PERSONAL STORIES FROM THE VIETNAM AIRWAR
The 1960's saw the tragedy of Vietnam unfold, with the US unleashing its full arsenal of air weapons and the North Vietnamese responding with advanced jets from the USSR, frequently flown by Russians, along with a formidabled array of surface to air defence missiles.
This is a call to action to get aircrew stories from this titanic struggle into the history books. We know something of the US experience but there is much left to tell, and we know almost nothing about the North Vietnamese, Russian and Chinese experience. And the Australian involvement is largely unknown.
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Following are links to sites that have valuable and interesting information on the Vietnam conflict. We have an effort underway to contact these sites to see if they have personal histories they can contribute to Aircrew Remembered. If you know of other sites we could contact, please let us know.
USAF PLANS AND OPERATIONS THE AIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM 1966 (u) by Jacob Van Staaveren USAF Historical Diyision Liaison Office January 1968 FOREWORD USAF Plans and Operations: The Air Campaign Against North Vietnam, 1966, is the seventh of a series of historical studies on the war in Southeast Asia prepared by the USAF Historical Division Liaison Office. The previous monographs covered plans, policies, and operations in the theater beginning in 1961. The current history reviews the political background and top level discussions leading to the renewed bombing campaign in early 1966, the restrictions still imposed on air operations, and the positions taken on them by the military chiefs. It discusses the various studies and events which led to the President's decision to strike at North Vietnam's oil storage facilities and the results of those mid-year attacks. It also examines the increasing effectiveness of enemy- air defenses and the continuing assessments of the air campaign under way at year's end. MAX ROSENBERG Chief USAF Historical Division Liaison Office (Material on this page is UNCLASSIFIED) NOTE Listed below are the code names programs, and aircraft cited in this study. Barrel Roll Initiated in December 1964, Barrel Roll missions were flown against troops, equipment and supplies provided by North Vietnam in support of the Communist-led Pathet Lao. Combat Beaver An air concept developed by the Air Staff in conjunction with the other services during September- November 1966. It was designed to support a proposed electronic and ground barrier system between North and South Vietnam. Flaming Dart The initial Navy and Air Force retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam on 7-8 and 11 February 1965. Gate Guard An air program designed to slow North Vietnamese infiltration toward the demilitarized zone. It began on I May 1966 in the northern part of Laos and then shifted into route package area I in North Vietnam. Iron Hand Operations begun in August 1965 to locate and destroy Soviet-provided SA-2 missile sites in North Vietnam. Rolling Thunder The major air campaign begun on 2 March 1965 which inaugurated regularly scheduled air strikes against North Vietnam. Steel Tiger Initiated in April 1965, Stee1 Tiger strikes were made against infiltration routes south of the 11th parallel in Laos. Tally-Ho An air interdiction program started on 20 June 1966 in the southern part of North Vietnam, aimed at slowing the infiltration of North Vietnamese troops, equipment, and supplies through the demilitarized zone into South Vietnam. Tiger Hound Begun in December 1965, these strikes were aimed at infiltration targets in southern Laos. They featured for the first time in Laos the use of forward air controllers and airborne comrnand and control for certain strikes. Wild Weasel USAF aircraft, largely F-100Frs and F-105Frs, specially equipped with electronic and other devices to neutralize or destroy Soviet-provi.ded SA-2 sites in North Vietnam. FOREWORD NOTE CONTENTS Air Operations in May: Beginning of Gate Guard I. OBJECTIVES OF THE AIR WAR AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM. . I Background to Rolling Thunder 1 The Air Force and JCS Urge Early Renewed Bombing 4 Secretary McNamara's Views 7 The Bombing Resumes and Further Air Planning g iNCREASING THE AIR PRESSURE ON NORTH VIETNAM 14 Air Operations and Analyses 14 The Beginning of Rolling Thunder Program 50 The Rolling Thunder Study of 6 April. 22 Air Operations in May 25 Highlights of June Operations .27 THE POL STRIKES AND NEW ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM 5I . 29 Background of the POL Air Strikes. . 29 The Strikes of 29 June . 3 I The Mid-1966 Assessment . 33 The Beginning of Rolling Thunder Program 5l . . . 35 The Tally-Ho Air Campaign . . . 38 IV. ANALYSES OF THE AIR CAMPAIGN . Operational Studies . 43 The Effectiveness of Air Power . . 45 Studies on Aircraft Attrition " 49 The Hise Report. . . Sz Secretary McNamarats Proposal to Reduce Aircraft Attrition . b6 V. THE AIR WAR AT YEAR'S END " 58 Approval of Rolling Thunder Program 52 . bg The Furor over Air Strikes on Hanoi . 60 Other Air Operations in Novernber and December. . . " . 62 Assessment of Enemy Air Defenses . . . " 63 Assessments of the Air War Against North Vietnam " 6? NOTES . .72 APPENDICES . .82 Appendix I - U.S. and VNAF Attack Sorties in Southeast Asia " 82 Appendix 2 - B-52 Sorties in Southeast Asia , 82 Appendix 3 - U.S. and VNAF Attack Sorties in North Vietnam . 83 Appendix 4 - U. S. Aircraft Losses in Southeast Asia " 84 Appendix 5 - USAF Combat Attrition in North Vietnam . 85 Appendix 6 - U. S. Aircraft Losses to SA-2's . 85 Appendix ? - SA-2 Sites in North Vietnam . 86 Appendix 8 - Light and Medium Antiaircraft Artillery Guns in North Vietnam. . 86 Appendix I - U"S. Aircraft Losses in Aerial Combat . 87 Appendix 10 - North Vietnamese Aircraft Losses ln Aerial Combat . . 87 GLOSSARY MAP Route Package Areas, North Vietnam CHART Chronology of the Growth of North Vietnamrs Air Defenses . " I. OBJECTIVES OF THE AIR WAR AGAINST NQRTH VIETNAM From its inception, the out-of-country air campaign in Southeast Asia, that is, against targets in North Vietnam and Laos, was limited in scope and objective. The first air strikes against North Vietnam were conducted'onr 5 August 1964 by Navy aircraft in retaliation for Communist attacks on U. S. ships in the Gulf of Tonkin. The next ones occurred on 7-8 and 11 February 1965 when USAF and Navy aircraft flew "Flaming Dart I and II missions in retaliation for Viet Cong assaults on U. S. military bases in South Vietnam. These were followed by an air program against selected North Vietnamese targets in order to exert, slowly and progressively, more military pressure on the Hanoi regime. Designated "Rolling Thunder, " it began on 2 March 1965. As explained by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, the air attacks had.three main purposes: raise South Vietnamese morale, reduce the infiltration of men and supplies to South Vietnam and increase its cost, and force the Communists at some point to the negotiating table. Background to Rolling Thunder The Rolling Thunder program was basically a USAF-Navy air effort but included occasional token sorties by the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF). Adm. U. S. Grant Sharp, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), Honolulu, exercised operational control through the commanders of the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), the Seventh Fleet, and the Military Assistance, Command, Vietnam (MACV). Coordination control was assigned to the PACAF commander with the tacit understandingthat it wouldbe further delegatedto Maj. Gen. JosephH. Moore, Jr., * For highlights of the air war against North Vietnam and Laos prior to 1966, see Jacob Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and Policies in South Vietnam and Laos, (AFCHO, 1964), and USAF Plan commander of the 2d Air Division (predecessor of the Seventh Air Force) in South Vietnam. Both the Air Staff and the PACAF commander considered this arrangernent inefficient, believing that air assets in Southeast Asia, with few ! exceptions, should be under the control of a single Air Force commander. (m+ft With the air program carefully circumscribed, the North Vietnamese initially enjoyed extensive sanctuarj-es. These included the Hanoi- Haiphong area and the northeastern and northwestern portions of the country closest to China. Targets were selected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) after cOnsidering the recomrnendations of Admiral Sharp and the MACV commander, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the decisions being based on intelligence from the war theater and in Washington. The Secretary of Defense reviewed the recommendations and then submitted them to the President for 2 final approval. Special targeting committees performed this vital task. (Sr€Ff) Rolling Thunder at first was characterized by individually approved air strikes but, as the campaign progressed, the high authorities approved one- and two-week target ttpackagestt in advance and also gradually expanded the bombing area. In August 1965 they narrowed North Vietnamrs sanctuaries to a 30-nautical mile radius of Hanoi, a l0-nautical mile ladius of Haiphong, a Zl-nautieal mile "buffer" near the Chinese border extending from the coast to longitude I06c E. and a 30-nautical mile buffer from longitude 106" E. westward to the Laos border. By early September armed reconnaissance sorties had reached a rate of about 600 perweek and did not ri.se above thib figure during the remainder of the year. There was a reduction in the number of fixed targets that could be hit * *nd ,to extension of the bombing area. Poor weather contributed to the static sortie rate after September. 3 SePtember was not reduced. ROUTE PACKAGE AREAS NORTH VIEINAM 22 Apr 66 ffi ffi COMMUNIST ,f -.... .Ar".,. l,{t'''^'' * ^j i.l.' {uo c^l \--",.*. ] fIt--., '1-r-\, ,l----t .z'r lt\\ l\ I THATLAND I I RP-I Defined os thot Areo Extending North frm th€ DMZ to o line cmmencing on the cost ot f 7-52N, 106'27E, olmg ond ircluding rqrte |08 to its junction of routes |95 ond 15, due wesi to the Lootion Sorder. RP-2 Thot oreo extending North.from the Nqthern boundory of RP-l to o line beginning ot the Lootion border 3 NM Northwest of route 8, thencle 3 NM Nqth ond West of rante 8, Eostword to luncticr with route | | 3, thence 3 NM Norfh of route I l3 Eortword to th€ c@sl. RP-3 Thot oreo extending North hm the Northern bondory of BP-2 to o line conmencing ot the Lsotion border 3 NM South of Rote | 18, thence 3 NM Soth of Route.l 18 Eostword to lunction with Rote 15, ihence 3 NM West of Rote 15 Southword to luncticr wifh Rote 701 , ihence 3 NM South of Route 701 Eostword to the coost. RP-4 Thot ors extending North frorn the Nsthern bondory of RP-3 to loiitude 20-31 N. RP-5 Thot oreo Nqth of lotitude 20-31N ond West of longitude 105-20E extending westerly olmg the Lootion border to the CHICOM bcder, thence nctherly ond eosterly olong the CHICOM border tq 105-20E. t RP-6 Thot oreo North of lotitude 20-31 N ond Eost of longitude 105-20E extending northeosterly to the CHICOM border. This ro.ute pockogo is further divided by o line cmmencing ot 20-31 N/|05-20E ond lunning northeosterly to Honoi thence olmg'lfid ioiflllre porolleling Route lA to the CHICOM bqder. The oreo to the West of this line is designofed RP-6A. Ihe oreo io the Eost of this line is designoted RP-68. THAI NCUY:N Source: USAF fu1gt Summary, 22 Apr 66 t" &,. (H;fl In Novernber Ig65 there was an important change in bombing procedure whenAdmiral Sharp, at the Navy's request, divided North vietnam into six principal 'rroute packages. " Each included lines of communication (LOC's) and other targets suitable for armed reconnaissance strikes and were to be assigned to the Air Force or Navy for a two-week period, the duration of specific Rolling Thunder programs at that time. (Service air strikes against fixed JCS-numbered targets were excepted'and took precedence over armed reconnaissance operations. ) Starting I0 December, the Air Force began armed reconnaissance flights in route packages II, rv, and v, and the Navy in route packages I and III. o G"rr.""I Moore, commander of the 2d Air Division, was dissatisfied with this split system of air responsi.bility. He felt it continuec to forfeit the advantages of centralized air control under which the complementing capabilities of Air Force and Navy aircraft could be better coordinated.4 (u) on 24 December rg6b the Ameri.cans began a two-day christmas bombing pause in the air campaign against the North which eventually grew into a 37-day moratorium as the U. S. government made a major effort to find a basis for negotiating an end to the war. The limited bombing of targets in Laos and the air and ground war in south vietnam continued, however. D The Air Force and JCS Urge Early Renewed Bornbing l|#) Both the Air staff and the usAF chief of Staff, Gen. John p. Mcconnell, were deeply troubled by the bombing moratorium. Testifying before Senate committees early in January 1g66, General McConnell observed that it enabled Hanoi to move men, supplies, and equipment around the clock and to restore its lines of communication. A delay in resuming attacks could. ed until April 1966. See p 21. 3" prove costly in lives. Concerned about the relative ineffectivenes€ 'of the*965 bombing effort, he favored removing political restraints on the use of air power to allow heavier strikes before a major U. S. and allied force buildup, then under consideration by the administration, was approved. He thought that the military effort against North Vietnarn should have a priority equal to that 6 given by the administration to the war in the South. (ff461 Other service chiefs supported General McConnellrs recommendations to resume and intensify the bombing of the North. On 8 Jarmary 1966 they informed Secretary McNamara that the bombing pause was greatly weakening the U. S. negotiating "leverage" and proving advantageous to Hanoi, permitting it Jo reconstitute its forces and continue infiltration through Laos into South Vietnam. They recommended renewed bombing 48 hours'5?fbi*'a Soviet delegation, then in Hanoi, returned to Moscow. Concerned about a possible Communist rnisinterpretation of U. S. resolve, the Joint Chiefs wanted 7 to insure that any peace negotiations were pursued from a position of strength. {-rC!+ After a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analysis eonfirmed that the 1965 bombings had failed to halt the resupply of Communist forces, the JCS prepared another recommendation for Secretary McNamara. On 18 January it urged, again in accordanee with General McConnellts view, that the bombing moratorium end with a "sharp'b16'itrr'b'frcllowed by expanded air operations throughout the North. It suggested reducing the ttsanctuarytt areas to a lO-nautical-mile radius of Hanoi and Phuc Yen airfield, a 4-nautical mile radius of Haiphong, and a 20-nautical-mile "buffer" zone in the northeast and northwest areas near the Chinese border. The JCS also called for closing the major seaports (by mining) and removing other political restraints B against striking i.mportant targets. (If|{!-lt On 25 January, in answer to a query from Secretary McNamara, the JCS proposed three alternate ways to resume the bombing. One would use all Thai-based USAF aircraft and planes from three Navy carriers, flying 450 sorties per day f.or 72 hours, hitting all land and water targets (vehicles, ferries, pontoon bridges, etc. ) outside of the sanctuary areas. The second would use the same aircraft flying armed reconnaissance against all LOC and petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) targets for 24 to 72 hours with fol:loWon attacks in accordance with the first alternative. The third called for 600 armed reconnaissance sorties per week in southern North Vietnam with the ternpo being increased until the target program recommended on 18 January q was reached. (+ATt€ In addition to their proposals to renew the bombing, the Joint Chiefs examined ways to improve air activity. They sent Admiral Sharp guidance on making more effective air strikes against watercraft on inland waterways in the North. Until the bombing halt, more watercraft had been observed as air attacks on the road and rail network had forced the North Vietnam.esF to rel,y increasingly on water transportation. The Joint Chiefs concluded that better air-delivered rnines should be developed and asked the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) to give special attention to this matter. 10 ({t+GF3) The JCS also examined the problem of elosing down the l24-mile rail link between Hanoi and Lao Cai. This and the Hanoi Dong Dang line were the two principat rail arteries to the Chinese border. Secretary McNamara had expressed surprise that the Hanoi-Lao Cai segment was still in service despite repeated air strikes by USAF aircraft before the bombing pause. On22 January, the JCS chairman, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler responded that there were two reasons why it remained open: frequent aborts because of weather during ffi December 1965 -- amounting to 37 percent of the planned sorties that month -- and the arrival of Chinese railway engineering personnel that substantially augmented the North Vietnamese repair capability. To keep the line elosed, said General Wheeler, wouLd require the destruction of three bridges, at least 100 armed reconnaissance sorties per week, and the use of reliable, Iong-delay bomb fuzes and seismic fuze antirailroad mines, both still under I1 development. Secretary McNamarar s Views (U) The administration moved cautiously toward a decision cn whether to renew the bornbing of the North. On 19 January Secretary McNamara informed the Joint Chiefs that their views on this matter were under constant study by the State Department. On the 26th, in a summation of the 1965 Rolling Thunder program, the Defense Secretary told a House subco- mittee:I2 It was clearly recognized that this pressure, by itself, woul-d not ever be sufficient to cause North Vietnam to move toward negotiation unless it were accompanied by military action in South Vietnam that proved to the North that they could not win there. These were our objectives then; they are our objectives now. A corollary of these objectives is the avoidance of unnecessary military risk. We, therefore, have directed the bombing against the military targets, primarily routes of infiltration. + We have not bombed Hanoi, we have not bombed Haiphong. We have not bombed certain petroleum suppli.es which are important. We have not mined the Haiphong port. We have gradually evolved from last February to mid-December, a target system that included all of North Vietnam except certain specified locations. The targets were very carefully chosen and the rate at which the bombing prograrn grew was very carefully controlled, all for the purpose of trying to achieve our limited objective without widening the confU.ct. (U) It was also Secretary McNarnarats "strong personal opinion" that the war in South Vietnam could not be won solely by bombing the North and that the northern air campaign should be essentially a Itsupplement" to military action in the South. 13 (al6|r{prfFAlthough the air warwas carefully limited, the Defense Secretary informed the President that it had already achieved the objective of rai.sing the cost of infiltration. Air attacks had reduced the amount of enemy supplies reaching the South, carried mostly by trucks over greatly improved routes, from about 400 to 200 tons per day. Moreo.rer, they had diverted 50,000 to 100,000 personnel to air defense and repair work, hampered the rnobility of the populace, forced decentralization of government activities thus creating rnore inefficiency and political risk, and reduced North Vietnamrs activities in Laos. (.lfl.q!r+' For 1966, Secretary McNamara thought that the bombing "at a minimum" should include 4,000 attack sorties per month consisting of day and night armed reconnaissance against rail and road targets and POL storage sites except in cities and the buffer zone near the Chinese border. He proposed more intense bombing of targets in Laos, along the Bassac and Mekong rivers running into South Vietnarn from Cambodia, and better surveillance of the sea approaches. In the South there should be rnore harassment of enemy LOC's and destruction of his bases. ({-€4IFtt Recognizing that estimates of enemy needs and capabilities and the results of air action "could be wrong by a factor of two either way, " the Secretary advised the President that unless studies under way indicated otherwise, heavier bombing probably would not put a tigirt ceiling on the enemyrs activities in South Vietnam. However, he thought it upuld reduce the ftow of Communist supplies and limit the enemy's flexibility to undertake frequent offensive action or to defend himself adequately against U. S. , allied, nse and repair crews varied widely during 1966. See pp 34, 47, and 69. NTOF*EOTEF and South Vietnarnese troops. Mr. McNamara suggested two pcssible byproducts of the bombing effort: it should help to eondition Hanoi toward negotiation and an acceptable end to the war and it would maintain the morale of the South Vietnamese arrned forces. The defense chief also outlined for the President the 1966 military objectivds fof*S€ruth *14 Vietnam. The Bombing Resumes and Further Air Planning (U) Having received no aceeptable response from Hanoi to his peace overtures, President Johnson on 31 January ordered resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam. It began the same day. "Our air strikes. from the beginning, t' the President announced, "have been aimed at military targets and controlled with great care. Those who direct and supply the aggression have no claim to immunity from military reply. " other officials told newsmen that the United States would continue to limit bombing of the North but intensify other aspects of the war, includingmore use of B-52 bombers and ground 'rtillery in South Vietnam. I5 {neff) As antieipated, the bombing moratorium had in fact benefited the North Vietnamese. USAF reconnaissance revealed that supplies had moved by truck and rail 24 hours per day and that repairs and new "orrli.r.r"rri on the road and rail net likewise had proceeded on a ttround-the-clockt'basis. General McConne1l believed that the moratorium had permitted the North to between President Johnson, and South vietnamese Prime Minister, Nguyen cao Ky at Honolulu from 6 to 8 February. They agreed to try to: (i) raise the casualty rate of Viet Cong- North Vietnamese forces to a level equal to their capability to put new men in the field; (2) increase the areas denied to the Comrnunists from 10 to 20 percent to 40to 50 percent; (3) increase the population in secure areas from 50 to 60 percent; (4) pacify four high-priority areas containing the following population: Da Nang, 387,000; Qui Nhon, 650,000; Hoa Hao, 800,000, and Saigon, 3, 500,00O; (5) increase from 30 to 50 percent the roads and rail lines open for use; and (6) insure the defense of all military bases, political and population centers, and food-producing areas under the control of the Saigon government. IO strengthen its antiaircraft defenses, including expansion of its SA-2 system from about 50 to 60 sites. Admiral Sharp reported the enemy had deployed about 40 more air defense positions in the northwest rail line area and 26 l6 more guns to protect routes south of Vinh. (*€{ft? When the aerial attacks resumed as Rolling Thunder program 48, allied air strength in South Vietnam and Thailand consisted of about 689 U. S. and I25 Vietnamese Air Force tactical combat aircraft. * tor" would aruive in subsequent months. The limitations placed on the renewed bombing effort disappointed the Joint Chiefs, especially since none of their recomrnendations had been accepted, In fact, the program was more restrictive than before the bombing pause. Armed reconnaissance during February was limited to 300 sorties per day and almost solely to the four route package areas south of Hanoi. Only one JCS target, Dien Bien Phu airfield, was hit several times, Poor weather forced the cancellation of many strikes and others were diverted to targets in Laos. A Pacific Command (PACOM) assessment indicated that the renewed air effort was producing few important results as compared to those attained during 1965 against trucks, railroad rolling 17 '?: '# stock, and watercraft. tE5#) Meanwhile, the bombing policy remained under intensive review. At the request of Secretary McNamara, General Wheeler on I February asked the service chiefs to establish a joint study group which would exarnine again the Rolling Thunder program and produce data that could serve as a basis for future JCS recommendations. They quickly organized the group under the Ieadership of Brig. Gen. Jammie M. Philpott, Director of Intelligence, x The number of U. S. tactical combat aircraft by service were: Air Force, 355; Navy (three carri.ers), 209; and Marine Corps, 125. In addition the Air Force had 30 B-52rs in Guam. (North Vietnam possessed about ?5 MIG's. ) 1l Strategic Air Command (SAC). Its report was not issued until April. * 18 (ff#fi On 8 February, following a three-week conference of service officials in Honolulu to plan U. S. and allied air and ground deploy.rnentsthrough fiscal year 1968, AdrniraL Sharp and his staff bri.efed Secretary McNamara on the results of their deliberations. They proposed a program of stepped up air attacks in the North and in Laos with the immediate goal of destroying Communist resources contributing to the aggression, and of harassing, disrupting, and impeding the movement of men and materiel. Admiral Sharp advocated 7, 100 combat sorties per month for the North and 3, 000 per month for the Solrth. 19 (gS{F*) Secretary McNamara did not immediately respond to these sor.tie proposals. However, he approved, with certain modifications, CINCPAC's recomrnended schedule for additional air and ground forces. These deployments promised to strain severely the resources of the services, especially those of the Air Force and the Army. Coneerned abqrt,theinimpact on the Air Forcers ttroles and missions,rl 1e1"" structure, overall posture, and research and development needs, Lt. Gen. H. T. Wheless, Assistant Vice Chief of Staff on 18 February directed Headquarters USAFTs Operations Analysis Office to undertake. a trvigorous" analysis and asked all Air Staff offices to support the effort. Its major purpose was to develop a more comprehen-' 20 sive data base on the use of air power in Southeast Asia. {:#ff Because of the decision to deploy more forces and the likelihood of stepped up air and ground operations, General McConnell decided a number of organizational changes were necessary. He directed the Air Staff to replace the 2nd Air Division with a numbered Air Force, upgrade the * See P 22. 1' commander of the Thirteenth Air Force in the Philippines to three-star rank, *2L and formalize USAF-Army airlift arrangements in the theater. '' :'r' -q 1ffi4|' With the air campaign continuing at a low tempo, the JCS, with Air Staff support, reaffirmed its prior recommendation to Secretary McNamara for accelerated air operations against the North and to stri.ke all targets stilL under administration wraps. If this could not be approved, the JCS urged extending operations at least to the previously authorized areas. The Joint Chiefs \Marned that if more remunerative targets could not be hit to compensate for the handicaps imposed by operational restraints, more air sorties should be flown elsewhere. They also raised their estimated sortie requirernent for the nort[ern campaign from 7, 100 to 7,400 perarronth,..citing Admiral Sharp's newly acquired intelligence which confirmed additional enemy deployments of SA-2 missiles and possible Chinese antiaircraft artillery units 22 in the northeast region. (egr€ltl Secretary McNamara i.nforrned the JCS that the political atmosphere was not favorable for implementing these recommendations, Some Air Staff members attributed the administrationts cautiousness to the Senate Foreign Relations Cornrnittee hearings on the riqar, v/hich began 4 February under the chairmanship of Senator J. William Fulbright. In addition, the Defense Secretary was known to believe that there were limitations to what air power could do in the type of war being waged in Southeast Asia. Mr. McNamara thought that even the obliteration of North Vietnam would not corrpletelyoend that countryts support of enemy operations in the South since most of the arms and arnmunition came from other Communist nations. He firmly believed * See Van Staaveren, 1966, p 40. 13 23 that the war would have to be won on the ground in South Vietnam, (U) Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown echoed this administration position position, asserting publicly on 25 February that tfie'destmction of the Northrs remaini.ng industrial capacity would neither prevent the resupply of equipment and troops in the South nor end hostilities. He also said:24 . should it appear that we were trying to destroy North Vietnam, the prospect of escalation by the other side would increase, and with it would increase the possibility of heavier U. S. casualties and an even harder and longer war . our objective is not to destroy North Vietnam. It is to stop aggression against South Vietnam at the lowest feasible cost in lives and property. We should take the course that is most likely to bring a satisfactory outcome . " at a comparately low risk and low cost to ourselves. Our course is to apply increasing pressure in South Vietnam both by ground and supporting air attacks; to make it clear to the North Vietnamese and Vi.et Cong forces , . that life is going tq get more difficult for them that war is expensive and dangerous. (U) Thus, for the time being, the JCS-recommended program for an accelerated air eampaign against North Vietnam had no chanee of receiving administration approval. t' ! L4 O TOF€EOffEI II. INCREASING THE AIR PRESSURE ON NORTH VIETNAM {ffff) On 1 March the JCS generally enCorsed Admiral Sharprs "Case I" air, ground,. and naval deployment program leading to steppedup operations against the Communists in North and South Vietnam and Laos. It also recornmended again that the war be fought in accordance with the Concept for Vietnam paper which it had approved on 27 August 1965 and later amenCed. This paper called for air strikes against the Northrs warsupporting industries in the Hanoi-Haiphong area, aerial mining of the ports, additional interdiction of inland and coastal waterways, and special air and ground operations in Laos -- all recommended many times in various ways. But administration authorities continued to favor a more modest air effort against the Hanoi regime. Air Operations and Analyses The new Rolling Thunder program -- number 49 -- was ushered in on 1 March. It was still limited to armed reconnaissance of the North but the admi.nistration had broadened the authorized attack area to include coastal regions and had eased restrictions to permit the use of air power up to the level existing when bombing ceased on 24 December 1965. The Air Force and Navy were allocated a total of 5, 100 armed reconnaissance sorties (and 3, 000 for Laos), with the number to be flown by each contingent on weather and other operational factors. Poor weather, however, limited their sorties to 4,491 during the month. The Air Force concentrated its efforts against targets in route packages I, III, and VIA, the Navy in route x Case I called for deployment of a total of 413,557 U.S. personnel in South Vietnam by the end of calendar year 1966. 15 packages II and IV and against coastal targets in route package I through IV. The VNAF flew token sorties in route package I under the protection of U. S. Marine Corps electronic and escort aircraft. On 10 March the JCS again pressed for its proposed accelerated air program vfith-eanly attacks on POL sites, the main rail system running from Chi.na, and the mining of deep water ports. Again the recommendation was not acted 2 upon. (il5r€?f) Meanwhile, the North's air defense system began to pose a greater threat to USAF and Navy operations. On 3 March photo reconnaissance aircraft discovered about 25 MIG-21 fuselage crates at Phuc Yen airfield near Hanoi. USAF " Big Eye" EC-121D aircraft also detected airborne MIGts about 55 times during March, although there were no engagernents. Admiral Sharp directed the PACAF and Seventh Fleet. commanders to prepare for counter-air operations and the SAC commander to submit a plan for a B-52 strike, if necessary, against Phuc Yen and Kep airfields. He asked for additional electronically equipped USAF EB-66 aircraft to reduce the effectiveness of the SA-2 missiles and the antiaircraft guns. t'Jamming" was thought to have already reduced the use- 3 fulness of enemy air defenses, t "'"'', ({FHTFT) Aircraft losses to enemy ground fire continued to cause rnuch concern. A Joint Staff study of the problern during March showed that 199 American aircraft had been lost over North Vietnam since the bombings began on 7 February 1965, sixteen of them by SA-2 missiles. mrnended striking the North's airfields on 10 Augrst 1964 and the JCS sent its first recommendation to do so on 14 November 1964. By 1 March 1966 the JCS had made a total of Il such recommendations but the administration had approved strikes on on1.y three small airfields at Vinh, Dong Hoi, and Dien Bien Phu in May 1965, June 1965, and February 196f. respectively. l6 The aircraft loss rate was six times higher in the northeast, the most heavil defended area,than in the rest of North Vietnam.Headquarters USAF estimated *4 the Northrs antiaircraft strength at 2,525 guns. To improve its analysis of aircraft losses and other operational data, the Air Staff on 26 March established an ad hoc study group in the Directorate of Operations. In the same month the Chief of Operations Analysis, in response to General Whelesst directive of l7 February, completed an initial study on the effectiveness of air interdiction in Southeaet,Asia;. It summarized the enemy's supply requirements, his capability to transport supplies by land or sea, and the extent air strikes had hampered such activities. One conclusion was that air attacks had not yet decreased the movement of men and supplies from the North through Laos to South Vietnam. They had, however, infLicted about $15 to 916 million direct and g8 million indirect damage on the Northrs economy and forced Hanoi to recruit 30,000 more personnel, in addition to local forces, to perform repair work. An analysis of one route from Vinh to Muang Phine suggested that air attacks had caused the Communists to increase their truck inventorv by one-third and their transport time by two-thirds. 5 {:ff) Another Operations Analysis interdiction study listed enemy targets destroyed or damaged in North Vietnam and Laos thrtugh March 1966 as follows: * Estimates of North Vietnamrs antiaircraft gun inventory varied considerably during 1966. See Admiral Sharp's estimate of July,p 34,the Seventh Air Forcers estimate for January and December 1966, p 64, and a final estimate, app 8. L7 Transportation Vehicles LOC Network * Counter-Air * ++ All Other Total North Vietnam Dam TotaI 2,500 4,3O7 4,381 4,927 1 89 323 4,196 7,877 11, 266 17,164 Laos Des Dam Total ft:"-' 't 515 485 1,000 398 4,886 5,284 L45 67 I 45 2,783 1,259 3,99? 3,841 6,697 LO,426 Des l, 537 546 I34 3,68I 5,898 €rfls Concerning the Communist effort to fill craters and repair roads damaged by air attacks, there were indications that only one man-day of direct productive effort per attack sortie was needed to perform this task. "At this rate, " the Operations Analysis study observed, rra few hundred sorties t. ,. , per day would only make enough work for a few hundred men.rl (fr€FS) As for Communist supplies, the study estimated that in 1965 they averaged 5I tons per day across the North Vietnamese-Laos border and L6 tons per day acnoss the Laos-South Vietnamese border. For 1966 (through March), the figures were ?0 and 35 tons respectively. The Laos panhandle infiltration routes in themselves appeared to be capable, despite air attacks, of supporting the current low-level cornbat by Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces. To support a higher combat level, for example, one day in seven, the Communi.sts would have to use other supply channels or dip into South Vietnamese stockpiles, either of which would complicate their distribution problems. x Included bridges, road cuts, rail cuts, ferry ships. -l-.:*. * i4 + Included aircraft, runways, antiaircraft sites, SA-2 sites, and radar sites. ++ Included buildings, POL tanks, power plants, locks and dams. (G ffi 18 tffrapll Concurrently, there was planning for the next Rolling Thunder program. In meetings with General Wheeler on 21 and 23 March, Secretary McNamara set forth certain guidelines for stepping up air strikes in the northeast and hitting additional JCS targets. The Joint Chiefs quickly responded by proposing Rolling Thunder program 50. It called for launching 900 attack sorties against major lines of comrnunication and striking nine POL storage areas, six bridges, one iron and steel plant, one early warning and ground control intercept (EW/cCI) site, and one cement pi"t, inJ r*ra." in Haiphong. Admiral Sharp planned to conduct this program within an allocation of 8, 100 sorties (5, 100 for North Vietnam, 3, 000 for Laos), 7 (5r€;f) Administration authoriti.es approved this program, which began on 1 April. For the first time in 1966 armed reconnaissance was authorized over the far northeast and four new JCS targets (a11 rail anO fri.glway'iridges) were cleared for interdiction. However, some time before program 50 ended on 9 July, permission to strike the other JCS-recommended targets was withdrawn. Dissatisfied wi.th the restri.ctions, General McConneLl and the Marine Corps chief jointly advised the JCS that "sound military judgment" dictated that all the targets be hit immediately. Higher administration officials withheld consent, however, principally because of the unstable South Vietnamese political situation vrhich developed after the ruling juntats ouster on 10 March of Lt. Gen. Nguyen Chanh Thi, the I Corps .o*rrr"rrd"r.8 FS) Poor weather in April again limited the number of attack sorties flown against the North and delayed until 5 May the completion of strikes against the four authorized JCS targets. Other air operations included armed reconnaissance against roads, rail lines, watercraft and similar LOC .$.,i'i:l l. :;il . ;i t:il i:{i.{.: n rrd{1:i1,r..." 11.11 ffi l I0P{F8ftEfr tar:gets. April also saw severaL important developments: establishment of the Seventh Air Force, the first B-52 strike in North Vietnatn', a rnanked step-up i.n Hanoits air defense effort that resulted in a U. S. downing of the first MIG-21, a change in the command and contiol of route package I, and the beginning of a study on increasing air pressure to offset civil disturbances in South Vietnam.9 (Wl The establishment of the Seventh Air Force, effective B April, followed General McConnellrs successful efforts to raise the stature of the major USAF operational command in the theater. General fVfSbl'e cffrtinued to serve as its chief with no change in his relationship with other commanders. Also, in accordance with General McConnellts wishes, the commander of the Thirteenth Air Force in the Philippines was raised to three-star rank on 10 1 July. (If+D SAC made the first B-52 strike against the North on 12 April when 30 bombers dropped 7,000 tons of 750- and 1,000-pound bombs on a road segment of Mugia Fass near the Laotian border. It was believed to be the single greatest air attack on a target since WmldWar II. Initial reports indicated that "route 15" had been "definitely closed" by a lar{dslide"ts had been hoped; however, 26 ll2 hours later reconnaissance photos showed all the craters filled i.n and the road appeared serviceable, attesting to the quick repair capability of the North Vietnamese. A second strike by 15 B-52's on 26 April on a road segment six kilorneters north of Mugia blocked the road for only 18 hours. The apparent inability of the B-52rs to close down the road -- expressed by the Secretary of State and other officials -- and a Seventh Air Force report of an SA-2 site near Mugia, prompted Admiral Sharp on 30 April to recommend'to the JCS no further attacks on the pass. t9 20 rffi In fact, the bombers were not again used near North Vietnam until 30 J,rty. * 1l (S#fowards the end of April Hanoi stepped up its air defense activity, dispatching 29 to 3l MIG's against USAF and Navy aircraft. In nine separate engagements in five days, six MIG's were destrijyed, all by USAF F-4C's which suffered no losses. The first MIG-21 was downed on 26 April by two F-4C's. Antiaircraft fire continued to account for most American aircraft combat losses with 31 dovrned (14 USAF, l?,Navy),.while 12 two -- an F-102 and a Navy A-lH -- were struck by SA-2 missiles. (I5d[ff) Meanwhile, a change in command and eontrol of air operations in route package I followed a meeting on 28 March between Admiral Sharp and the JCS. The PACOM commander recommended that General Westmorelandrs request for partial operational eontrol of this area be approved and that the sector be accorded the same priority as for South Vietnam and Laotian "Tiger Houndrt air operations. General Westmorelapd urgently desired more air power to hit enemy approaches to the battlefield area near the Demllitarized Zone (DMZ) for which he was responsible. Admiral Sharp thought that 3, 500 sorties a month was warranted alone for route p".k.g. I.18 (CrFe) USAF eommanders and the Air Staff objected to the proposed change, feeling that MACVTs command authority should be limited to South Vietnam. They believed that the PACAF commander should remain the sole coordinating authority for the Rolling Thunder program. Nevertheless, Secretary McNamara approved the change on14 April and the JCS endorsed it on the 20th. To allay any doubts where he thought the war's emphasis should be, the defense chief said that air operations north of route package I could be carri.ed out only if they did not penalize air operations in the * See p 40. rtfP-sfonFr. ffi "extended battlefield, " that is, in South Vietnam, the Tiger Hound area of Laos, and route package area I. Under this change Admiral Sharp still retained partial operational control of route package I. General Westmoreland's authority was limited to armed photo reconnaissance and intelligence analysis of Rolling Thunder and "Iron Hand" operations. Simultaneously, the Air Force-lrlayy rotational bombing procedure in other route packages, in effect since late 1966, also ended. * 14 GfS4e) The civil disturbances and reduced U. S. and allied military activity in both South and North Vietnam that followed General Thi's disf Inissal prompted the Joint Staf f on 14 ApriL to recommend a step-up in the attacks in accordance with the JCS proposals of 18 Januar! .* It " thought this might help arrest the deteriorating situation. A special Joint Staff study of the problem also examined the possibility that a government coming to power in Saigon might wish to end the war and ask U. S. and allied 15 forces to leave. (5A€Fl) The Air Staff generally supported the Joint Staff's recommendation for an intensified air offensive against the North and withdrawal of U. S. forces if a local fait accompli left the United State*,and, itsnallies no choice. But the Army's Chief of Staff doubted that heavier air strikes could resolve the political situation in South Vietnam. Observi.ng that Admiral Sharp already possessed authority to execute some of the recommended strikes, he opposed sending the Joint Staff's study to Secretary McNamara on the grounds that if U.S. strategy \,eas to be reevaluated it should be by separate action. General McConnell suggested, and the JCS agreed, to consider alternate ways of withdrawing part or all of the U. S. x See p4. + See p 18. 2L . itO?fioifl.* 22 .m forces from South Vietnam should this be necessary. Reviews were begun but in subsequent weeks, after political stability was gradually restored, the need to consider withdrawal action lessened and no final decisions were 16 taken. The Rolling Thunder Study of 6 April (U) April also witnessed the completion of the special joint report on the Rolling Thunder program requested by Secretary McNamara in February. 6 Prepared under the direction of General Philpott, it rvas baBed on all data available in Washi.ngton plus information collected by staff members who visited PACOM, MACV, the 2d Air Division, and the Seventh Fleet. (ryref*f Completed on 6 April, the Philpott report reviewed the results of one year of Rolling Thunder operations (2 March 1965-2 March f966). Duringthis period U.S. and VNAF aircraft had flown about 45,000 combat and 20, 000 combat support sorti.es, damaging or destroying 6,100 "fixed" targets (bridges, ferry facilities, military barraeks, supply depots, ete. ), and 3, 400 trmobile" targets (trucks, railroad rolling stock, and water"craft). American combat losses totaled about 185 aircraft. (rur5pq The report touched briefly on Laos where the air effort consisted primarily of armed reconnaissance in two principal areas designated as "Barrel Roll'r and t'Steel Tiser. " It noted that the effectiveness of USAF strikes in Laos was limitea l.]*u"" of small fixed targets, high jungle growth, and mountainous terrain that hampered target location and identification. AIso, important targets were normally transitory and had to be confirrned carefully before they could be attacked. The operations in North Vietnam and Laos, said the report: * see pp 10-11. 23 . have achieved a degree of success within the p/tirarneters of imposed restrictions. However, the restricted scope of operations, the restraints and piecemealing effort, have degraded program effectiveness to a level well below the optimum' Because of tNs, the enemy has reeeived war-supporting rnateriel frorn external sources, through routes of ingress, which for the most part have been immune from attack, and has dispersed and stored this rnateriel in politically assured sanctuaries. . . 'Although air operations caused significant disruption prior to the standdown, there has been an increase in the North Vietnamese logistic infiltration program, indicating a much greater requirement for supplies in South Vietnam. JJJ5rJrpal Of a total of 236 "JCS numbered" targets in North Vi'etnam, I34 had been struck, i.ncluding 42 bridges. Among the 102 untoughed targets, 90 were in the northeast area and, of these, 70 were |n the sanctuary zones of Hanoi, Haiphong, and the "buffert' territory near China. Elsel' . ;:, .rrl where il the North 86 percent of the JCS targets had been hlt. The report further asserted: The less than optimum air campaign, and the uninterrupted receipt of supplies from Russi.a, Chi.na, satellite countries, and certain elements of the free world have undoubtedly contributed to Hanoi's belief in ultimate victory. Therefore . . the Study Group considers it essentiat that the air campaign be redirected against specific target systems, eritical to the capability and important to the will of North Vietnam to continue aggression and support insurgency. (Isrfrf ) It consequently proposed a three-phase strategy. In Phase I, over a period of four to six weeks, the United States would dxpirna the armed reconnaisSance effort over the North except for the sanctuary areas and again attack previously struck JCS-numbered targets in the northeast. Air units also would strike 11 more JCS-numbered bridges, and the Thai NgUyen railroad yards and shopS; perform armed reconnaissance over Kep airfi.eld; strike 30 more JCS*numbered targets, 14 headquarters/barracks, four ammunition and two supply depots, f ive POL storage areas, one airfield, two naval bases, and one radar site. 24 t#eFt? In Phase II, a period of somewhat less duration than Phase I, American aircraft would attack 12 military and war-supporting targets within the reduced sanctuary areas, consisting of two bridges, three POL storage areas, two railroad shops and yards, three supply and storage depots, one machine tool plant, and one airfield. During Phase III all remaining JCSnumbered targets (now totaling 43)wou1d be attacked, including six bridges, seven ports and naval bases, six industrial p1-ants, seven locks, 10 thermal/ hydroelectric plants, the headquarters of the North Vietnamese rninistries of national and air defense, and specified railroad, supply, radio, and transformer stations. (fll#) Concurrent with this program, the study group proposed three attack options that could be executed at any time: Option A, strike the Haiphong POL center; Option B, mine the channel approaches to Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha; and Option C, strike four jet airfields -- at Phuc Yen, Hanoi, and Haiphong. Finally, it proposed that Admiral Sharp should deterrnine when to hit the targets in each of the three phases, the weight of the air attacks, and the tactics to be employ.d. l7 ^, .- (CtEltt) General Wheeler, who was briefed on the report on 9 April, called it a ttfine professional approach, t' a ttgood job, rr and endorsed it, The rnanner in which it should be sent to Secretary McNamara created difficulties, however. General McConnell suggested that the Joint Staff prepare ttpositivett recommendations for the implementation of the reportts air program, stating that if this vrere not done, it would not receive the attention it deserved. But strong ser.vice support was lacking for that approach. An agreement eventually was reached to send the report to 25 secretary McNamara with the Joint chiefs "noting" it. They advised him it was fu1ly responsive to his request, was in consonance with the JCS recommendations of 18 January 1966, and would be useful in considering future I8 recommendations of the Rolling Thunder program. Air Operatiolq in May: BegiffiilLg oL "cate d;;rdi, * (U) The Rolling Thunder study had no immediate impact on air operations. In fact, Secretary Brown on 22 May publicly affirmed the administrationrs decision not to expand significantly attacks on new targets. He said such action would not cut off infiltration but would raise the danger of a 'wlqer *19 war. F++ Thus the authorized level of 5, 100 sorties for North Vietnam rernained unchanged in May and only a few important attacks on fixed targets were approved. The principal operation was against seven targets within the Yen Bai logistic center which were struck by T0 uJ;F "oiti"" . Monsoon weather again plagued the air campaign, causing the cancellation of.2,972 USAF-Navy sorties or about 32 percent of those scheduled. usAF 20 sortie cancellations amounted to 40 percent. €6rG!t) Heavier North Vietnamese infiltrati.on toward the DMZ as indicated by more truck sightings led to a change in tactics. Beginning on I May, a special air effort called "Gate Guard" was initiated in the northern part of the steel Tiger area in Laos and then shifted into route package I when the monsoons hit the Laotian region, utilizing many of the I'integrated interdiction'r tactics developed in Laos earlier in the year, Gate Guard involved stepped-up air strikes on a series of routes or "belts " x Not stated by Secretary Brown was the fact that civil disturbances in South Vietnam triggered by the dismissal of General Thi on 10 March still prompted the administration not to risk escalation of the war at this time. See p18. 26 . +0P'$teflfi[r running east to west. Many special USAF aircraft were used: C-i30 airborne command and control centers, C-130 flare aircraft, EB-66rs for ECM, and RF-lOlrs. Attack aircraft interdicted selected points in da;rtime and destroyed 2l "fleeting targets" at night. tt5's-€44ll During the month there were few MIG sightings and only one was destroyed. Heavy antiaircraft fire accounted for most of the 20 U. S. aircraft (13 USAF, six Navy, one Marine) that were downed. USAF losses included seven F-105's in the northeast. The enerny's ground fire, General McConnell informed a Senate subcommittee during the month, was "the only thing we are not able to cope with . . " whereas the SA-2's -- which were deployed at about 103 sites ---had destroyed only five USAF lnd two !{avy aircraft. The SA-2rs were countered by decoys, jamming techniques, and evasive aircraft tr"ti"". * 22 (fl€€F3) During May the Air Staff began a study effort to establish requirements for a suitable, night, all-weather aircraft interdiction system using the latest munitions, sensors, and guidance equipment to provide an "aerial blockade" against infiltrating men and supplies. This followed an expression of frustration by high State Department and WhitE.House_gfficials in late April about the inability of air power to halt these movements into the South. As part of this study, the Air Staff solicited the views of PACAF, SAC, and other commands, advising them of the need for a solution wi.thin existing bombing restraints. Recommendations to t'strike the sor.u'ce" of Communist supplies, they were informed, were politically unacceptable and likely to remain "o, " x Air Force confidence in the value of anti-SA-2 operations was challenged in a Seventh Fleet study, dated 1.2 July 1966 and based on SA-2 USAF and Navy firing reports. It asserted that the value of ECM and ,other jamming techniques was uncertain as aircraft with deception devices normally sought to evade the missiles when fired upon. For General Harrist view, see pp 53-54. 27 (3*Cf#In a joint reply on 24 N'{ay, the commanders-in-chief of PACAF and SAC, Generals Hunter Hamis, Jr. and John D. Ryan, pointed to improved results from air operations in route package I and in parts of Laos. They said that interdiction could become even more effective by greater use of airdelivered mines (against ferries), "deniall' munitions with deil.ayed.f.uaes insuring "longevity" up to 30 days, around-t'he-ctock air strikes on selected routes south of Vinh, special strikes against Mugia Pass, and improved airground activity in Laos, They also proposed the use of low-volatile chemicalbiological agents to contaminate terrain and surface bursts gf nucle,nq weapons. The latter would trdramatically" create t'barrierstr in areas difficult to bypass. To implement these measures, General Harris again stressed the need for centralized control of air resources, asserting it should be a I'high priority'r Air Force objective. But most of these suggestions could not or would not be implemented in the immediate flrt.r.". 24 Highlights of June Operations €3+€t June witnessed another step-up in air activity over North Vietnam, the major highlight being USAF-Navy strikes, beginning 2l June, against previously exempt POL storage sites and culminating in major POL strikes in Hanoi and Haiphong on the 29th. (See details in Chapter III. ) tE0{F0) Other targets continued to be hit, such as the Hanoi-Lao Cai and Hanoi-Dong Dang rail lines, but most USAF sorties concentrated on route package I targets which absorbed about 93 percent of the total flown in the North that month. These strikes reflected the importance General Westmoreland placed on curbing the flow of enemy troops and supplies toward and into the DMZ, Gate Guard targets were hit hard and, after the introduction of USAF MSQ-77 "Skyspot" radars for greater bombing 28 x accuracy, the infiLtration ttgatestt were ttguardedtt virtually'around the clock. About 97 percent of the Navy effort was concentrated along the coast in route packages II, UI, and IV. The VNAF flew 266 sorties in route 25 package I, its highest total against the North in 12 months. (IS*l*t The Gate Guard campaign seemed to confirm the vaLue of night air attacks. By 7 JuIy the nightime missions had achieved better results than those in da5rtime, 164 trucks being destroyed and 265 damaged 26 compared with the da5rtirne toll of 154 destroyed and 126 damaged. (flS# Despite these successes, Gate Guard operations faced certain handicaps. During dayiight hours USAF 0-I forward air control (FAC) aircraft -- used to support U.S. strikes -- were highly vulnerable to the heavy ground fire and, when forced to f1y higher, became less effective. AIso, interdiction points, often on flat terrain, were easy to repair or by-pass. And the North Vietnarnese could store and service their trucks in numerous small villages, secure in the knowledge that U. S. aircraft would not attack civilian areas. Events finally overtook the Gate Guard effort. Corrtinued infiltration through the DMZ pro*pi"a ge"O] quarters MACV to develop a t'Ta1ly-Ho" air program -- a more ambitious effort to block, if possible, a large-sca1e invasion by North Vietnamese troops through the DMZ into South Vietnam's northernmost provinc.r." * The initial MSQ-?7 radar was plaeed at Bien Hoa, South Vietnam on I April 1966, and the second one at Pleiku in May. With the installation of the third and fourth radars at Nakhon Phanorn, Thailand and Dong Ha, South Vietnam on 3 and 12 June, respectively, the system could be used for air strikes in route package I. A fifth radar was placed at Dalat, South Vietnam on 26 September. The MSQ-,77 was an MSQ-35 bomb-scoring radar converted into a bomb-directing radar with a range of 200 nautical miles. 29 ttl. THE PoL sTRIKES AND RoLLING THUNppn pnocnAnn rt €-e".drds indicated, the highlight of the aipwar -- and of the Rolling Thunder program since its inception -- were the POL strikes in June 1966. General McConnell and the other service chiefs had long urged the destruction of North Vietnam's major POL sites but the administration did not seri.ously consider attacking them until March. Background of the POL Air Strikes {ssraFri Some months before, in December 1965, a cIA study had concluded that the destruction of the North's POL facilities would substantially increase Hanoi's logistic problems by requiring alternate import and distributing channels and the use of more rail cars, drums, and other storage & ..,a, items. CIA analysts recognized that the North Vietnamese probalrly anti - cipated such attacks and that the POL facilities near Haiphong, a major port city, politically were sensitive targets. Assessing the consequences of a POL air campaign, they further concluded it would (1) not change Hanoirs policy either toward negotiation or tourard sharply entering the war; (2) probably result in more Soviet pressure on theregime to negotiate;(3) force Hanoi to agk for and receive more supply and transport aid from China and air defense aid from the Soviet Union; (4) aggravate Soviet-Chinese relations, and (5) cause further deterioration of U. S. -Soviet relations, especially if a Soviet ship were hi.t. Soviet counteraction was thought possible and might ..4 take the form of attacks on U.S. ferrett aircraft or interference with U.S. access to West Berlin. Chinese Commrnist intervention in the v/ar, while possible, was considered unlikely. 30 (Irer#l| In March another CIA study predicted that the destruction of POL sites (and a cement plant in Haiphong) would severely strain the Northrs transportation system. It was one of the most influential doctrtn€nts to bear on the subject. On 23 March Secretary McNamara informed General Wheeler that a new RoIIing'Ihunder program directed against POL storage and distribution targets might be favorably received. On 25 Apil, Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance assured the JCS that its 1965 POL studies were now receiving full consideration. On 6 May, a White House aide, Walt W. Rostow, reealling the impact of oil strikes on Germany in World War II, suggested to the Secretaries of State and Defense that systematic and sustained bombing of POL targets might have more prompt and decisive results on Hanoits x2 transportation system than conventional intelligence indicated, (flFEflt On 31 May -- although a final decisionto hit the major facilities had not been made -- Admiral Sharp was authorized to attack certain POLassociated targets in the northeast aLong with five small route targets. On 6 June General Westmoreland advised CINCPAC that an improving political situation in South Vietnam (since civil disturbances began on 10 March) was causing Hanoi much disappointment and dismay. Noting this circumstance and the heavy toll inflicted by the air campaign over North Vietnam and Laos, he recommended that these psychological and military gains be rrparl,ayed into dividends" by hitting the POL storage sites. To do so later, he warned, would 3 be less effective because of dispersal work already under way. (!trFCFlt Support continued to build up. Admiral Sharp quickly endorsed General Westmorelandrs views and, on 8 June, the U. S. Ambassador I Mr. Rostow observed that in 1965 U.S. estimates showed that 60 percent of the Northts POL was for military purposes and 40 percent for civilian needs. The current ratio was now placed at 80 and 20 percent, respectively. ffi. to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge suggested that intensified bombing was the most effective way to get Hanoi to the negotiating table. General McConnell, who had long supported such action, told a Senate subcommittee that hitting POL targets woul.d have a "substantial" effect on the amount of supplies the Communists corrld send to their forces in South Vietnarn. An Air Staff intelligence report asserted that hitting the sites would harre rla.mq€t prof ound " impact on Hanoits infiltration activities and expressed confidence it could be done vrithout causing severe civilian casualties.4 The Strikes of 29 June The administration now moved'toward its decision. In a preliminary action, the JCS on 16 June authorized Admir'al Sharp to hit aII of the POL dispersal sites listed in the curuent Rolling Thunder program except those within a 30-nautical-mile radius of Hanoi, a l0-nautical-mile radius of Haiphong, and 25 nautical miles from the Chinese border east of longitude 105o 2ct E. and 30 nautical miles west of longitude tos* zo' n. on 21 June USAF jets struck gasoLi.ne and oil depot sites ranging from 28 to 40 miles from Hanoi. Several other sites, previously exempt from attack, were hit in ensuing days outside the Hanoi-Haiphong "."*. " tffi3) In addition, extraordinary steps were taken to prepare for the attacks on POL targets in the two main cities of North Vietnam. On 23 June, after Seeretary McNarnara and General Wheeler had informed President Johnson of their precautionary rneasuru"o ,o avoid attacks on ci.vilian areas ffiwrx usfiT pliots most experienced with operations in the target areas,weather conditions permitting visual target identification, avoiding to the extent possible populated areas,minimum pilot distraction to improve delivery accuracy, use of munitions assuring highest precision consistent with mission objeetives, attacks on air defenses only in sparsely populated areas, special security precarrtions concerning the proposed operations, and person\l attention by commanders to the operations. 31 rffi' 32 and foreign merchant ships, the JCS authorized Admiral Sharp to strike early on the 24th seven POL storage facitities and a radar site at Kep, northeast of Hanoi. Although special security precautions surrounded the planning, the news media soon reported the essential details of the operation. This forced 6 the administration to postpone it and deny any decision had been made. (if:€Fat The strike was rescheduled and took place on 29 June. A USAF force of 24 F-I05's, 8 F-105 "Iron Handts", 4 EB-66's plus 24 F-4Crs and 2 F-104rs for MIG """p" and escort hit a 32-tank farm about three-and-a-half miles from Hanoi. Approximately 95 percent of the target area, comprising about 20 percent of the Northts oil storage facilities, was damaged or destroyed' l" .,. simultaneously, Navy A-4 and A-6 aircraft hit a large POL storage area two miles northwest of Haiphong. This facility, containing an estimated 40 percent of the Northts fuel storage capacity and 95 percent of its unloading equipment, was about B0 percent destroyed. One USAF F-I05 was lost to ground fire. Four MIG-l?'s challenged the raiders and one was probably shot down by an Iron Hand F-105. No sA-2 missiles rvere observed. Maj' Gen. Gilbert L. Myers, deputy comrnander of the Seventh Air Force termed the raids t'the most signifieant, the most important strike of the war' " Secretary McNamara subsequently called the USAF-Navy strike "a superb professional job, " although he was highly incensed over the security leaks that preledea tfie I attacks. (u) In a press conference the next day, the defense chief said the strikes were made ltto counter a mounting reli.ance by North Vietnam on the use of trucks and powered junks to facilitate the infiltration of men and equipment from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. " He explained that truck movements in the first five months of 1966 had doubled, and that daily supply tonnage and 33 troop infiItration over the "Ho Chi Minh trail" were up 150 percent and I20 percent, respectively, over 1965. Further, the enemy had built new roads and its truck inventory by December 1966 was expected to be double that of January 1965. This would require a 50- to 70-percent increase in oil imports over 1965. The Secretary also justified the timing of the strikes, asserting that the "perishablet' nature of POL targets made it more desirable to attaek them now than earlier in the ,""t. t (alfl{prf' President Johnson said that the air strikes ontbitritarytargets in North Vietnam I'will continue to impose a growing burden and a high price on those who wage war against the freedom of others. " He directed that in the forthcoming weeks first priority be given to "strangling" the remainder of Hanoits POL system except for that portion in areas still exempt from air attack. He also wanted more bombing of the two main rail lines running between Hanoi and China.9 The Mid-1966 Assessment (flfi€dJ Shortly after the 29 June POL strikes, another maior conference took place in Honolulu to review the war and plan additional U. S. and allied air, ground, and naval deployments. A mid-year assessment of the war, contained in a letter from Admiral Sharp to the JCS and the Office tr* ,.": .:.- . .u1.;a of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), was expanded in briefings for Mr. MeNamara in Honolulu on 8 July. The PACOM commander said that he considered the air program for North Vietnam still inadequate, observing that previous recommendations to hit major ports of entry, logistic targets leading from China, and certain POL sites (in addition to those struck on 29 June) had not been approved. He thought it impossible to prevent the enemy from moving supplies from North to South and thus to "isolate the battlefield"; rather, the "highest 34 Truck Parks Military Storage Facilities POL Military Installations Transshipment Points TotaI 1 Jan 66 1 Jul 66 55 126 31 6 696 38 180 680 939 -td5?3 - 65 2:b63 task" was route interdiction and strikirg new targets as they were uncovered. Recent intelligence showed that the air campaign was hurting Hanoi. Its repair and reconstruction force now totaled about 500,000 and the morale of the government and troops was declining. To raise the cost of infiltration, he proposed striking as soon as possible 33 important exempted targets and rnore of the enemyrs supplies, road and rail repair centers, and military IO training areas. (Hp-+l Admiral Sharp pointed to Hanoirs greater effor"t to hide and disperse its logistic supplies because of the air attacks. As a result there was greater U.S. effort inthe first six months of the year to uncover more of the following types of targets: Total New Targets L2L 380 142 259 DD -6fr- The table showed an increase of g0 percent in significant targets since I January 1966 with the major portion consisting of truck parks, military storage facilities, and transshipment points. tflCO) During the first half of the yeaqAdmiral Sharp continued, Rolling Thunder strikes had destroyed or damaged 1,076 trueks, 900 pieces of rolling stock, and 3,304 watercraft. A total of 2,771 trucks were destroyed or damaged in Laos. Discussing the Northts air defense system, he said that Hanoi's antiaircraft gun inventory had increased from about 859 in February 1965 (when the bombings began) to more than 4, 200T an average increase of about 205 guns per month. The North also possessed 20 to 25 35 active SA-2 battalions, good early warning, ground control interception tt equipmentrand a respectable MIG force. {g*U In reply, Secretary McNamara reported that President Johnson had accorded first priority to 'rstrangulation" of the Northts POL system' Thus, it was essential to determine Hanoits land and sea distribution system, categorize the targets, and then render them ineffective. The Secretary also pointed out the need for increased interdiction of railroad lineqIpar:tiqlrlarly bridges i.n the northeast and northwest leading to China. Expressing concern over U. S. aircraft attrition, he said OSD was working with the services on ways 12 to reduce it. The Beginning Rolling Thunder Program 5I spsal The stra.ngulation campaign was incorporated into a new Rolling Thunder program -- number 51. It was authorizedbythe JCS on 6 July and went into effect on the 9th. Armed reconnaissance could now encompass all of North Vietnam except for the established sanctuary areas (i. e., a 30-nautical-mile radius of Hanoi, a I0-nautical-mile radius of Haiphong, and 25 to 30-nautical-mile buffer area adjacent to China). Admiral Sharp assigned PACAF specific responsibility for halting all rail traffic in the northeast and northwest sectors. In addition, the JCS on 9 July authorized an increase in attack sorties for North Vietnam and Laos from 8, I00 to 10, 100 13 per month. (51t6;r|pBecause of the high priority assigned to the strangulation effort -- and in response also to Secretary McNamarats direction -- the Air Staff on 16 July established anOperationgombat Strangler task force headed by Maj' Gen' Woodrow P. Swancutt, Director of Operations, Headquarters USAF. Its immediate objective was to evaluate POL strangulation and LOC interdiction plans 36 prepared by the seventh Air Force and pACAF. sirnultaneously, the Air Staff established an Operations Review Group within the Directorate of Operations under col. LeRoy J. Manor, an enlarged and reorganize&,suceesfor to * the ad hoc study group formed on 26 March 1965. It examined the effeetiveness of combat and combat support operations in southeast A.sia as well as the activities of USAF worldwide operational fo.""".14 (gf#fi Under Rolting Thunder program 51, USAF aircraft intially concentrated on route packages I, V, and.VIA and the Navy on the others. Then on 20 July, at the direction of General westmoreland, the Air Force inaugurated a "Tally-Hot' air campaign in route package I in a renewed effort, somewhat similar to Gate Guard, to curb Comrnunist infiltration into and through the DMZ. AIso, on 6 August at General westmoreland's'request and by the decision of Admiral Sharp, the "Dixie station" aircraft carrier used for air operations in south vietnam was moved to ttyankee Station, tt thereby providing three rather than two carriers for the stepped up air activities against the North. Another important change was an agreement between the Seventh Air Force and Seventh Fleet commanders whereby the former would provide about 1, 5c0 sorties per month in the normally Navy-dominated route packages II, III, and IV. The Air Staff and General Harris considered the arrangement better than the relatively rigid deli.neation of service air responsibility for the North that had existed previously. Although the agreement took effect on 4 September , restrictions on air operations ""Ur"'o1':rr.poite 15'r prevented its full .""lir*tiorrl+ 15 x See p 16. + By September USAF aircraft generally were covering 46,265 square miles or 77 percent of the land area of North Vietnam. 'Ihe Navy, by comparison, was coverlng 13,891 square miles or about 2g percent of the land area. ++ The restrictions were eased in December 1966. 37 (flfrCf*ffhe immediate priority, of course, was given to POL sites. The campaign increased in momentum until the week of 13-19 August when 140 attack sorties were flown against POL targets. Thereafter the sortie rate dropped. By the end of August an estimated 68 percent of known POL storage capacity in route paekages I, V, and VI had been destroyed. On 19 September the remaining POL capaeity in the North was plbced at.,pbout 69,650 metric tons, of which 18,526 metric tons urere not yet authorized 16 for destruction. (fl€rGF€) By the end of September it was apparent that the POL strikes were becoming less productive. There had been no let-up in Soviet deliveries of POL supplies and the North Vietnamese continued their dispersal efforts. Supported by Combat Strangler analyses, PACAF considered the benefits derived frorn attacking the scattered sites no longer worth the cost in aircraft lost. In a report to Secretary Brown on 14 October, PACAF stated that the POL campaign had reached the point of diminishing returns and that the Soviet Union and China could adequately supply the North wifh PQL products. Also, U. S. air power could best force changes in POL handling and distribution by striking targets listed in Rolling Thunder program 52 proposed by the JCS on 22 August. * tnr" would constitute, PACAF fel.t, the best kind of ttstrategic persuasiont' before Hanoi could devise counterm."",r".",l7 {f{|pr$ The railroad strangulation effort, particularly against the Hanoi- Lao Cai and the Hanoi-Dong Dang lines running to China and located in route packages V and VI A, was not especially productive because of bad weather and the ability of the North Vietnarnese to .repair the lines quickly. In fact, rt This program called for 872 sorties over 19 new targets. *ffi $':||Frn .t 38 PACAF beli.eved it was virtually impossible to maintain an effective.4ir program against them. Weather problems in the two route packages forced the cancellation or diversion of about ?0 and 81 percent of the attack sorties scheduled for July and August, respectively. The weather improved in 18 September but turned poor again in October. (f:{l!l*) Enemy antiaircraft defense, including additional SA-2rs also added to the difficulty in interdicting the two main rail lines. As American aircraft losses rose, Admiral Sharp on 20 September ordered a reduction of about one-third of the air strikes in route package VIA until rneasures could be devised to reduce the tol]. For example, on 7 AugUst anti.aircraft guns knocked down seven U.S. aircraft (six USAF, one Navy ), tfre highest oneday total since 13 August 1965 when six were shot down. American combat losses in the North during the third quarter of the year were: 4l in July, 37 in August, and 26 in September. Eighty of these were USAF aircraft. In 19 October combat losses declined to 23, only nine of them USAF. (eApr+1 MIG pilots also became increasingly aggressive. Fifteen "incidents" i.n July resulted in two MIG-21's and one MIG-17 being shot down against the loss of one USAF F-105 and one Navy F-8. During an engagement on ? July, two MIG-2]rs for the firsttime inthe war fired air-to-air missiles against two F-105's but failed to score. Another milestone in the air war oecurred on 21 September when the biggest air-to-air'battle ., to date was fought over the North. In seven separate encounters USAF pilots downed two MIG-I?'s, probably a third, and damaged a MIG-21 without 20 suffering any losses. The Tally-Ho_Campaign (!FFt In terms of total sorties flown, the largest portion of the USAF effort, as in previous months, was concentrated in route package I ' T0P€E0fl[:h .ffi which included the DMZ, the area of the greatest enemy threat. Intelligence believed that about 5,000 North Vietnamese had infiltrated through the zone in June. PACAF speculated that these enemy movements rnay have been due to the recent success of Tiger Hound air operations in Laos which, together with monsoon weather, had virtually blocked certain logistic routes in that 2l country. fiffrpedite procurement of an antiradiation missile, develop betterl,,warneed$ using the implosion principle, ernploy beacons to aid in finding SA-2 emitters, provide VHF/UHF homing capabilities for Wi.ld Weasel aircraft, and improve data exchange between the Rome Air Development Center and Southeast Asia operational activities. l7 {9fftfl The Air Staff generally agreed with Admiral Sharprs recommendations. The JCS also concurred and directed General McConnell to procure and deploy adequate numbers of anti-SA-2 devices and equipment. The Joint Chiefs were still undecided at the end of the year whether to recommend ffi.. 'ffi to Secretary McNamara an all-out campaign against the SA-2's in the iml8 mediate future. Assessments of the Air War Against North Viltnam rjilsrhD As 1966 ended, General McConnell and the Air Staff remained convinced that greater use of air power, especially in North Vietnam, was the only alternative to a long, costly war of attrition. They also thought it would make unnecessary the massive buildup of U. S. and allied ground forces still under way. Although the combined air and ground effort in Southeast Asia had prevented a Communist takeover of South Vietnam, one Air Staff assessment found no significant trend toward the attainment of other 19 U. S. objectives in that country. 4W Within the JCS General McConnell continued to support recommendations to reduce operational restrictions and expand target coverage in the North. The level of air effort was less than he desired, but he believed air power had shown how it could be tailored to the geography of a country and, by the selection of weapons and mode of air attack, be responsive to political and psychoLogical considerations. In some instances, it was clear, the Vietnam experience ran counter to conventional ai.r power concepts. As he had observed in May, t'tactical bombingtr in South Vietnam was being conducted in part by "stralegic" B-52 bombers pnd "strategictt bombing of the North was being conducted largely by rrtactical bombers". 20 (U) Any evaluation of the effect of air power, especially in the North, ti"r. .*a had to consider political factors which limited military activity. To deal with this circumstance, General McConnell offered the following dictum: "Since air power, like our other military forces, serves a political objective, it is also subject to political restraints. Therefore, we must qualify any 67 68 assessments of air powerts effectiveness on the basis of limitations that govern its applicatiorr. " 21 Ff!* General Ha*is, the PACAF commander, singled out three principal factors hampering the air campaign against North Vietnam: poLitical t. restraints and geographical sanctuaries that precluded striking more lucrative targets, poor weather for prolonged periods of time, and Hanoirs ability to repair and reconstruct damaged target areas. With respect to the last, PACAF officials acknowledged the North Vietnamese had t'exceptionaltr recuperative capabilities to counter air attacks on trucks, rolling stock, and the lines of communications. They had built road and rail by-passes and bridges in minimum time, dispersed POL by using pack animals, human porters and watercraft, and developed an effective air defense system. Infil. tration through the DMZ, Laos, and Cambodia was pt"""A'"t Z, OOilto 9,000 men per month, * and the enemy logistic systern was supporting an estimated 128,000 combat and combat support personnel with out-of-country resources. General Harris thought that an important t'lesson learnedtt was that the gradual, drawn-out air campaign had created very little psychological impact on Hanoits leaders and the populace. He also continued to believe (as did the Air Staff and other Air Force comrnanders in Southeast Asia) that control of air operations in the North -- as well as in Laos and South Vi.etnarn -- was too fragmented and should be centralized under a single air 22 comrnander. (f,5r€7r8) Admiral Sharp's view of the air carnpaign against the North in 1966 was that little had been accomplished in preventi.ng external assistance to the enemy. Except for the June strikes on POL targets in Haiphong * MACV and DIA eventually estimated that about 81,000 North Vietnamese entered South Vietnam in 1966. The infiltration rate was high in the first half and dropped sharply in the second half of the year. . i$ffifffif, (which handled 85 percent of the North's imports during the year), the port was almost undisturbed. Of the nearly 82,000 attack sorties flown during the year, less than one percent were against JCS-proposed targets. In the critical northeast area (route packages VIA and VIB), of 104 targets only 19 were hit in 1965 and 20 in 1966; the remaining 99 percent of attack sorties were armed reconnaissance and ftowl to harass, disrupt, and irnpede the movement of men and supplies on thousands of rniles of roads, trails, and inland and coastal waterways. IIe noted that despite severe losses of vehicles, rotling stock, watercraft, supplies and men from air attack, the North Vietnarnese were ingenious in hiding and dispersing their supplies and showed "remarkable" recuperative ability. He concluded that the overall amount of supplies and men rnoving through ttre DMZ, Laos, and Cambodia into South Vietnarn probably was greater in 1966 than in 1965.23 (U) Secretary Brown took a somewhat different view of the air campaign believing it had inflicted "serious" logistic losses on the North. From 2 March 1965 (when the Rolling Thunder program began) through Septernber 1966, air strikes had destroyed or damaged more than 7,000 trucks, 3,000 rail,way cars, 5,000 bridges, 15, 000 barges and boats, two-thirds of the POL storage capacity, and many ammunition sites and other facilities. He cited prisoner of war reports indicating that troops in the South received no rnore than 50 percent of daily supply requirements.* In add$iotv,'.thgair war had diverted 200,000 to 300,000 personnel to road, rail, and bridge repair work, and combat troops for air defense. * t, December, military action in both North and South Vietnarn had reduced battalion size attacks from seven x Seep L + on I March 196?, Secretary McNamara estimated that Hanoi was using I25,000 men for its air defenses and "tens of thousands" of others for coastal defense. 69 70 to two per month and, in the past eight months, raised enemy casualties from 3,600 to 5, 200 per month. (u) Although infittration frorn the North continued, secretary Brown said: "I do not believe that an air blockade of land and sea routes will ever be completely effective any more than a sea bLoekade can prevent all commerce from entering or leaving a country. " He thought the air attacks were becoming more effective due to improvements in intelligence, tactics, equipment, and techniques. (u) The Air Force secretary defended the administrationrs policy of exempting certain targets from air attack if they supported only the North's civilian economy, were close to urban areas and would cause civilian suffering if hit, and would not significantly affect in the short term the enemyrs ability to continue fighting. He 1isted five criteria for judging whether to strike a target: its effect on infiltration from North to south, the extent of air defenses and possible u.s. aircraft losses, the degree of 'rpenalty" inflicted on North Vietnam, the possibility of civilian casualties, and the danger of soviet or chinese intervention resulting in a larger war. He thought that a "Korean-type" victory -- with the aggressor pushed back and shown that aggression did not pay -- would meet u. s. objectives and make the war in Vietnam a ttsuccess .t, 24 (tlnpq Secretary McNamarars views on the controlled use of air power against the North were well known. rn a ttdeployment issuett paper sent to the JCS on 6 october in conjunction with deproyment planning, he said that intelligence reports and aerial reco.nnaissance clearly showed how the air program against the North effectively harassed and delayed truck movements and rnateriel into the South but had no effect on troop infiltration moving along 7l trails. He thought that the cost to the enemy to repLace trucks and cargo as a result of stepped up air strikes would be negligible compared with the cost of greatly increased U.S. aircraft losses. In a summation of his views on the war before House Subcommittees in Februarv 1967 te further stated: For those who thought that air attacks on North Vietnam would end the aggression in South Vietnam, the results from this phase of the operations have been disappointing. But for those who understood the political and economic structure of North Vietnam, the results have been satisfactory. Most of the war materiel sent from North Vietnam to South Vietnam is provided by other Communist countries and no amount of destruction of the industrial capacity . can, by itself, eliminate this flow When the bombing campaign began he added, "we did not believe that air attacks on North Vietnam, by themselves, would bring its leaders to the conference table or break the morale of its people -- and they have not done so. " (U) The Defense Secretary also observed that although air strikes had destroyed two-tNrds of their POL storage capacity, the North Vietnamese had continued to bring it in t'over the beachrt and disperse it. POL shortages did not appear to have greatly impeded the Northts war effort. He reiterated the U. S. policy that 'rthe bombing of the North is intended as a supplement to and not a substitute for the military operations in the South. " 25 {tffit$ffi"o 72 Notes to Pages I r 7 NOTES t. Chapter I Hist (TS), CINCPAC, 1965, vol II, pp 326 and 328; Project CHECO SEA Rprt (TS), 15 Dec 66, subj: Comd and Control, 1965, pp 1-7; memo (TS), Lt Col B. F. Echols, Exec, Dir/Plans to AFCHO, 27 Nov 6?, subj: Review of Draft Hist Study, "The Air Campaign Against NVN. " Hist (TS), CINCPAC, 1965, vol II, pp 326 and 328; Testimony of Gen J. p. McConnell, CSAF on 9 May 66 before Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcmte of Cmte on Armed Services, 89th Cong, 2d Sess (U) g-10 May 66, USAF Tactical Air Ops and Readiness, pp 25-26. Rpft (TS), An EvaI of the Effects of the Air Campaign Against NVN and Laos, prepared by Jt Staff, Nov 66, in Dir/P1ans; Talking paper for the JCS for the State-JCS Mtg on 1 Apr 66 (TS), Undated, subj: Discussions with Mr. Bundy on Far Eastern Matters, in Dir/plans; Hist (TS), CINCPAC, 1965, vol II, pp 339-41; memo (TS), Col D. G. Gravenstine, Chief Ops Review Gp, Dir/Ops to AFCHO, 22 Nov 6?, subj: Draft of AFCHO Hist Study. Memo (TS), CoI J. C. Berger, Asst Dir for Jt Matters, Dir/Ops to CSAF, 10 Aug 66; Background Paper on Division of R/T Area (TS), Mar 66, both in Dir/Plans; Excerpts from Gen Moorets Presentation to the JCS (TS), 13 JuI 66, in OSAF; Project CHECO SEA Rprts (TS), 15 Dec 66, subj: Comd and Control, 1965, pp 1-9; and I Mar 6?, subj: Control of Air Strikes in SEA, pp 95-97; memo (TS), Echols to AFCHO, 27 Nov 6?. Van Staaveren (TS), 1965, pp 7L-74; N.y. Times, l Feb 66. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Memo (TS), CoI J.H. Germeraad, Asst Dep Dir of Plans for War plans, Dir/Plans to CSAF, 10 Jan 66, subj: Strat for SEA; Background paper on Pertinent Testimony by SECDEF and JCS given on 20 Jan 66 (TS), 20 Jan 66, both in Dir/Plans. JCSM-16-66 (TS), 8 Jan 66. Memo (TS), Lt Gen J.T. Carroll,, Dir DIA to SECDEF, 2L Jan 66, subj: An Appraisal of the Bombing of NVN, in Dir/ptans; JCSM-41-66 (TS), 18 Jan 66. JCSM-56-66 (rS), 25 Jan 66. JCS 2343/751 (TS), 13 Jan 66; SM-82-66 (TS), 22 Jan 66. Memo (TS), SECDEF to Chmn JCS, S Jan 66, no subj: in Dir/ptans; CM- 1135-66 (TS), 22 Jan 66. a. 8. 10. 11. (This Page is Unclassified) ffi" Notes to Pages 7 - 14 UI{CLASSIFIED Testimony of Secy McNamara on 26 Jan 66 before House Subcmte on Appns, 89th Cong, 2d Sess (U), Supplemental Def Appns for 1966, p 3I. Ibid., p 32; background briefing by U.S. officials (U), 31 Jan 66, in SAFOI. Memo (TS), SECDEF to Pres, 24 Jan 66, subj: The Mil Outlook in SVN, i.n Diri Plans; Hist (TS), CINCPAC, 1966, vol II, p 605. trfash Post, I Feb 66; N.Y. Tirnes, 1 Feb 66. 22. Intvw (U), McConnell with Hearst Panel, 2I Mar 66, in SAFOI; Hist (TS), CINCPAC, 1966, vol II, p 49I; Rprt (TS), Dir/Ops, 20 Apr 66, subj: SEA Counter-Air Alternatives, p A -28, Ln AFCHO. Memo (TS), Col D. G. Cooper, Ofc Dep Dir of Plans for War Plans, Dir/ Plans to CSAF, 12 Feb 66, subj: The Emplo;rment of Air Power in the War i.n NVN; Briefing of JCS R/t Stuay Gp Rprt (TS), 6 Apr 66, subj: Air Ops Against NVN, App A; Rprt (TS), An EvaI of Effect of the Air Campaign Against NVN and Laos, all in Dir/Plans; Hist (TS), CINCPAC, 1966, vol II, pp 493-44; Jacob Van Staaveren, USAF Deployment Planning for SEA (AFCHO, 1966) (TS), pp 1-2 and 26 (hereinafter cited as Van Staaveren, 1966). CM-I14?-66 (TS), I Feb 66. Hist (TS), CINCPAC, 1966, vol II, pp 510-11; Van Staaveren (TS), 1966, ch II. Merno (U), Lt Gen H. T. Wheless, Asst Vice CSAF to Deps, Dirs, Chiefs of Cornparable Ofces, l? Feb 66, subj: Analysis of Air Power, in Dir/ Plans; Van Staaveren, 1966, pp 10-15. Merno (S), Lt Gen R. R. Compton, DCS/P&O to DCS/P&R, 21 Feb 66, subj: Organization in SEA, in Dir/Plans. Memo (TS), Maj Gen S. J. McKee, Asst DCS/Plans and Ops for JCS to CSAF, 18 Feb 66, subj: Air Ops Against NVN; JCSM-113-66 (TS), 19 Feb 66, both in Dir/Plans. Testimony of Secy McNamara on 25.Jan 66 before House Subcmte on Appns, 89th Cong, 2d Sess (U), Supplernentary Def Appns for L966, pp 33 and 39; memo (TS), Cooper to ment of Air Power in the War in VltI; memo (TS), McKee to SECDEI', 24 Mar 66, subj: Air Ops against NVN, both in Dir/Plans; N.Y. Tirnes, 5 Feb 66. 23. Chapter II I. Jacob Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and Operations in Southeast Asia (AFcHo, 1e65) (TS), p so s-)lflan Staaveren, 1966, pp 4 and 19. 73 12. I3. 14. 15. t6. L7. t8. 19. 20. 2L. UNCLASSIFIED 3. 4. 74 2. 9. 10. II. t2. UNCLASSIFIED Notes to Pages 15 - 20 Rprt (S), SEA Air Ops, Mar 66, pp 2-3, prepared by Dir/Tac Eval, Hqs PACAF ( hereinafter cited as PACAF rprt); JCS R/T Study Gp Rprt (TS), 6 Apr 67, App A; ltr (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 18 Sep, subj: An Eval of CY 66-67 Force Rqmts; rprt (TS), Eval of Effects of the Air Campaign Agai.nst NVN and Laos, Nov 66, all in Dir/ptans; JCSM-I53- 66 (TS), 10 Mar 66. Memo (TS), McKee to Gen. W. H. Blanchard, Vice CSAF, 23 Mar 66, subj: Air Ops Against AfLds in NVN, in Dir/Ops; Hist (TS) MACV, 1966, p 431; Hist (TS), CINCPAC, 1966, Vol II, p 494. Memo (TS), McKee to CSAF, 25 Mar 66, subj: Acft Losses Over NVN, w/atch Talking Paper, in Dir/plans; intvw (U), McConnelt with Hearst Panel, 21 Mar 66 in SAFOI; rprt (TS),Dir/plans,20 Apr 66, p A-34; N.Y. Journal American, 2O Mar 66. Hist (S), Dir/Ops, Jul-Dec 66, p 10; Hq USAF Ops Analysis Initial progress Rprt (S), Mar 66, subj: Analysis of Effectiveness of Ipterdiction in SEA, in AFCHO. Hq USAF Ops Analysis Second Progress Rprt (S), May 66, subj: Analysis of Effectiveness of Air Interdiction in SEA, ch Vrin AFCHO. Summary of Action by JCS (TS), 2b Mar 66, subj: Air Ops Against NVN, in Dir/Plans; Hist (TS), CINCPAC, 1966, vo1 II, p 497. CSAFM-W-66 (TS), 20 Jan 66; CSAFM-P-23-66 and CMCM-33-66 (TS), 18 Apr 66; Talking Paper onAir Interdiction NVN/Laos (TS), 6 JuI 66; rprt (TS), An Eval of the Effects of the Air Campaign Against NVN and Laos, Nov 66, all in Dir/P1ans; Hist (TS), CINCPAC, 1966, vol II, p 497; Hist (TS), MACV 1966, p 43I. CSAFM-W-66 (TS), 20 Jun 66; rprt (TS), An Eval of the Effects of the Air Campaign Against NVN and Laos, Nov 66, PACAF rprt (S), SEA Air Ops, Apr 66, pp 3-8, all in Dir/plans. DAF Order No 559N (U), 26 Mar 66, in AFCHO; Hist (TS), CINCPAC, 1966, vo1 II, p 468; tel to Ofc of Asst for Gen Officer Matters, DCS/P (U), 15 Aug 6?. PACAF rprt (S), SEA Air Ops, Apr 66, p 388, in Dir/Ops; Seventh AF Chronology, I Jul 65-30 Jun 66 (S), p 48; HqUSAF Ops Analysis Second Progress Rprt (S), May 66, pp 39-44, both in AFCHO; project CHECO SEA Rprts (TS), 15 JuI 67, subj: R/T, Jul 6b-Dec 66, p b0, and 21 JuI 67, subj: Expansion of USAF Ops in SEA, f966, pp 100-03; Hist (TS), CINCPAC, 1966, vol II, p 575. Seventh AF Chronology, I JuI 65-30 Jun 66, p bI; pACAF rprt (S), SEA Air Ops, Apr 66, pp 3-8. 5. 6. 7. 8. UNCLASSIFIED Notes to Pages 20 - 28 UNCLASSIFIED 20. Background Paper on the Division of the R/T Area (TS), Mar 66; Talking Paper on the Division of the R/T Area (TS), Mar 66, both in Dir/Plans; Hist (TS), CINCPAC, 1966, vol II, pp 494-95. Memo (TS), McKee to CSAF, 16 Apr 66, subj: Priority of Air Effort in SEA; memo (TS), SECDEF to Chmn JCS, 14 Apr 66, no subj: ltr (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 18 Sep 66, subj: Eval of CY 66-67 Force Rqmts w/atch MACV Rprt (TS), 5 Sep 66; CM-1354-66 (TS), 20 Apr 66; Background Paper on R/T Areas (TS), Mar 66, all in Dir/Plans; Hist (TS), CINCPAC, 1966, vol II, pp 494-97; merno (TS), Gravenstine to AFCHO, 22 Nov 67. JCS 2343/805-1 (TS), 14 Apr 66. CSAFM-P-30-66 (TS), 20 Apr 66; memo (TS), Maj Gen L. D. Clay, Dep Dir of Plans to CSAF, 26 JuI 66, subj: U.S. Strat for SEA and S.W. Pacific; JCS 2343/805-1 (TS), 14 Apr 66; JCS 23431805-5, 22 Jlu'L 66, a1l in Dir/Plans. JCS R/T Study Gp Rprt (TS), 6 Apr 66, subj: Air opsAgainst NVN; memo (TS), McKee to CSAF, 13 Apr 66, subj: R/T Stuay Gp Rprt, Air Ops Against NVN; memo (TS), Gravenstine to AFCHO, 22 Nov 66. CSAFM-P-22-66 (TS), 13 Apr 66; memo (TS), McKee to CSAF, 13 Apr 66; JCSM-238-66 (TS), 14 Apr 66, all in Dir/Plans. Transcript (U), Secy Brownrs remarks on "Meet the Press, " 22 May 66, in SAFOI. Memo (S), Berger to CSAF, 15 Sep 66, subj: ?th AF Ops in RP II, Itr, and IV; PACAF rprt (S), SEA Air Ops, May 66, pp l-8, both in Dir/Plans. PACAF rprt (S), SEA Air Ops, May 66, pp L-8; Seventh AF Chronology, I Jul 65 to 30 Jun 66, p 52; ltr (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 18 Sep 66; Project CHECO SEA Rprts (TS), I Sep 66, subj: Night Interdiction in SEA, pp 33- 37, and 25 May 67, subj: Interdiction in SEA (1965-1966), pp 39-69. Testimony of McConnell on 9 May 66 before Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcmte (TS), pp 16-17 (AFCHO's classified copy); PACAF rprt (S), SEA Air Ops, May 66, pp l-8 and 22; CINCPACFLT Analysis Staff Study 9-66 (TS), 12 Jul 66, subj: Cornbat Effectiveness of the SA-2 through Mid-I966, both in Dir/Plans. Memo (S), Maj Gen R. N. Smith, Dir of Plans to DCS/P&O, 3 May 66, subj: Capabilities for Aerial Blockade; msg 87716 (TS), CSAF to SAC, PACAF, TAC, USAFE, 6 May 66, both in Dir/Plans. Msg 95413 (TS), CINCPACAF to CSAF, 24 May 66, in Dir/Plans. Hist (S), Dir/Ops, Jul-Dec 66, p 126; PACAF rprt (S), SEA Air Ops, Jun 66, pp 6-9; Seventh AF Chronology, 1 Jul 65-30 Jun 66, (S), p 52; ltr (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 18 Sep 66; Project CHECO SEA Rprt (S), 9 Aug 6?, subj: Combat Skyspot, pp 6 and 19; Project CHECO SEA Rprt (TS), I Sep 66, subj: Night Interdiction in SEA, pp 33-37. 75 13. L4. I5. 16. 17. 18. 19. 2t. 22. 23. 24. 25. ul{cLASSIFIED to UITICLASSIFIED Notes to Pages 28 - 35 26. PACAF rprt (S), SEA Air Ops, Jun 66, pp 6-9; project CHECO SEA Rprt (TS), I Sep 66, subj: Night Interdiction in SEA, pp 33-3?. Project CHECO SEA Rprt (TS), 25 May 6?, subj: Interdiction in SEA, 1965-1966, pp 60-6I. Chapter III Memo (TS), R. Hekns, Acting Dir CIA to Dep SECDEF, 27 Dec 6b, subj: Probable Reaction to u. s. Bombing of pol, Targets in NVN, in Dir/ Plans. 27. 1. 2 Memo (TS), McKee to SECDEF, 24 Mar 66, subj: Air Ops Against NVN; memo (S), C. R. Vance, Dep SECDEF to Chmn JCS, 2b apr OO, sarne subj; memo (TS), W.W. Rostow, Spec Asst to pres to Secys State and Def, 6 Miy 66, no subj, all in Dir/plans; study (TS), 2z oct 66, subj: Effectiveness of Ai.r Strikes Against NVN, prepared by Sys Analysis Div, Dept of Navy, in OSAF. Memo (TS), Smith to CSAF, 16 Jun 66, subj: NVN Strike prog, in Dir/ Plans; Hist (TS), CINCPAC, 1966, vol II, p 498. Ibid. ; Testimony of Mcconnell on g May 66 before Senate preparedness Investigating Subcmte of the Crnte on Arrned Services (Ul, p 27. Project CHECO SEA Rprt (TS), t5 Jut 6?, subj: R/T, Jul 65-Dec 66, p 59; N. Y. News, 24 Jun 66; Wash post, 30 Jun 66, N. y. Tirnes, I Jul 66. Hist (TS), CINCPAC, 1966, vol II, pp 499-b00; Hist (TS), MACV i966, p 431; fg!-p""l, 26 Jun 66; Balt Sun, 2? Jun 66. Project CHECO SEA Rprt (TS), Ib Jul 62, subj: R/T, Jut 65-Dec 66, p 64; Hist (TS), CINCPAC, 1966, vol II, pp 499-500; Van Staaveren, 1966, p 42; N. Y. Tirnes, I JuI 66. 3. ,?. 5. 6. l. 8. Wash Post, 30 Jun 66. q N. Y. Times, I Jul 66; Van Staaveren, 1966, p 42. 10. Ltr (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 4 Aug 66, subj: CINCPAC Briefing for SECDEF, 8 JUI 66; memo (TS), A. Enthoven, Asst SECDEF for Sys Analysis to Secys of MiI Depts et al, 12 Jul 66, subj: crNCpAC July g, 1966 Briefing, both in Dir/plaridlffist (TS), CINCPAC, 1966, vol Ir, pp 510-11. Ltr (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 4 Aug 66; memo (TS), Enthoven to Secys of MiI Depts et al, 12 Jul 66. Van Staaveren, 1966, pp 42-53. It. L2. UI{CLASSIFIED Notes to Pages 35 - 40 UNCLASSIFIED PACAF rprt (S), SEA Air Ops, Jul 66, pp 4-?; Rpt (TS), An Eval of the Effect of the Air Campaign Against NVN and Laos, Nov 66; 1tr (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 4 Aug 66. Hist (S), Dir/Ops, Jul-Dec 66, pp 13 and 20-22. Memo (TS), Berger to CSAF, 15 Sep 66; Excerpts from Gen Moorers Presentation to the JCS (TS), 13 Jul 66; pACAF rprt (S), SEA Air Ops, JuI 66, pp 4-7; memo (TS), Gravenstine to AFCHO, 22 Nov 6?. Talking Paper for JCS for Their Mtg with Adm Sharp at the JCS Mtg of 23 Sep 66 (TS), 22 Sep 66, in Dir/ptans; PACAF rprt (S), SEA AirOps, Aug 66, pp 1-2; Hist (TS), CINCPAC, 1966, vol II, pp b00-02. Memo (TS), M/cen J. E. Thomas, Asst CS/I to SAF, 14 Oct 66, subj: PACAF Rprt on the NVN POL Situation, in Dir/plans. PACAF Rprts (S), SEA Air Ops, JuI 66, pp 4-b, Aug 66, pp 1-3; Sep 66, pp 4 and 8; and Oct 66, pp 10-ll, all in Ops Review Gp, Dir/Ops. Talking Paper for JCS for Their Mtg with Adm Sharp . . . on 23 Sep 66 (TS), 22 Sep 66; PACAF rprts (S), SEA Air Ops, JuI 66, pp 4-5 and 20; Aug 66, p 22; Sep 66, p 23; and Oct 66, p 23. 77 I3. 14. 15. 16. L7. 18. lo 20. 2t. PACAF rprt (S), SEA Air Ops, Jul 66 and 9 Aug 66; Wash Star, Jul 66, pp 4-5 and 20; N. Y. Times, 8 8 Aug 66; Balt Sun, 2fE!-6El- 23. 24. Project CHECO SEA Rprt (TS), I Sep 66, subj: Ni.ght Interdiction in SEA, pp 37-38; ltr (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 18 Sep 66; Hist (TS), MACV, 1966, p 434; NJ. Times, 3I Jul 66. Project CHECO SEA Rpts (TS), 9 Sep 66, subj: Night Interdiction in SEA, pp 37-38; 2l Nov 66, subj: Operation TaIly-Ho, pp vi and l-12; 15 Feb 67, subj: Air Ops in the DMZ Area, pp 3b-42; and 15 May 6?, subj: Air Interdiction in SEA, pp 6I and 64; briefing (TS), by Brig Gen C. M. Talbott, Dep Dir Tac Air Control Center, ?th AF for SECDEF et al (Saigon), 10 Oct 66, Doc No 13 in Project CHECO SEA Rprt, Ib Feb 67 pt II; PACAF rprt (S), SEA Air Ops, JuI 66, pp ?-8; Wash Star, 1 Aug 66. Memo (TS), Rear Adm F. J. Bloui, Dir Fast East Region, OSD to Dir of Jt Staff, 1 Jun 66, subj: Air Ops in ttre DMZ; msg (TS), JCS to CINCPAC, 20 Jun 66, both in Dir/plans; Hlst (TS), MACV, 1966, pp 24-25. PACAF rprt (S), SEA Air Ops, Aug 66, p 6; JCSM-603-66 (TS), t? Sep 66; N.Y. Times, 3l JuI 66. Memo (S), McConnell to Dep SECDEF, 25 Aug 66, no subj, in Dir/plans; Hist (S), Dir/Ops, Jul 66, p 255; project CHECO SEA Rprt (TS), 2l Nov 66, subj: Operation Tally-Ho, pplT-2b. 25. UNCLASSIFIED ?8 U]{CLASSIFI[D Notes to pages 4r - 4s 26. PACAF rprt (S), SEA Air Ops, Oct 66, p 2; Project CHECO SEA Rprt (TS), 15 Feb 6?, subj: Air Ops in tlrre DMZ area, pp 22, 26-28, 37, and 4t. 27. Project CHECO SEA Rprt (TS), 25 May 67, subj: Air Interdiction in SEA, 1965-1966, pp 64-65. 28. Memo for record (S), by Lt CoI L. F. Duggan, Exec Asst Ofc, Dir Jt Staff, 13 Oct 66, no subj; memo (TS), undated, subj: JCS Assessment of the Threat, both in Dir/Plans; Briefing (TS), by Brig Gen Talbott, l0 Oct 66; Project CHECO SEA Rprt (TS), 15 Feb 67, subj: Air Ops in the DMZ area, 1966, pp 24-25 and 51; PACAF rprt (S), SEA Air Ops, pp l-7 and I7. 29. Memo (TS), Holloway to SAF, 19 Oct 66, subj: Results of Air Effort Upon Movement Through NVN/SVN DMZ During Aug 66, in Dir/Plans. 30. Project CHECO SEA Rprt (TS), 25 May 6?, subj: Air Interdiction in SEA, 1965-1966, p 68; Doc 96 in Project CHECO SEA Rprt, 15 Feb 67, pt II. Chapter IV t. Hist (S), Dir/Ops, Jul-Dec 66, pp 20-23. 2. Memo (S), CoI F.W. Vetter, MiIAsst to SAF to Vice CSAF, 3 Aug 66, subj: Significance of Watercraft Destroyed in NVN, in Dir/Plans. 3. Ibid. 4. Hist (S), Dir/Ops, Jul-Dec 66, pp 23-24; memo (TS), Gravenstine to AFCHO, 22 Nov 66. 5. Memo (TS), SECDEF to SAF, SN, 2 Sep 66, subj: Night Ops in SEA, in OSAF. 6. Ibid. 7. Memo (S), SN to SECDEF, 28 Sep 66, subj: Study Results: Night Ops in NVN, in OSAF. 8. Memo (S), SAF to SECDEF, I0 Nov 66, no subj; study (TS), 2? Oct 66, subj: Effectiveness of Air Strikes Against NVN. 9. Memo (TS), SN to SECDEF, 3 Nov 66, subj: Study of Effectiveness of Air Strikes Against NVN w/atch study (TS), 27 Oct 67, subj: Effectiveness of Air Strikes, both in OSAF; memo (TS), Gravenstine to AFCHO, 22 Nov 67. 10. Memo (TS), SAF to SECDEF, I0 Nov 66. UNCLASSIFITD Notes to Pages 49 - 58 UNCLASSIFIED Merno (S), SAF to SECDEF, 19 JuI 66, subj: A/C Attrition in SEA, in Dir/Plans. Ibid. Memo (S), SAF to SECDEF, 24 A.ug 66, subj: Questions Resulting from Briefing on Night Ops in SEA; merno (TS), McConnell to Dep SECDEF, 25 Aug 66, subj: JCS 2343/894-1, 25 Aug 66, both in OSAF. Memo (S), Clay to CSAF, 25 Aug 66, subj: SEA Tac Ftr Attrition and A/C Proc Prog; merno (S), Holloway to Chmn JCS, 29 Aug 66, subj: SEA Tac Ftr Attrition and A/C Procur, both in Dir/Plans. N. Y. Times, 23 Sep 66. 22. Briefing Rprt of Factors Affecting A/C Losses in SEA (S), 26 Sep 66, prepared by Col. H.W. Hise, Chrnn, JCS A/C Losses Study Gp; ICS A/C Losses Study Gp Rprt (TS), Nov 66, subj: Factors Affecting Combat Air Ops and A/C Losses in SEA, both in Dir/Plans. Msg 20135 (S), CINCPACAF to CSAF, 20 Oct 66, in OSAF; CINCPACFLT Analysis Staff Study 9-66 (TS), 12 Jul 66, subj: Combat Effectiveness of the SA-2 Through Mid-1966; Briefing Rprt of Factors Affecting A/C Losses in SEA (S), 26 Sep 66, both in Dir/Plans; Hist (S), Dir/Ops, Jul- Dec 66, pp 272-74. Msg 20135 (S), CINCPACAF to CS,AF, 20 Oct 66; Briefing Rprt of Factors Affecting A/C Losses in SEA (S), 26 Sep 66. Memos (S), Clay to CSAF, 23 and 2? Sep and 3 Oct 66, same subjs: Factors Affecting A/C Losses in SEA, in Dir/Plans; JCSM-651-66, 10 Oct 66. Memo (Vl, 22 Oct 66, subj: Secy Brownrs Questions Concerning the Hise Rprt, in OSAF; Talking Paper for Chmn JCS on an Analysis of Air Ops in NVN to be discussed with SECDEF on 12 Nov 66 (TS), I1 Nov 66, subj: Analysis of Air Ops in NVN, both in Dir/Plans; JCS 2343/956-f (TS), 15 Nov 66. Memo (S), SECDEF to Chmn JCS, 17 Sep 66, subj: SEA Utitization of A/C, in OSAF; transcript (U), SECDEF News Briefing, 22 Sep 66, in SAFOL Memo (TS), Chief, PAC Div, Jt Staff to J-3, 17 Sep 66, . subj: Utilization of A/C in SEA; in OSAF; JCSM-646-66 (TS), 6 Oct 66. 23. JCSM-645-66 (TS), 6 Oct 66; JCSM-646-66, 6 Oct 66. Chapter V l. Van Staaveren, 1966, ch V. 79 t2. 13. L4. 15. 16. L7. 18. 19. 20. 2t. UNCLASSIFIED 80 U}ICLASSIFITD Notes to Pages 58 - 66 CM-1906-66 (TS), 8 Nov 66; memo (TS), cravenstine to AFCHO, 22 Nov 6?. Memo (TS), SAF to SECDEF, 10 Nov 66, no subj, w/atch Interirn Reply on Air staff Action Items Resul.ting from SECDEF Trip to sEA, 10-14 oct 66, in OSAF. PACAF rprt (S), SEA Air Ops, Nov 66, pp I-4; rprt (TS), An Eval of the Effects of the Air Campaign on NVN and Laos, Nov 66, both in Dir/plans; Van Staaveren, 1966, pp 63-66. PACAF rprts (S), SEA Air Ops, Nov 66, pp t-9; Dec 66, pp l-8, both in Dir/Plans. A?. 5. 6. 2. 3. ,- 8. o I0. 11. t2. Ibid.; Project CHECO SEA Rprt (TS), pp 98-99; Hist (TS), CINCPAC, 1966, 18 Dec 66; N.Y. Tirnes, 16 Dec 66. BaIt Sun, 14 Dec 66; N.Y. Times, lb Dec 66; 8""!:g$ 15 and i6 Dec 66. Project CHECO SEA Rprt (TS), tb Jul 67, subj: R/T, .lut 65-Dec 66, pp 99-I00. Ibid.; N.Y. Times, 27 Dec 66. Project CHECO SEA Rprt (TS), 2b May 6?, subj: Air Interdiction in SEA, 1965-1966, p 68; PACAF rprt (S), SEA Air Ops, Nov 66, pp l-9; Dec 66, pp l-8. Ibid.; app I and Z; \tfJi*qg, 26, 27 Dec 66, and 3 Jan 6?. CASFM-D-25-66 (TS), 23 Nov 66; memo (TS), Brig Gen E.A. McDonald, Dep Dir of Plans for War Plans to Dir/plans, 16 Dec 66, subj: Combat Beaver, both in Dir/Plans; Hist (S), Dir/Ops, Jul-Dec 66, pp 2-3 and 254. Memo (TS), McDonald to Dir/plans, 23 Nov 66; Hist (S), Dir/Ops, Jul- Dec 66, pp 2-3; Project CI{ECO SEA Rprt (TS), lb Jul 6?, subj: R/T, JuI 65-Dec 66, pp 94-95. Project CHECO SEA Rprt (TS), 2l JuI 6?, subj: Expansion of USAF Ops in SEA, 1966, p I11; PACAF rprts (S), SEA Air Ops, Nov 66, p 22; and Dec 66, p 25. PACAF Chronology, Jul 65-Jun 66 (S), in AFCHO; PACAF rprts (S), SEA Air Ops, Nov 66, pp 1-9; Dec 66, pp l-8; project CHECO SEA Rprt (TS), 15 Jul 67, subj: R/T, .lut 6b-Dec 66, p lL8; USAF Mgt Surnmary (S), 6 Jan 67, p 70; Hist (TS), CINCPAC, 1966, vol II, pp b22-28; app t0 and D. Ltr (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 22 Nov 66, subj: SA-Threat Conf Rpt, in Dir/Plans; Hist (TS), CINCPAC, 1g66, vol II, pp 516-19. 15 Jul 67, subj: R/t, .lut 65-Dec 66, vol II, pp 504-05 and 512; BaIt Sun i3. L4. 15. 16. U1{CLASSIFIED Notes to Pages 66 - ?1 '-$[$fE[r 17. Ltr (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 22 Nov 66; JCS 23431977 (TS), 16 Dec 66. Memo (TS), Cof E. T. Burnett, Dep Chief, Tac Div, Dir/Ops to Asst Dir of Plans for Jt and NSC Matters, 28 Nov 66, subj: Major Recommendations of the SA-2 Conf, in Dir/Plans; JCS 23431977 (TS), 16 Dec 66; Hist (TS), CINCPAC, 1966, vol II, p 519. Van Staaveren, 1966, pp 7l-74. Address (U), Gen McConnelL before Jt Activities Briefing, Hq USAF, 23 Nov 66, in SAFOI; Testimony of McConne1l on 9 May 66 before Senate Investigating Preparedness Subcmte (U), p 29i Yan Staaveren, 1966, pp 7l-74. Address (U), Gen McConnell before the Houston, Texas Forum, 29 Nov 66, in SAFOI. Project CHECO SEA Rprts (TS), t Mar 67, subj: Control of Air Strikes in SEA, pp 8I-99; and 23 Oct 67, subj: The War in VN, pp 44-45; memo (TS), SAF to SECDEF, 3 Jun 67, subj: Possible Course of Action in SEA; memo (TS), SAF to SECDEF, 9 Jun 67, no subj, both in Dir/Plans; memo (TS), Echols to AFCHO, 27 Nov 67. 23. Hist (TS), CINCPAC, 1966, vol II, pp 510-12 and 606-07. Address (U), Secy Brown before Aviation/Space Writers Assoc Mtg, Wash D. C., 8 Dec 66, in SAFOI; Balt Sun, 9 Dec 66; rprt (U), Selected Statements on VN by DOD and OIGIEIETn Officials, I Jan-30 Jun 6?, p 33, in SAFOI. Testimony of Secy McNamara on 20 Feb 67 before House Subcmtes of the Cmte onAppns, 90th Cong, lst Sess, Supplemental Def Appns for 19-67. p 21; Van Staaveren, 1966 pp 48-50. 8I 18. 19. 20. 2L. 22. 24. 25. ffi $50*EIr82 '€E0flfF; APPENDD( I U. S. and VNAF Attack Sorties in Southeast Asia 1966 USAF USN USMC VNAF Total North Vietnam 44, b00 32, 9b5 8,694 ?99 8 I, 948 Laos 32, 11 b 9,044 B, 60 I O 44,760 South Vietnam ?0, 36? 21,729 S?, 61 0 32, 033 I 6 1,. ?89 TOTAL t46,982 63,729 44,905 32,832 299,447 SOURCE: Annual Supplement to Summary Air Ops, SEA, Cy 1966, prepared by Dir/Tac Eval, Hqs PACAF, 23 Jan 6Z; Ops Review Gp, Dir/Ops, Hq USAF. APPENDD( 2 B-52 Sorties in Southeast Asia 1966 Total North Vietnam 176 South Vietnam 4,LL2 Laos 647 4,93b DMZ North 104 DMZ South l? 8 282 TOTAL 280 4,290 647 5,2t7 SOURCE: Strat Ops Div, J-3, JCS; Ops Review Gp, Dir/Ops, Hq USAF , €E€RI*; 83 APPENDD( 3 U. S. and VNAF Attack Sorties in North Vietnam USAF USN 1966 (by Month) USMC VNAF Total Jan * Feb Mar Apr May Jun JuI Aug sep Oct Nov Dec TOTAL 57 1,547 2, 559 2,477 1,794 4,442 6, 170 6,336 6,376 4,932 3,68I 4,I29 44,500 80 1, 265 I,919 2,818 2, 568 3, 078 3,416 4, 683+ 4,953 3, L47 2,938 2, 090 32,955 0 0 0I 0 137 o 2,8L2 0 4,478 L44 5,447 103 4,465 266 ?,788 243 r0,199 2l ll, 832 6 I2,t60 4 8,642 8 7,260 4 6, 736 799 8 l, 956 0 2 370 792 825 559 633 5I3 3,702 * Bombing of North Vietnam resumed on 3l January 1966. + Reflects an increase from two to three aircraft camiers at ttyankee Station" beginning in August 1g66. SOURCE: Annual Supplement to Summary of Air Ops SEA, Cy 1966. Prepared by Dir/Tac Eval, Hqs PACAF, 28 Jan 6?; Ops Review Gp, Dir/Ops, Hq USAF. 84 APPENDIX 4 U.S. Aircraft Losses in Southeast Asia Hostile Causes 196 5 North Vietnam Laos South Vietnam Total USAF USN' USMC + TOTAL USAF USNUSMC+ TOTAL USAF USN + USMC+ TOTAL 82 85 3 t70 172 109 4 285 I1 8 3 64 6 0 76 6 L4 96 I57 99 ____q_ 22 70 262 1966 48 I 5 60 296 I22 33 45L Operational Causes 1965 1966 Total 64 27 IO 7B 40 l2 L42 67 22 10t 130 23L * Excludes helicopters. Includes losses due to enemy mortar attacks. + USN and USMC figures subject to variatj.ons contingent on bookkeeping procedures. SOURCE: Ops Review Gp, Dir/Ops, Hq USAF. rSfBtEF,- APPENDD( 5 USAF Combat Attrition in North Vietnam 1965* Sorties Losses 85 Type of Sorties + Attack CAP/Escort Reconnaissance Other TOTAL Attack CAP/Escort Reconnaissance Other TOTAL Rate per 1,000 Sorties 11,599 5, 675 3,294 4, gg3 25,551 63 7 I 3 82 1966 138 6 19 9 5.43 L.23 2.73 0.60 3.21 3.10 0.66 2.40 0.54 44,482 9,041 7,910 r 6, 587 78, O20 Confirmed Probable Losses Losses 2.20 Percent Effective Confi.rrd Total 5.6 6.1 1.9 2.9 172 * Bombing of North Vietnam began on 7 February 196b. * Excludes E-52 strikes. SOURCE: Ops Review Gp, Dir/Ops, Hq USAF. APPENDIX 6 U.S. Aircraft Losses to SA-2ts Date 1965 x 1966 TOTAL Missiles Fired t80 _L99 L,237 {'$AF 5 t3 IISN IIS?'flC USAF IISN lr${C 50010 ?0560 t8 t2 2.4 3.4 * The first SA-2 firings were sighted in JuIy 1965. SOURCE: Ops Review Gp, Dir/Ops, Hq USAF. 86 APPENDD( 7 SA-2 Sites in North Vietnam J"go Sep Dec 42364 115 t44 15 I @e was detected in April t96b. SOURCE: Ops Review Gp, Dir/Ops, Hq USAF. t965 19 66 Jan 0 64 2,884 Mar 0 100 APPENDD( 8 Light and Medium Antiaircraft Artillery Guns in North Vietnam Jan Feb * Jun Sep Dec 1965 1966 r,156 3, 092 ry l, 418 3,159 1, 643 4, I23 2,636 5,009 2,551 6, 398 * Bombing of North Vietnam began on 7 February 1g65. SOURCE: Ops Review Gp, Dir/Ops, Hq USAF. *1$fffifa APPENDD( 9 U. S. Aircraft Losses in Aerial Combat 87 1965 1966 TOTAL USAF USN zo I 5' USMC Total 002 4#09 * Consisted of 2 F-105rs. + ConsisteC of 3 F-105's, t F-4C, I RC-4? and two 'rprobables", I F-4C and I A-1. ++ Consisted of 3 F8ts and 1 KA3. No "probables. " SOURCE: Ops Review Gp, Di.r/Ops, Hq USAF. APPENDD( 10 North Vietnamese Aircraft Losses in Aerial Combat Destroyed by: USAF USN USMC TOTAL USAF USN USMC TOTAL * No "probables" listed, SOURCE: Ops Review Gp, Dir/Ops, Hq USAF. MIG-I5's MIG-I7|s MIG-2I's Total'* L7 6 0 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 196 5 2 3 0 5 1966 L2 4 0 I6 o2 03 00 05 5 2 0 7 AFCHO PUBLiCATIONS Below is a list of AFCHO historical monographs dealing vrj.th various aspects of the conflict in Southeast Asia which may be obtained on loan or for permanent retention. Copies may be obtained by calling Oxford 6-6565 or by forwarding a written request. USAF Counterinsurgency Doctrines and Capabilities, 196I-1962. USAF Special Air Warfare Doctrines anl-Capabilities. 1963. (S-Noforn) USAF Plans and Policies in South Vietnam, 196l-1963. (TS-Noforn) USAF Plans and Policies in South Vietnam and Laos, 1964. USAF Plans and Operations in Southe?st Asiq. 1965. (TS-Noforn) USAF Logistic Plans and Policieq in Southeast Asia. 1965. (TS-Noforn) USAF Logistic Plans and Policies in Soqtheast Asia. 1965. (TS-Noforn) USAF Deployment Planning For Southeast Asia, 1966. (TS-Noforn) In addition to the above monographs, there are a large number of historical studies dealing with Vietnam operations prepared by Project CHECO and by the various partici.pating and supporting commands, including organizational histories down to the wing and squadron level.