with 4 twin 105mm guns, in all one hundred guns.

The German Flak guns & gunners were good, meaning deadly accurate. They got a direct hit on Bakker's Mitchell FR178, with the bomb load still on board and armed. Even if Bakker flew at 13.000 ft, or almost 4 kilometers high. Evasive action might have helped to prevent this, but it would not have helped the bombing accuracy. The Bakker crew, and indeed all bomber crews in WW2, were caught in between the need for survival, meaning evasive action, and the urgency to get the job done, meaning flying straight and level whilst on the bombing run. We need to bear in mind that the Bakker aircraft crashed on the target, meaning that the aircraft was hit in the final stage of the bombing run. Author feels that the 'considered opinion' of the survivors could do with a reconsideration. Pilot Bakker may not have been reckless; he performed as ordered. His task was extremely risky by any means. The only evasion he could have flown in this stage of the attack would be to dive down. This he did not do.

This defence of Commander Bakker was presented to Mr. Jan Kloos, for scrutiny. He responded as follows:

Re-Bakker, ik heb natuurlijk een andere opinie; Bakker was pas bij de
Sqn en had zeer weinig ervaring. Daarom kregen wij een zekere Wing Co Lynn, een gekke Zuid-Afrikaan die enorm veel ervaring had en veel
gevlogen had, om onze mensen goed te trainen in de moeilijke kunst van
aanvallen wanneer je in de Flak zit. Ben een keer met hem gevlogen en verder verschillende ops onder zijn leiding en de man wist het verdomd
goed. Bakker heeft té lang op de bombing run gezeten, daar zijn allen
van overtuigd. Ik heb met verschillende van de jongens die op deze trip waren gesproken en het was een "suicide run". Je moet voor de trip al uitmaken wat je gaat aanvallen, hoe sterk verdedigd het is, enz... en alhoewel je geen evasive action kan uitvoeren kan je het in een vertikale plane doen en natuurlijk de run zo kort mogelijk maken. Dit is mijn opinie Rob. Ik heb genoeg gevlogen en soms een box van 6 geleid om te weten dat er verschillende tactics zijn.

Zoals eerder vermeld was 320 (op de Mitchell) zonder ervaring toen we van Lasham vlogen. De aanvalsroute ken ik niet maar die kan veranderd worden door de leider als hij het anders voelt. Bij de briefing kregen we 'vliegers en navigators' altijd alle mogelijke info met de gevaarlijke Flak zones. enz... Maar ik wou zeggen, als je een leider met ervaring hebt, die de zaak 'voelt'
dan kom je ver: voorbeeld: de beruchte aanval die we deden op een fabriek net buiten Caen in Normandie; dat was in een strongpoint door de duitsers gemaakt en de Schotse infantry stond er 500 m voor en kon niet verder. Wij hebben het plat gegooid (ik heb het verhaal) maar we zaten in het vuur
van ongeveer 30 x 88 mm en op een ideale hoogte voor dat soort vuurwerk. W/C. Lynn heeft ons daarin gebracht en we zijn er ZONDER een krasje uitgekomen ! Dit verhaal vind je in mijn boek op blz. 187. Gewoon een voorbeeld.

Translation:

Re-Bakker, I obviously have another opinion. Bakker had very recently joined the Squadron and he had very little experience. That's why we were given a certain Wing Co Lynn, a crazy South African who had flown a lot and who was vastly experienced, to train our people in the difficult art of attacking under Flak. I flew once with him, and several ops under his command, and he knew very well what he was doing. All agree that Bakker remained on the bombing run for too long. I have talked to several of the guys who participated in this attack, and it was called a "suicide run". Prior to take-off, you have to prepare target data, stength of defences, etc... Evasive action cannot be flown in the horizontal plane when on the final bombing run, but it can be flown in the vertical plane, and of course the bombing run can be made as short as possible. This is my opinion, Rob. I have flown quite enough, and have sometimes led a box of six, to know about the different tactics.

As mentioned before, 320 had no experience flying the Mitchell, when we flew from Lasham. I do not know the attack path, but this can be changed by the leader if he feels that he should do so. During the briefing, pilotos and navigators were always given all available information about dangerous Flak zones etc. My point is that, if you have an experienced leader, who "senses" the situation, then you will get far. Example: the notorious attack we did on a factory just outside of Caen in Normandy. A German stronghold checking the advance of Scottish infantry 500 meters from the factory. We flattened it (I hold a report on this attack) but we were in the fire of about thirty 88mm guns, and flying at an ideal altitude for that type of fireworks. W/C Lynn led us through this without a scratch! The story is recounted in my book on page 187. Just an example.

Source: J.P. Kloos, email 10/3/2006

Mr. Kloos introduces the concept of Flak evasion as an art, requiring skill that comes from experience and, almost, a sixth sense. Refer also to Chapter 3, Fatal crash causes, subchapter 5.

In all fairness, Commander Bakker had received a Flying Cross for 251 hours of combat experience. He had little experience with leading Mitchells into combat. As stated by Mr. Kloos, the entire 320 Squadron had just started to fly the Mitchell, and the raids for which it was used. It also needs to be remarked that 98 Squadron, led by W/C. Lynn in a 320 Squadron aircraft, led the attack. 320 Squadron attacked shortly afterwards. We assume that Commander Bakker followed the bombing run track of W/C. Lynn. It seemed the obvious thing to do, and we have no evidence that he did not. This means that the German Flak gunners were able to train their guns on the first group, making it easier to achieve hits on the second group. This could have been avoided if Commander Bakker had chosen a very different direction and height of attack. He could have, but he did not. It is all theory. When the Allies were flying their thousand bomber raids, Group Commanders were having less space to manoeuvre. If groups would develop, whilst in the target area, their own attack directions, they would increase the risk of collisions and of being bombed by the guys above. Massed attack reduced the opportunity to let individual art come into these lethal equations.

The Lanvéoc fortress, close to Lanvéoc-Poulmic airbase. The fortress, built 1878, is still an active facility for the French military. Lanvéoc-Poulmic 060125-9

Name

1. Bakker, Eduard (Eddy)

Rank

Hfd Off Vl 1kl, Pilot

Decorations

Vliegerkruis

Born

28/3/1909

Place

Rotterdam, NL

Squadron

RAF 320 (Dutch) Sqn Bomber Command

Ops/hr

Aircraft

Mitchell Mk. II B-25C FR178 NO-W "Nona"

Base

RAF Lasham, Hampshire, GB

Mission

Raid on Lanvéoc-Poulmic airfield; take-off 12.38h; time over target 14.30h

Status

KIA, aircraft shot down by enemy Flak

age

34

Killed

25/10/1943

Place

Lanvéoc-Poulmic Airfield, Finistère, France

Buried

Initially buried at Lanvéoc Cemetery, Finistère, south wall, grave 2 to 5. Grave relocated by OGS to Orry-la-Ville, grave C/1/9

Known to

OGS

yes

CWGC

no

Other crew

2. Sgt Vl Telegr MLD M. Bolk, Wop/Ag - KIA

3. Off Vl 2kl SD H.G. van Haaften, Copilot/Nav - KIA

4. Res 2Lt Wnr R.W.H. van Pelt, Ag - KIA

Remarks

Send from Java via USA to England to join the RAF. JAAB, Officer in Command of Fighter Training. He had become the 320 CO three weeks earlier. His wife & child arrived at base on the day that he was lost.

Vliegerkruis, 29/11/1941

Het gedurende meer dan een jaar deelnemen aan de operaties op verschillende vliegtuigen, waarbij 251 dag- en nacht vlieguren in oorlogsopdrachten werden volbracht en herhaaldelijk, in contact met den vijand, moed, initiatief en volharding werden betoond, waardoor op succesvolle wijze aan de oorlogvoering in de lucht werd deelgenomen.

GB arrival

22/5/1940 from France after he, in a group of 24 aircraft, mostly Fokker trainers, had escaped from Holland on 14/5/1940

Memorial

None known



Name

2. Bolk, Marinus

Rank

Sgt Vl Telegr MLD, Wop/Ag

Stb.Nr. 12156

Decorations

Vliegerkruis

Born

2/9/1913

Place

Rotterdam, NL

Squadron

RAF 320 (Dutch) Sqn Bomber Command

Ops/hr

Aircraft

Mitchell Mk. II B-25C FR178 NO-W

Base

RAF Lasham, Hampshire, GB

Mission

Raid on Lanvéoc-Poulmic airfield; take-off 12.38h; time over target 14.30h

Status

KIA, aircraft shot down by enemy Flak

age

30

Killed

25/10/1943

Place

Lanvéoc-Poulmic Airfield, Finistère, France

Buried

Initially buried at Lanvéoc Cemetery, Finistère, south wall, grave 2 to 5. Grave relocated by OGS to ereveld Grebbeberg, grave 8/17

Known to

OGS

yes

CWGC

no

Other crew

1. Hfd Off Vl 1kl E. Bakker, Pilot - KIA

3. Off Vl 2kl SD H.G. van Haaften, Copilot/Nav - KIA

4. Res 2Lt Wnr R.W.H. van Pelt, Ag - KIA

Remarks

Vliegerkruis, 28/5/1942

Het gedurende geruimen tijd op oorlogspatrouillevluchten van het 320e Squadron R.D.N.A.S. van Onzen Marine Luchtvaartdienst blijken geven van moed, bekwaamheid, volharding en plichtsbetrachting.

GB arrival

22/5/1940 from France after he, in a group of 24 aircraft, mostly Fokker trainers, had escaped from Holland on 14/5/1940

Memorial

None known


Name

3. Haaften, Herman Gerard van

Rank

Off Vl 2kl SD, Copilot/Nav

Stb.Nr. 20481

Decorations

None known

Born

28/9/1908

Place

's-Gravenhage, NL

Squadron

RAF 320 (Dutch) Sqn Bomber Command

Ops/hr

Aircraft

Mitchell Mk. II B-25C FR178 NO-W

Base

RAF Lasham, Hampshire, GB

Mission

Raid on Lanvéoc-Poulmic airfield; take-off 12.38h; time over target 14.30h

Status

KIA, aircraft shot down by enemy Flak

age

35

Killed

25/10/1943

Place

Lanvéoc-Poulmic Airfield, Finistère, France

Buried

Initially buried at Lanvéoc Cemetery, Finistère, south wall, grave 2 to 5. Grave relocated by OGS to ereveld Grebbeberg, grave 8/18

Known to

OGS

yes

CWGC

no

Other crew

1. Hfd Off Vl 1kl E. Bakker, Pilot - KIA

2. Sgt Vl Telegr MLD M. Bolk, Wop/Ag - KIA

4. Res 2Lt Wnr R.W.H. van Pelt, Ag - KIA

Remarks

GB arrival

Memorial

None known


Name

4. Pelt, Richard Willem Hubertus van

Rank

Res 2Lt Wnr, Ag

Decorations

None known

Born

8/7/1913

Place

Rotterdam, NL

Squadron

RAF 320 (Dutch) Sqn Bomber Command

Ops/hr

10/22

Aircraft

Mitchell Mk. II B-25C FR178 NO-W

Base

RAF Lasham, Hampshire, GB

Mission

Raid on Lanvéoc-Poulmic airfield; take-off 12.38h; time over target 14.30h

Status

KIA, aircraft shot down by enemy Flak

age

30

Killed

25/10/1943

Place

Lanvéoc-Poulmic Airfield, Finistère, France

Buried

Initially buried at Lanvéoc Cemetery, Finistère, south wall, grave 40/F/3. Grave relocated by OGS to Orry-la-Ville, grave C/1/8

Source: CAD-MvD 5.050.5220 map 81

Known to

OGS

yes

CWGC

no

Other crew

1. Hfd Off Vl 1kl E. Bakker, Pilot - KIA

2. Sgt Vl Telegr MLD M. Bolk, Wop/Ag - KIA

3. Off Vl 2kl SD H.G. van Haaften, Copilot/Nav - KIA

Remarks

R.W.H. van Pelt was married

GB arrival

Memorial

None known

'Lanvève' Cemetery, Finistère, France, south wall, initial burial site of the Bakker crew. It is evident that the crew members were identified at the time, and we have to assume that this was done by the Germans, who also produced these crosses. Lettering on the crosses is in German style. 'Lanvève' has to be a misspelling of Lanvéoc. Source: @St.M.Vl.P. 1939-50

South wall of Lanvéoc Cemetery, still holding the graves of 8 RAF airmen. One from Poland, a member of 2TAF, is buried to the left of this photograph. The masonry of the wall is quite the same as in the old photograph. Author considers this to be evidence that 'Lanvève', a place that does not exist in France, is a misspelling of Lanvéoc. Lanvéoc-Poulmic 060125-4

3. Crash site data


Map 41. Lanvéoc-Poulmic airfield, crash site of Mitchell FR178 (Bakker)

The crash took the lives of the four man crew on 25/10/1943. The red dots indicate the German Naval Flak positions in 1944, of the 3rd Marine Flak Brigade.

1 = Kertanguy, Lanvéoc, directly North of the airfield, 4 x 88mm of 2/804 MAFLA,

2 = headquarters of the 804 Marine Flak Abteilung, West of Lanvéoc,

3 = St. Jean, Lanvéoc, 2/231 MAFLA, 4 x 75mm,

4 = L'Ile Longue, Roscanvel, 1/803 MAFLA with four 105mm AA guns,

5 = Pointe des Espagnols, Roscanvel, 1/231 MAFLA with four 105mm guns,

6 = Pointe de Cornouaille, Roscanvel, 1/804 MAFLA with four 105mm guns, and

13 = Bot Sand, Lanvéoc, 1/803 MAFLA with four 88mm guns.

Any of these four-gun batteries may have fired the shot fatal to Mitchell FR178.

With thanks to Claude Helias for the Flak position data

Map 42. Lanvéoc-Poulmic target, Flak positions, and Lanvéoc cemetery

Map showing the target, hangars in the East of Lanvéoc-Poulmic airbase, the obvious attack flight path, and the position of German Flak at Kertanguy, directly North of the airfield. Also visible is Lanvéoc cemetery, in literature called Lanvève Cemetery, which does not exists. At the South wall of this cemetery eight RAF airmen remain buried. The Bakker crew was buried here initially.


Picture #1 taken during the Group 1 attack on 25/10/1943, from a 98 Squadron Mitchell. This first attack wave was led by W/C. Lynn, with navigator C. Waardenburg. The Kertanguy Flak battery is located above and left of the airfield perimeter road. But picture sharpness does not allow a positive identification of the Flak guns. Visibility was excellent, also for the Flak gunners. Source: Claude Helias


Picture #2, taken directly after #1, considering the development of the smoke plumes from the bomb explosions. These pictures confirm the attack direction sketched in a map above. The pattern of explosions is southwest of, and bordering, the target area with aircraft hangars. Mitchell FR178 was hit and disintegrated very shortly after this picture was taken. Source: Claude Helias


In November 1943 the RAF took this photograph of Lanvéoc-Poulmic Airfield. The hangars, targets for this attack, and the building at the dispersion place are intact. That building has received at least three very near misses, see the attack photo's above. Although ammo dumps were assumed to have blown up, the damage done to the enemy with the 25/10/1943 attack can only be called disappointing. This copy of the aerial photograph is not defined enough to see evidence of an aircraft crash. Fragments of the aircraft are likely to have scattered over a wide area. Source: Claude Helias

However, the aerial pictures below strongly suggest that the aircraft came down into the water, the Anse du Poulmic, the floatplane area, directly East of the Air Base.

This shot shows FR178 going down. We see the Eastern edge of Lanvéoc-Poulmic Airfield. Source: Reg Day Memorial Museum, Dunsfold, Surrey, GB

FR178 seems to be going down in the Anse du Poulmic, land side of the breakwater, where it meets the land. This is the floatplane harbour of the Poulmic Base. Source: Reg Day Memorial Museum, Dunsfold, Surrey, GB


Aerial view of Lanvéoc today. Source: Google Earth


Aerial view of the Base aéronavale Poulmic today. Source picture: http://frenchnavy.free.fr/naval_stations/Lanvéoc-p...


Les premiers gros travaux de construction de la base débutèrent en 1930.
Durant la seconde guerre mondiale, elle est aux mains des allemands et accueillera près de 190 avions ayant pour tâche la défense du port de Brest et les raids dirigés sur l'Angleterre. A la fin de la guerre, c'est une base détruite à 90% tant par les bombardiers alliés que par les sabotages effectués par les allemands à leur départ qui sera rendue à la Marine. A la fin de 1944, la décision est prise de réarmer la base aéronavale.

Source: http://membres.lycos.fr/airmil/lanveoc.htm

Claude Helias did research into this crash. He reports that the Lanvéoc register of deceased in 1943 does not hold the names of the Bakker crew. No trace of information about this crash has been found by local historians. Therefore it is assumed that Mitchell FR178 crashed within the boundaries of the Lanvéoc-Poulmic airfield. Claude Helias: "The site was off limits to French civilians and the Germans didn't care to give any details on the crew when they buried them".

Source: Claude Helias, 24/8/2005

Southwest end of the Lanvéoc-Poulmic runway. Parts of FR178 came down in this area. Lanvéoc-Poulmic 060525-8



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