PAGE UNDER CONSTRUCTION

31/1.08-09.1944 No. 625 Sqn Lancaster I ME676 CF-F F/O Reynolds

Operation: Raimbert

Date: August 31-September 1, 1944

Unit: No. 625 Squadron

Type: Lancaster I

Serial: ME676

Code: CF-F

Base: Kelstern

Location: Outbound, abandoned near Friston (Bexhill-on-Sea)

Pilot: F/O George Henry Reynolds 131143 RAFVR Age ? Safe (1)

Fl/Eng: Sgt Edward William Bird 1894039 RAFVR Age ? Safe (2)

Nav: P/O R.L.S. Hathaway (NZ-RNZAF) NZ4215660 Age ? Safe (3)

Air/Bmr: F/O Roderick George Hoffman (NZ-RNZAF) NZ429925 Age ? Safe (4)

W/Op/Air/Gunr: F/Sgt Brian Gibson Mulvey (AUS-RAAF) A422970 Age ? Fractured ankle (5)

Air/Gnr: Sgt Victor Davies 1836612 RAFVR Age ? Safe (6)

Air/Gnr: Sgt Ronald Ernest Davies 1837006 RAFVR Age ? Safe (7)

INTRODUCTION:

August 1944 was an opportune time for a rookie bomber crew to be posted to an operational squadron—the Battle of Berlin and Operation Overlord were in the slipstream of time. For the majority of Bomber Command squadrons these two campaigns would be the most costly of the war. For 625 Squadron six of its triple or greater aircraft and crew losses, out of a total of seven, would occur during these dark times. It would be two months before the Squadron would suffer the loss PB531, PA174 and LM691 to the October 23/24 Essen raid. S/L C.W.C. Hamilton, pilot of LM691, would be the sole Squadron survivor.

At this stage of the war the end was in sight, with an unknown endpoint. After the Normandy invasion Bomber Command gradually transitioned to daylight raids to minimize civilian and friendly troop casualties. In addition the bomber crews now enjoyed the security of fighter escort to and from the target. Those forced to bale out over Allied territory could find themselves back at their home Base within a matter of days, and back into the fray of ops. Those forced to bale out over Occupied territory were more likely to become POWs for the duration. Few evaders, and during the latter months of the war a greater risk of being murdered by irate civilians and the militia. Whenever possible Allied airmen were advised to surrender to Luftwaffe personnel.

With this in mind F/O G.H. Reynolds and his crew were posted to RAF Kelstern from 11 Base on August 10, 1944. They included a mix of four Brits, two Kiwis and an Aussie, and of three officers and four other ranks. They would have two weeks to adjust to the routine and realities of an operational squadron. During this interlude two of the Squadron’s crews failed to return from bombing attacks: ME733, W/O Percy and crew; LM674, P/O Charlick and crew— No survivors from either crew.

By August 25/26th they were deemed fit to start their tour of operations, finding themselves on the Battle Order detailed to attack Rüsselsheim, Germany. P/O A.H.C. Atkins would mentor F/O Reynolds on his second ‘dickie’ op with his crew, Sgt R.E Davies manning the mid-upper turret. P/O Atkins would have the extra insurance of his nav, F/Sgt Davies, and rear gunner, F/Sgt A.J. Smith. This four hour night raid in Lanc PD200 was uneventful.

In short order F/O Reynolds and his crew carried out successful missions to Kiel on August 26/27th in PD200 and Stettin on August 29/30th in ME676.

However, the August 31st day raid on Raimbert, France, in ME676, would be a different story. They departed Kelstern at 12.54 hrs but did not return. The ORB debriefing for ME676 provides the following information:

RAIMBERT. Target not bombed. Owing to engine trouble, the Captain ordered all the members of the crew to bale out, which they did near FRISTON. After ensuring the aircraft would crash-land safely the Pilot baled out and the aircraft crashed near FRISTON. All the crew landed safely.

(ADD MAP #1) ME676 Target and Crash Site. Courtesy of Kelvin Youngs.

ORB—Summary of Events

31.8.44 OPERATIONS. 18 aircraft were detailed for Operations, the target being Raimbert. The attack was concentrated on the dumps at this place, and from results observed, many hits were obtained. A heavy bomb load was carried, and in fairly good weather delivered according to instructions. One of our aircraft, captained by F/O G.H. REYNOLDS had engine trouble during the outward journey, which caused the engine to catch fire. It was decided the aircraft should be abandoned. All the crew baled out and landed safely, only one member of the crew being injured in the landing. The aircraft crashed in the marshes near BEXHILL, no damage being caused to any person or any property. All the crew returned to Base later.

On September 4th Flight Engineer, Sgt E.W. Bird, was posted to 12 Base, (N/E Sick).

REASON FOR LOSS:

We are grateful to John Naylor for his analysis regarding the loss of ME676:

Whilst we know the reason for this particular loss, we can only conjecture on the possible cause.

I have my own thoughts on this particular scenario, that was unusual to say the least, and therefore, my focus has been more on the aircraft itself, rather than any possible failings of the crew.

It is odd that yes, an engine was on fire, but it appears there was no attempt to feather the propeller and operate the Graviner fire extinguisher? I feel this all happened very quickly, and the chances are, is that the other three engines, grossly over heated, were close to bursting into flames, and the situation was rapidly becoming uncontrollable, necessitating the Pilot to order the crew to jump. The fact that she was still fully laden with bombs, also supports this theory, and potentially could have been catastrophic, if she had not come down where she did, in open country, and in an apparent flat attitude. Had she not done so, I think a more thorough investigation would have ensued, that may have revealed some anomalies in the operation of this aircraft, that was not apparent to the crew.

To quantify my suspicions, I have looked at the history of ME676.

She was part of a batch of 250 Mk1 Lancasters, ordered from Metro-Vickers, and starting with ME554, fitted with Merlin 22 engines. However, from ME639 onwards, the engines were changed to Merlin 24s’.

This in itself would not originally have been significant, and she had served 460 Sqn well enough at Binbrook, racking up well over 200 flying hours, with no apparent problems, before being transferred to 625 Sqn at Kelstern in June 1944.

My theory however, is that the F/E had been trained on Merlin 22s’, and, for a number of possible reasons, was unaware that ME676 was fitted with Merlin 24s’. This could have been a perfectly innocent error in administration, somewhere during the transfer of the aircraft, or indeed afterwards, and whilst the ground crew would have been fully aware, owing to the engine plate identification on each engine, it may have been assumed that the F/E had also been informed. It could also be that the Flight Engineers Engine Management Manual was inadvertently transferred with the aircraft as having Merlin 22s’?

The only difference between the Merlin 22 and 24 engines, were the Carburetor and Engine Boost settings for take off and cruising at various altitudes. These settings would have been different for each operation, depending on bomb loads and flying heights.

The Merlin 22 had an SU Carb, whilst the 24 had a modified anti-g Carb. Boost pressure and fuel mixture were different on each engine, and a weak mixture, coupled to a higher than required boost setting on a 24, could have resulted in overheating, and a consequent fire.

Though the crew had flown this same aircraft on a previous mission to Stettin, they may well have experienced anomalies with the settings, and overcome them by juggling with the engines, until bomb release gave them a more balanced flight, through weight loss, for the journey home.

On this occasion however, the mission was aborted. and they were left with the bombs still on board, and consequent weight anomalies experienced as on the Stettin raid, but this time were unable to overcome them. The extended time factor would have meant that the engines were already beginning to overheat, without the Pilot or F/E knowing why, as they approached the English coast, resulting in one of them catching fire, and a critical situation developing rapidly.

Following the crash, at Station level, these innocent administration errors may have been discovered in the enquiry. As no damage had occurred on the ground, and no loss of life or serious injury had ensued, it may have been decided to send the F/E on a refresher course on Merlin 24s’, under the pretext of him being ‘sick’ and N/E, (Non Effective), for that period. This hypothesis is based on the fact that he was sent back to 12 Group, rather than being admitted to the perfectly comfortable sick quarters at Kelstern?

It is odd indeed that there is no evidence of him being posted back to Kelstern, as indeed he was, to the same crew, and to complete his tour of operations with them, without any further problems being experienced!

My thoughts only of course, but a plausible scenario nonetheless, backed up by my own experience in PA474 of the Battle of Britain Memorial Flight, in an air display at RAF Brize Norton in the late 1970s’.

Lancasters were always prone to overheating whilst on the ground and static. It was always necessary to rev the engines, even when taxying, to increase the coolant pumping.

We were holding, waiting to cross the main runway, to access our taxi position to the end of the active runway.

There was considerable traffic holding us up, and I was listening on the intercom in the Mid Upper Turret. The Pilot and F/E were getting anxious about the waiting time, and informed Air Traffic that if we could not move soon, he may have to shut her down.

In just a very short time, we immediately got clearance!

JN

REPORT ON LANCASTER ME676

Serial Range ME554 - ME868. This aircraft was one of 250 Lancaster Mk.1s ordered from Metro- Vick May42 and delivered from Nov43 to Jun44. ME676 was delivered to 460 Sqdn 16Mar44, joining 625 Sqdn 5Aug44. Took part in the following Key Operations: With No.460 Sqdn, Berlin 24/25Mar44; Nuremburg 30/31Mar44; Schweinfurt 26/27Apr44;. With No.625 Sqdn as CF-F, Brunswick 12/13Aug44; Stettin 16/17Aug44; Raimbert 31Aug44-abandoned on return (sic). When lost this aircraft had a total of 255 hours. Airborne 1254 to attack a V-2 storage site. Homebound (sic) when abandoned near Friston. F/O G.C.Reynolds Sgt E.W.Bird P/O P.L.S.Hathaway RNZAF F/O R.G.Hoffman RNZAF F/S V.G.Mulvey Sgt V.Davies Sgt R.E.Davies "

ME676 served with 100, 460 and 625 Squadrons.

With 460 it served 30/03/44 to 22/04/44. It flew 8 missions with the Squadron.

Also lost on Raimbert mission was PS176 of 460 Sqdn.

Courtesy of Dave Hatherall, volunteer researcher at the Bexhill museum.

AFTERMATH:

(ADD PHOTO #2) PB413 Crash Site after auto landing on home soil. Similar dynamics. Courtesy of David Langner.

https://aircrewremembered.com/hannah-harold-allan.html

(ADD PHOTO #3) ME676 Crash Site January 2025. Courtesy of Peter Blythe.

The Lancaster came down just in front of the reeds to the left of the tree that's pretty much in the centre of the first photo.

(ADD PHOTO #4) ME676, Local Map of Crash Site. Courtesy of Peter Blythe and Bexhill Museum.

(ADD Photo #5) ME676, Official Crash Report. Courtesy of Peter Blythe and Bexhill Museum.

(ADD PHOTO #6) ME676, Details of Occurrence. Courtesy of Peter Blythe and Bexhill Museum.

(ADD PHOTO #7) ME676 Form 78, Courtesy of Peter Blythe and Bexhill Museum.

(ADD PHOTOS # 8 AND 9) ME676 Form 1180, Parts 1 and 2. Courtesy of Peter Blythe and the Bexhill Museum.

Form 1180 for ME676 states:

The crew abandoned A/C by 'chute after SI engine started over-speeding. When switched off fire broke out and spread back to wing. Engine would not feather.

An oil leak had made the constant speed unit inoperative. Unable to locate leak from the wrecked engine.

George Reynolds had flown 1661 hours and 36 on type.

Courtesy of Peter Blythe.

Followup by John Naylor:

This is interesting indeed, and for me it enforces my earlier assumption. The fact that the Constant Speed Unit failed is indicative of an oil leak. It was oil fed from the Crankshaft, and it may well be that the pressure was too much, owing to wrong settings on the carb and boost controls. It is interesting on the form 1066, that despite a Form 1022 being raised, they were unable to find an oil leak. The AOC in C has confirmed this on the Form 1066. It seemed a pressure leak on one of the gaskets on the the Constant Speed Unit could have forced oil back into the sump, but the unit was unable to suck oil back in, owing to the drop in pressure. The gasket itself would have shown no evidence of a leak when the empty unit was examined, as it only happened under pressure.

I still feel that a similar occasion was about to happen on the other three engines that may have been showing signs of overheating, necessitating a rapid exit from the aircraft.

It would not have been possible to feather the engine with a damaged Constant Speed Unit as the two are linked. I still cannot see why the Graviner was apparently not used, as this may well have put the fire out, even though the flames quite naturally would have been spreading backwards over the wing. It may have looked worse than it was?

The comment on the Form 1180 about George Reynolds having flown 36 hours on type means Lancaster Mk1, and not Merlin 24 type. Also, I think there is a typo error on the number of hours flown being 1661 hours. On average, he would need to have completed 276 missions, at an average of 6hrs per mission! The fewer hours, the more missions!

Hope this goes some way to help explain this very unusual event!

JN

Eyewitness Account courtesy of the Bexhill museum.

Tony Heard: March 2015

“I lived at Green Lane, Little Common then.

“I don’t know what the date would have been. But we had seen the blokes coming down by parachute. We knew there was an aircraft down but we didn’t know where at first. But then word soon got round Little Common.

{{Lancaster ME676 was observed from the swings at Little Common Recreation Ground.}}

“Opposite the Black and White (service station in Barnhorn Road). We went up the bank and across a couple of fields behind old J.C.Moore’s place. About a quarter of a mile. That was a couple of days later.

“The Lancaster had gone through a hedgerow. There was a huge row where someone had laid out all these bombs along the hedge.

“We want to get pieces of Perspex. There was no guard on it when we got there. The Perspex was all over the place – where the plane had ploughed through the hedge.

“What we understood at the time was that all the crew had baled out and, as we were told, the pilot had brought it down.

“The plane wasn’t that badly damaged. The props were all bent and the scoops under the engines were full of grass and stuff. I don’t know when it was taken away. I didn’t see it.

“The Perspex was lying all around. We used to put holes in it with hot pokers at home.

Courtesy of Dave Hatherall, volunteer researcher at the Bexhill museum.

Following this incident, for the month of September, other than the flight engineer, no other members of F/O Reynolds crew were posted away. A review of the Squadron’s ORB indicates none of the crew served as ‘spare bods’ with other crews.

The Reynolds crew would have required some time to recover after their close call and lick their wounds. They would also have to have suffered through a debriefing and investigation into the circumstances resulting in the loss of ME676. It is quite possible they may have participated in some training flights to regain their confidence. F/O Reynolds was promoted to Flight Lieutenant (War Subs) w.e.f. 9.9.44.

It is noteworthy the most harrowing mission of their tour would not count towards the thirty ops to tour expire—they did not bomb the detailed target and return to Base with the required photoflash evidence.

However, after a month’s reprieve and missing their flight engineer they returned to the fray. The Battle Order for October 3rd had F/L Reynolds and his crew detailed to attack West Kapelle on an uneventful day raid in Lanc I NN699. This included ‘spare bod’ Sgt R.J.I. Wood as flight engineer and F/Sgt Mulvey had recovered to return as wireless operator.

On October 5/6th they attacked Saarbrücken in Lanc III LM747, with Sgt Wood in the flight engineers’s seat. Almost without exception LM747 would become their trusty mount for the remainder of their ops. She would become their talisman.

The Reynolds crew found themselves on the Battle Order of October 7th for a daylight trip to Emmerich with Sgt Wood as flight engineer and F/Sgt B.J. Allen as the ‘spare bod’ wireless operator.

After a four day breather this crew exemplified the cohesive nature of ‘crewing up' when their original flight engineer returned to this combat team, for a daylight attack on October 11th to Frederik Hendrik. This proved to be an eventful mission: Frederik Hendrik. Abortive sortie - all bombs were brought back.

ORB Summary Bombing Attack on FREDERIK HENDRIK

15 aircraft were detailed for the attack against the above target, due to very bad weather and much low cloud, all aircraft were instructed by the Master Bomber to return to Base with their bombs.

October 14th would prove to be a memorable and exhausting day for many of Bomber Command crews who found their names on the Battle Order, twice on the same day, to attack the same target, Duisburg, Germany—by day and night. 625 Squadron would contribute 60 sorties to this effort, 30 for each attack and F/L Reynolds and his crew would have the unenviable pleasure of participating in both.

The day raid would be eventful and demoralizing for the Squadron. Lancaster LL956, with F/O Lloyd Hannah at the controls and Sgt Basha Paige on his second ‘dickey’ trip with four of his crew, would start its takeoff roll at 06.28. However, due to an engine fire past the point of no return, would crash and explode west of the airfield six minutes later, claiming the lives of F/O Hannah and rookie bomb aimer, F/Sgt L.D. Bennett RCAF. The six remaining crew members parachuted to safety. They included the rear gunner of F/O Hannah’s crew, F/Sgt J.H. Loughran, who would cross paths with F/L Reynolds at the end of his tour.

https://aircrewremembered.com/hannah-lloyd-albert.html

It is noteworthy F/L Reynolds and his crew would depart at 06.45 hours, eleven minutes after the demise of LL956, meaning that they would have witnessed this event while taxiing to the active runway and would have climbed out over the crash site—most likely not realizing this was one of their Squadron’s aircraft. Strict radio silence would have meant F/O Hannah could not have transmitted a Mayday call. However, squadron mates would have been notified of the loss on their return to Base. For F/L Reynolds and his crew this would have been most sobering, as if their engine fire had declared itself in a similar fashion they would have suffered the same fate with the loss of their pilot and salvation of the rest by chute—facing the remainder of their tour as an orphaned crew, filling ‘spare bod’ positions with unfamiliar and unknown faces.

After an eleven hour reprieve the Reynolds’ crew would be airborne at 22.34 hours for the night attack on Duisburg. This would be uneventful for the crew and all Squadron aircraft returned to Base.

On October 19/20th F/L Reynolds and crew were detailed to attack Stuttgart during an uneventful night raid.

Their next trip on October 23/24th, a night effort, was a different story: Essen. Returned early as all guns were frozen. This was an abortive sortie. However, this was most fortuitous as this was a tragic raid for the Squadron, with it suffering its seventh and final triple or greater losses— the following aircraft failing to return: PB531, PA174 and LL691. Most unnerving for a crew not yet at the halfway mark to their tour.

The Battle Order for October 25th, had them return to Essen by daylight. Uneventful, and for the superstitious ones, a breath of fresh air as for the majority this would have been Op #13! Most opportune as they would now have the luxury of their first leave of two weeks or more.

However, on return they would be confronted with the other inevitable aircrew jinx, the breaking up of their cohesive seven member chain, with the mentoring of a rookie crew on their Skipper’s second ‘dickey’ mission.

On November 11/12th, F/L Reynolds would introduce F/L W.E. Conner and his crew to the grim reality of operations with a night attack on Dortmund. For security he included his nav, P/O Hathaway and rear gunner, Sgt R.E. Davies.

F/L Reynold’s crew would have an uneventful day trip to Duren, on November 16th.

The Battle Order for November 18th detailed them for another day mission to Wanne Eickel. On return in Lanc I PB708 they were diverted to Knettishall along with the majority of participating Squadron aircraft.

On the evening of November 27/28th they returned from an uneventful attack on Freiburg.

They closed out the month of November on the 29th with an uneventful day trip to Dortmund.

December 1944, would be a busy and exhausting month for the Reynolds’ crew, completing eight missions.

On December 3rd they were detailed to carry out a day attack on the Urft Dam that did not go according to plan: Urft Dam. Returned to Base with full bomb load on M/Bomber’s instructions.

The hazards of landing a bomb laden aircraft came to light during this mission when F/O G.A. Naylor in Lanc I, NN699, on return to Kelstern, overshot the runway and crashed through a fence with a full bomb load. The seven crew members survived unscathed to tour expire. NN699 was less fortunate, being a write-off.

The Battle Order for December 4/5th had F/L Reynolds and his crew detailed for an uneventful night attack on Karlsruhe.

On December 12/13th they would take Lanc I PB708 for a trip to Essen.

For the nights of December 15/16 and 17/18th they would be back to their regular mount, LM747 for raids on Ludwigshafen and Ulm. Both uneventful.

They would be detailed to attack Bonn on December 21/22nd followed by a diversion on return to Ludford for a FIDO landing.

On December 28/29th F/L Reynolds would be tasked with taking F/O J.C. Wilson and his crew for a second ‘dickey’ op for their baptism to fire, in an attack on the Mönchengladbach marshalling yards. He would be accompanied by his regular nav and rear gunner.

For their last op of the month and year they were assigned to Lanc I NG253 for an op to Gelsenkirchen Buer on December 29/30th.

1945

The Battle Order for January 2/3rd detailed F/L Reynolds and crew to attack Nuremberg. In their trusty steed, LM747, this would be an uneventful night mission, as would be the remainder of their ops with their talisman aircraft and crew.

In January they would operate against the following targets, with no aborts or ‘spare bod’ crew substitutions: January 5/6th, Hannover; January 7/8th, Munich; January 14/15th, Merseburg Luena and January 16/17th, Zeitz.

It would have been with cautious optimism that F/L Reynolds and his crew observed their names listed on the February 1/2nd, Battle Order, detailed for a night attack on Ludwigshafen in their trusty LM747. For F/L Reynolds this would be his thirty-first op and for the remainder their thirtieth. This crew was comprised of four of his regular crew mates and two filled by ‘spare bods’; flight engineer, F/Sgt S. Kitchen and rear gunner, F/Sgt J.H. Loughran R217337 RCAF. It was coincidental F/Sgt Loughran was a member of F/O Lloyd Hannah’s crew who were forced to bale out shortly after take off due to an engine fire on October 14, 1944. There was a rule of thumb that no orphaned airmen were ‘volunteered’ to fill in as a ‘spare bod’ with a crew where any member of that crew had less ops than himself. This might explain the two week hiatus between their last op—awaiting to assemble this magic mix.

To tour expire from the first operational contract it was required an airman complete thirty missions with photo documentation the target was bombed. During the latter months of the war exceptions were made when the target was reached but the raid was cancelled by the Master Bomber due to weather conditions preventing accurate target marking. This was to minimize civilian and friendly troop casualties.

It was not unusual for a Skipper to extend his tour of operations until all of his crew had fulfilled their thirty mission contract. Towards war’s end the risk of failing to return would have been minimal, but ever present. Such action exemplified the camaraderie resulting from the ‘crewing up’ concept that glued a crew together regardless of the horrors encountered.

It did not take long for this crew to be disbanded and posted to noncombat stations. The end was inevitable and close at hand. They has done their bit and survived the gauntlet.

Postings Out:

F/L Reynolds to 12 Base w.e.f. 25.2.45

F/O Hoffman to 14 OTU w.e.f. 28.2.45

P/O Hathaway to 1662 HCU w.e.f. 28.2.45

P/O Mulvey to ACAC Catterick* w.e.f. 19.3.45

F/Sgt V. Daves to ACAC Catterick w.e.f. 19.3.45

F/Sgt R.E. Davies to ACAC Catterick w.e.f.19.3.45

Talisman Lancaster III LM747 CF-L:

No. 625 Sqn.: a) Essen, 23/24-10-44. G-H Fight, Methwold. No. 625 Sqn.: b) Nuremburg, 16/17-3-45; c) Nordhausen 3.4.45, daylight. S.O.C., 15.5.47.

*Aircrew Allocation Centre Catterick

The ACAC at RAF Catterick was an Air Crew Allocation Centre.

Toward the end of the war, and indeed afterwards, certainly to September 1945, many redundant Aircrew were sent to Catterick as a holding unit, until it could be established how to make the best use of them.

Tiger Force was in the making for the War with Japan, (though never fully formed owing to Wars’ end in the Far East in August 1945). Many aircrew were re-crewed for this special force, and training was underway, so some of the Catterick personnel were allocated to this cause but never flew operationally.

Many Pilots, Engineers and Navigators were transferred to Transport aircraft such as Dakotas and Lancastrians to continue flying in this role that, at that time, was very busy with clearing operations, supply and repatriation of POWs’. After a short time at OCUs’, they were crewed up and allocated to various Squadrons in RAF Transport Command.

Other Commissioned Aircrew were easily transferred to ground (admin) duties, but it was not so fortunate for the gunners, as there was no immediate use for them, other than to continue their skills with the new Avro Lincoln that was then coming into service, albeit in restricted numbers with a much reduced Bomber Command.

Many found themselves sent on indefinite leave, pending discharge. Others were offered ground duties wherever there was an immediate requirement.

As a typical example, my Father, after returning from a POW camp in Poland, at the end of the war, and now a redundant gunner, was promoted to Warrant Officer. He was posted to a Transport Unit in London as Second in Command, with little or no training in this alien admin role, and told me a funny story of how he was exploited by other personnel at the Unit, who were fully aware that ex-Aircrew could be easy pickings!

The OC went on leave and left my Father in charge during his absence. In just a few days, my Father received countless applications for leave, and just kept signing them, without realising the possible consequences.

When the OC returned, he was horrified to learn that there were next to no personnel left, as they had seized an opportunity, not apparent to my Father, to ‘escape on leave’.

JN

BURIAL DETAILS:

Nil. All crew members safely baled out of ME676 and tour expired.

BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS OF CREW:

We have limited information and no photos of this crew and appeal to anyone with access to either to contact the HELP DESK.

1. F/O George Henry Reynolds:

2. Sgt Edward William Bird:

3. P/O Roy Lewis Stuart Hathaway Hathaway: He went on to fly 404 flights in the Berlin airlift, and flew in the V force as a navigator on Valiant's. He married Doreen in 1982, and was in a nursing home in Hornchurch in 2014.

(ADD PHOTOS #10) Berlin Airlift Record Press Clipping. Courtesy of Peter Blythe Collection.

(ADD PHOTO #11) L-R, F/L Roy Mather (Pilot), F/L Roy Lewis Stewart Hathaway AFC (Nav), F/L Richardson (Engineer) and Royston William Marshall AFM (Signaller). Courtesy of Peter Blythe Collection.

http://number59squadron.com/berlin_59/nominal_roll...

4. F/O Roderick George Hoffman: Born in 1922, married a Land Girl and died in 1982.

(ADD PHOTO #12) R.G Hoffman Headstone.

5. F/Sgt Brian Gibson Mulvey: Born 14th May 1924, Bondi, New South Wales. He died on 12th July 2006.

6. Sgt Victor Davies: Enlisted at Penarth but no further details yet.

7. Sgt Ronald Ernest Davies: Also enlisted at Penarth, and called Davies - makes you wonder if there's a connection there? He was born in Swansea on the 13th October 1921, and died on the 2nd of November 1986.

DECORATION REOMMENDATIONS:

1. F/O G. H. Reynolds 131143: DFC.
   2. Sgt E.W. Bird 1894039 RAFVR: DFM.
   3. P/O R.L.S. Hathaway (NZ-RNZAF) NZ4215660: DFC.
   4. F/O R.G. Hoffman (NZ-RNZAF) NZ429925: DFC.
   5. F/Sgt B.G. Mulvey (AUS-RAAF) A422970: DFM.
   6. Sgt V. Davies 1836612 RAFVR: DFM.
   7. Sgt R.E. Davies 1837006: DFM.

AUTHOR’S NOTES:

In short order F/O Reynolds and his crew would have realized they had volunteered for a one way ticket, with their odds of surviving their tour of ops at roughly one in three. Sobering to say the least.

Upon arrival at RAF Kelstern they were constantly reminded of the danger of the tasks at hand. During their six month tour they would bear witness to seventeen of the Squadron’s crews failing to return. This included the loss of seasoned F/O Lloyd Hannah and LL956 as a result of an engine fire on takeoff. This event would have indelibly impacted F/O Reynolds’ crew as they could just as likely suffered a similar fate— wrong place at the wrong time. The only difference being, would have been the demise of F/O Reynolds, orphaning his crew.

They had also participated on the triple loss Essen raid. This would have left them looking over their shoulders wondering if they would be next to get the chop. At this point they had not yet reached the halfway mark of their tour. It is impossible to fathom how these young men garnered the courage to return, mission after mission, to the fray of death and destruction of the night skies over Occupied Europe. It is remarkable so few choose the path of refusing to fly in combat, instead going the route of lack of moral fibre (LMF). One can only attribute this action to the inherent wisdom of “crewing up”—the unbreakable bond of teamwork and camaraderie—regardless of the consequences.

Of the seventy-four Squadron aircraft and crews ‘failing to return’, seven would do so on home soil, two outbound and five on the homeward journey.

Outbound ME676 would be the first to fall, with F/O Reynolds and his crew successfully abandoning their aircraft. Unfortunately, F/O Lloyd Hannah would be less fortunate in LL956 taking Sgt ‘Basha’ Paige and his crew on their second ‘dickey’ trip. F/O Hannah would perish six minutes after takeoff due to an engine fire beyond the abort point. Rookie bomb aimer, Sgt Lloyd Bennett would also lose his life, baling out at an altitude too low for his chute to fully deploy. The six remaining crew members abandoned the aircraft successfully and all would survive the war, with three of them having to bale out with the loss of PB815 after she was struck by ‘friendly fire’ or incendiaries dropped form above!

https://aircrewremembered.com/paige-d-r.html

At this point it is worth mentioning one crew’s close encounter early in their tour of ops that came ever so close to a catastrophic end.

On the evening of November 3, 1943, F/Sgt Reg Price and his crew were detailed for their second op to attack Düsseldorf, in Lanc I W4833. During the climb out, in the dark on instruments and at max takeoff weight with a full load of petrol and bombs, at 300 feet AGL, the starboard inner engine spewed flames. This engine was promptly feathered and secured. In short order the port inner failed and had to be secured as well. W4833 settled into a gradual descent towards mother earth and oblivion…

One hour and fifteen minutes later F/Sgt Price made a ‘greaser’ landing at Base, on the two good engines. It is testimony to the ‘crewing up’ concept and the thoroughness of the training this crew received in pre-operational courses at OTU, Heavy Conversion and Lancaster Finishing courses. Their actions epitomized the strength of the seven link gold chain in the Squadron’s crest. Reg admitted this was the most harrowing trip during his entire tour of ops and to make matters worse it did not count towards the thirty required to fill the tour contract. Quite simply, they had not bombed the target and returned with the photoflash proof!

https://aircrewremembered.com/price-reginald-dfc.h...

https://aircrewremembered.com/price-reginald-william-douglas.html

Inbound the first to fall would be Lanc III W4999 with W/O P.R. Aslett along with Sgt D.M. Blackmore on his second ‘dickey’ introduction. They would come to grief on return to Base following the December 2/3, 1943 Berlin raid, striking an obstacle while landing and wrecking the aircraft. The eight crew members survived but the Bomb Aimer, Sgt C.L. Jennings, sustained a fractured femur.

Two weeks later, on December 16/17th, Lanc III ED951 captained by 2nd Lt G.E. Woolley USAAF, returning from another Berlin attack, crashed one mile south of the airfield in low cloud and poor visibility. Tragically, the flight engineer, Sgt S.A. Taylor and bomb aimer, Sgt G.A. Draycott, were killed due to multiple trauma and burns. Rear gunner, Sgt G.A. Richards, sustained severe injuries including a compound skull fracture, was placed on the dangerously ill list—and survived.

The Squadron would suffer two more losses as a result of this infamous raid, to become known in Bomber Command lore as Black Thursday. On the return leg crews encountered widespread fog at their bases. This proved to be catastrophic for Bomber Command, losing more aircraft (59) and crews over home turf than due to night fighters and flak (55) over Occupied Europe.

This weather phenomenon would also cause a second skipper to come to grief at home Base. W/O Ted Ellis after executing an overshoot, in a low, slow turn, impacted the ground with the inner wing. With the catlike reflexes, he wisely decided to carry out a belly landing. His crew survived without injuries and Lanc W4993, following repairs, was retired to the Lancaster Development Unit. For further information refer to Black Thursday at:
https://aircrewremembered.com/clark-geoffrey-francis.html

The third loss from this raid was Lanc III LM424, P/O D. Baker and crew, who fell to the guns of Nachtjagd ace, Lt Helmut Lent—his seventy-ninth victory. There would be no survivors from his crew who included rear gunner, F/L W.D. Crimmins DFC RCAF. He was the Squadron’s Gunnery Leader.
https://aircrewremembered.com/baker-donald.html

The catastrophic Nuremberg raid on the night of March 30, 1944, would claim the the lives of S/L T.M. Nicholls and his crew, the result of a night fighter attack.

This mission would prove to be very challenging for 1st Lt Max Dowden USAAF and his crew in Lanc ED390. His combat moxie saved their lives with two decisions and more magic over home soil. During the extended outbound leg his crew reported numerous bomber crashes and condensation trails from their aircraft. Lt Downden elected to climb above their telltale signature. Early on the return journey they managed to escape unscathed from three successive night fighter attacks. At this point he elected to take continuous corkscrew evasive maneuvers—for the next hour! As a consequence they arrived over the south coast of England with insufficient fuel to reach home Base. On diverting to RAF Silverstone they were refused permission to land due to a crashed aircraft on the runway.

With petrol reserves down to vapours Lt Dowden elected to carry out an off-airdrome landing, wheels extended. In the process the port wing wrapped around a tree and a pig pen was demolished. The crew was uninjured and ED390, following removal and repairs, was transferred to No. 5 Lancaster Finishing School.

Sadly, Lt Dowden’s crew’s tour of ops would come to an abrupt end on the evening of May 21, 1944, during an attack on Duisburg, when their Lancaster III LM513 was shot down in flames by a night fighter. He and his flight engineer, P/O Frank Moody, had made a prearranged pact to ride their aircraft down. Together they managed to maintain control allowing their crew mates to bale out. In the crash landing Max Dowden was killed and Frank Moody critically injured.

Rear gunner, F/Sgt ‘Gib’ McElroy, recounted his final moments:

…but just before I fell into German hands a local told me that the one in a blue uniform was alive when the Germans got to the aircraft but he was in such a hopeless condition they had to shoot him.
https://aircrewremembered.com/dowden-max-eugene-1.html

The Squadron’s third inbound loss over home soil would occur on April 18, 1944, when P/O J.P. Cosgrove and crew in Lanc I ME734 on returning from the Rouen raid were shot down in flames, on short final by a German intruder. They crashed out of control just outside the aerodrome boundary, with no chance of survival. This encounter is included in the text of Boys at War by Russell Margerison, Max Dowden’s mid-upper gunner.
https://aircrewremembered.com/cosgrove-joseph-patr...

As noted above the Squadron would suffer its seventh and final triple loss raid during the night of October 23, 1944, to Essen, Germany. Tragically, this would include the loss of Lanc I PA174 with the entire crew on their rookie solo op, during the return journey. Eyewitness accounts reported this aircraft spinning out of the cloud deck and crashing at 21:00 hours in the vicinity of Weeley Lodge, Weeley, Essex. The post crash investigation could not determine if this accident was due to spatial disorientation, icing or the result of battle damage, due to extensive airframe damage on impact.

For a change the Squadron’s final, home soil loss would have a happy ending.

The daylight raid to attack the Urft Dam on December 3rd was cancelled by the Master Bomber with instructions for crews to return to Base with their bomb loads. F/O G.A. Naylor and crew in Lanc I NN699 overshot the runway and ploughed through a fence before stopping. The crew escaped unscathed but their trusty steed was a write-off.

Two of the aircraft mentioned above are not included in 625 Squadron’s total of seventy-four recorded as lost/failing to return during its eighteen month operational history: W4993 and ED390. In both cases there were no serious injuries and the aircraft returned to service, albeit not with the Squadron. Unfortunately, F/Sgt D.J. Gigger and his crew in W4833 would fail to return from the Squadron’s second triple loss Stuttgart raid on March 15, 1944.
https://aircrewremembered.com/gigger-derrick-john.html

Of the seven aircraft and crews who came to grief on home soil two would manage to tour expire:

F/L Reynolds and F/O Naylor along with their crews. F/O Blackmore who was second pilot with W/O Aslett’s crew would also tour expire. Sadly, W/O Aslett would be KIA along with his crew on March 23, 1944, while serving with No. 7 Squadron. This crew included his original flight engineer, Sgt J.W. Bott and navigator, Sgt H.B. Cooper.

F/O Hannah’s orphaned crew would tour expire as ‘spare bods’. Coincidentally his rear gunner, F/Sgt J.H. Loughran would tour expire with F/O Reynolds on their last op. Remarkably, Sgt D.R. ‘Basha’ Paige who was on his second ‘dickey’ trip with F/O Hannah, was forced to bale out a second time when their aircraft was struck by incendiaries dropped from above. He along with two of his crew had the rare distinction of having to bale out of a burning Lancaster twice during their operational careers. For fighter pilots this was not an uncommon occurrence but for bomber crewmen the vast majority to abandon the aircraft did so once only, to become POWs or evaders, and evaders who successfully returned home were not usually permitted to return to ops over occupied territory.
https://aircrewremembered.com/paige-d-r.html

Sadly, there were no survivors from P/O Cosgrove or Tweeter’s crew. At this time we do not have any additional information on 2nd Lt Woolley’s crew after their accident.

It is interesting the statistics presented to the press and public for Bomber Command losses would be for those crews lost over Occupied Europe or the route to and from the target but not over English soil. This was for propaganda and aircrew morale reasons. This was exemplified with the Black Thursday Berlin raid when the official loss rate would have increased from 5.2 to 11.2% if the home soil losses were included. The rational for this statistical ‘anomaly’ was the losses over home turf did not result from combat with the enemy. It is difficult to accept this argument taking into account the cause of the loss of ME734 with P/O Cosgrove and his crew.

It would have been more reasonable to consider that once a crew observed their names on the Battle Order, they were in combat with the enemy from the moment they became airborne until the moment their props had stopped windmilling at the hardstand.

After war’s end it was anticipated the major risks of sudden death were a thing of the past. However, this was not always the case as there were new challenges that needed to be addressed, and on occasion necessary precautions were overlooked. Such was the case when F/O Donald Beaton DSO along with five of his crew and Lancaster RF230 were detailed to transport twenty-four POWs from Juvincourt, France, to their home Base of 514 Squadron at RAF Waterbeach. This was a mission of Operation Exodus, tasked with repatriating POWs after liberation.

Fully loaded with its manifest of passengers F/O Beaton departed Juvincourt, France, at noon on May 9, 1945 and climbed to the northwest. Shortly thereafter, it appears an inflight emergency developed and F/O Beaton elected to carry out an urgent landing at the nearest aerodrome at Roye, France. After an initial failed approach, eyewitnesses reported that at circuit altitude RF230 stalled and appeared to enter a flat spin. The aircraft broke in two on impact and the forward section burned out.

The Court of Enquiry held on May 20, 1945, concluded this accident occurred as a result of unrestrained passengers moving to the rear of the aircraft, leading to an uncontrollable aft shift of the centre of gravity. Blame was directed at the young mid-upper gunner in that he failed to control this unpredictable behaviour by the passengers. Incredibly, no consideration was given to the lack of insight by the Senior Staff that these aircraft had not been fitted with appropriate restraint harnesses to prevent this accident from happening in the first place—in the event of such an emergency.
https://aircrewremembered.com/beaton-donald.html

Airmen’s Obituaries Book Two

(ADD PHOTO #13) Airmen’s Obituaries Book, Two by Jay Iliff. Courtesy of author.

Wing Commander Basil ‘TR’ Templeman-Rooke DSO DFC and Bar

This highly-decorated bomber pilot began his career in April 1943 flying Lancasters with

No. 100 Squadron. During this tour he discovered empty beer bottles made a haunting screech when they fell through the air. As a result he made a regular practice of releasing them over the German countryside.

In May 1944 he began his second tour with No. 576 Squadron, as a flight commander. During this time he developed an “unorthodox tactic”—on the return leg diving to very low altitude to avoid flak and night fighters.

On February 14, 1945, he was appointed to command No. 170 Squadron and on April 25th led his crews on their last bombing mission of the war to attack Hitler’s retreat a Berchtesgaden. This would be ‘TR’s sixty-fourth operation over enemy territory.

Subsequently, he participated in Operations Manna (food drops to the starving Dutch) and Exodus (POW repatriation), and Cook’s Tours to show ground personnel the effects of their air attacks.

One can view ‘TR’s dropping empty beer bottles as a subtle form of psychological warfare or his personal talisman.

However, his tactic of a low level return leg has much more significance. With the guidance of a skilled nav it would be easy to skirt around the known flak batteries. But much more significant, it would be virtually impossible for even a skilled night fighter pilot to intercept and gain a position to bring his Schräge Musik weapons to bear— without hitting an obstacle on the ground. It would be interesting to know how many bomber pilots adopted this tactic without disclosure or if this strategy was considered by Bomber Command senior staff. Perhaps it was and discounted due to the possibility of increased risk of mid-air collisions. However, this would have been minimized if all aircraft after the photoflash turned onto a predetermined heading and initiated a maximum permissible steady dive until visual contact was established with the ground or if in instrument conditions, to a predetermined altitude that would provide obstacle clearance. With all aircraft descending on the same heading and rate of descent this would minimize the collision risk. Once stabilized at low altitude it would be up to the nav to provide headings to avoid known flak batteries. It would also be essential that all crews were provided a worst case scenario altimeter setting reading for the return leg to ensure they were flying at or above the safe obstacle clearance altitude. At the south shore of the North Sea the skipper would have to decide to remain low level or start a slow climb if there was a critical engine situation that might result in a ditching. The extra altitude would provide the option of gliding one way or the other. A ditching in the North Sea was risky business at any time of year.

The Schräge Musik weapon system was introduced with the August 17/18, 1943, Peenemünde raid with great success. Over the following months some crews were lucky enough to escape the wrath of this weapon system and limp home to base. The forensic experts would soon propose that German night fighters were armed with a weapon system that fired 20mm cannon projectiles nearly vertically, in unwitnessed attacks. Then the catastrophic March 30/31, 1944 Nuremberg raid provided Bomber Command intelligence officers with the information they needed—an eye witness account of a Lancaster being stalked and shot down in flames by a twin-engined night fighter—equipped with upward firing weapons.

Bomber Command senior staff informed aircrews the multiple explosions during this raid were in fact Scarecrow shells designed to mimic an exploding bomber, with the multicoloured ones simulating a Pathfinder aircraft. The intent was to allay crew’s anxiety but not inform them of the real, unexpected threat from below. This left them to falling back on the obsolete corkscrew maneuver and the cover of darkness and cloak of clouds. However, little did they realize that a skilled Nacjtjagd crew had the ability to intercept and attack under these conditions with the benefit of Airborne Interception radar and Schräge Musik weapons. One cannot blame the rear gunner for letting down his guard and not scanning for enemy fighters when they were ‘safely’ cloaked in cloud. Perhaps just the occasional glimpse dead astern, never expecting a ghostly shadow was slipping into position from below. The first sign of the attack would have been the resonant thumping as cannon shells ripping into the wing and fuel tanks. Often followed by the skipper’s almost immediate order to bale out. The following account on the demise of Halifax MZ422 provides graphic evidence of how just quickly this could happen.
https://aircrewremembered.com/mather-gordon-s.html

At this point it is worth playing devil’s advocate and extrapolate Bomber Command losses following the Nuremberg debacle, to assess a different approach as suggested in “TR”’s unorthodox tactic of the low-level, return leg—versus High Command’s decision to stick with the traditional corkskrew maneuver and the heads-in-the-sand, transparent, Scarecrow shell hoax. Would it have made a difference in survival rates?

The loss of Lanc W5009 was the Squadron’s twenty-third of the seventy-four lost during its eighteen month operational history. Over the next year, fifty-one crews would fail to return. We now know the two major threats to a bomber crew surviving their tour of ops were night fighters and flak, with the former being the greatest of all by a quantum leap. At this point we are lacking the final Squadron stats.

If we examine the Squadron’s fifty-one crews that came to grief in the last year of the war we can remove ten from this list as they fell to causes other than night fighters and flak: 2 on training flights (ND407, P/O H. Winder and PB556, P/O Harris), 2 in mid-air collisions (LM512, F/O H.N. Cornish with second pilot, P/O D.S. Tointon and LM691 S/L C.W.C. Hamilton), 2 outbound (ME676, F/O G.H. Reynolds and LL956, F/O L.A. Hannah), 2 inbound (PA174, P/O L.A. Tweeter and NN699, F/O G.A. Naylor), 1 to friendly fire (PB815, F/O D.R. Paige) and 1to an intruder attack at Base (ME734, P/O J.P. Cosgrove).

This leaves us with forty-one aircraft to deal with. We will divide this group into a third,14 aircraft for the outbound leg and two thirds, 27 on the homeward journey. The outbound crews were compelled to fly the courses and altitudes specified in the pre-raid briefing in order to concentrate the bomber stream and saturate the night fighters—safety in numbers. However, this left them exposed to fighters, flak and mid-air collisions.

The return journey would be a different story with the altitude restriction removed. The “unorthodox” tactic of diving at max allowable airspeed to low level, with courses to avoid known flak concentrations would essentially neutralize the two major threats, fighters and flak. As a result the majority would have returned safely to Base. In other words 27 crews or 189 souls would have been saved in the last year of conflict. A 58% increase in survival rate if this tactic had been introduced following the Nuremberg raid, without incurring additional costs. On the other hand the introduction of the Scarecrow hoax may have had the opposite effect with crews, especially the rear gunners, being lulled into a false sense of security. If this percentage rate is extrapolated to include all the Squadrons operating within Bomber Command over the last year of conflict, it is mind boggling how many young airmen would have returned to their families at war’s end.

Once, and if, the cloak of darkness is unveiled with opening of the Official Secrets Act (OSA) will we be able to review the reasoning of the politicians, senior RAF staff and Intelligence Officers following the discovery of the existence of Schäge Musik.

With the lifting of the OSA the public became aware of the existence and failure of Operation Freshman. On the evening of November 19/20, 1942, Two Halifax tow planes manned with crews from 596 and 597 Squadrons along with two Horsa gliders were detailed to attack the Norsk Heavy Water hydroelectric plant at Vermork, Norway. The gliders each had two pilots and fifteen Airborne commandos on board. Halifax ‘A’ had a crew of six and ‘B’ seven. To date we are uncertain if Halifax had a flight engineer or this role was undertaken by the second pilot.

This raid did not go as planned. Halifax ‘A’ was able to release its glider or it broke the tow line due to severe turbulence in clouds. Halifax ‘B’ and its glider crashed close to each other in Norway. The sole survivors of this mission were the crew from Halifax ‘A’, who managed to land at RAF Wick.

Of the forty-seven service men involved in this operation six were safe, eighteen were killed in action, including the aircrews of Halifax ‘B’ and the Horsa gliders and 23 of the commandos were murdered. Unbeknownst to them when they volunteered, Adolph Hitler had proclaimed the Commando Order on October 18, 1942, stating they were to be killed and not allowed to surrender. A German communique issued during the following 48 hours declared an aircraft and two gliders were forced to land and “the sabotage troops were engaged and annihilated”.
For a detailed report on this operation: https://aircrewremembered.com/operation-freshman.h...

The forty-seven service men participating in this operation represented three countries with a skewed mix:

Halifax II W7720 ‘A’, RAFVR (1), RAF (2), RAAF (3).

Halifax II W7801 ‘B’, RCAF (1), RAF (1), RAFVR (5).

Horsa DP349 Glider #1, 1st Glider Pilot Regiment Army Air Corp (2), Commandos from the 9th Field Company (Coy) Royal Engineers (RE) and 261st Airborne Field Park Coy RE (15).

Horsa HS114 Glider #2, P/Os RAAF (2), Commandos from the 9th and 261st Coys RE (15)

The sole RCAF member of Operation Freshman was the pilot of Halifax W7801, 26 year old F/L Arthur Roland Parkinson of Lachine Quebec. His education included a B.Sc. (Geology, McGill University) and he was employed as an assistant engineer. He enlisted in 1940 and by May 1941 had earned his pilots wing with 138 hours in Fleet Finch, Yale and Harvard types. His sports activities included rowing, football, skiing and tennis. Hobbies, photography and music.

He is buried in the Helleland Churchyard, Norway, Grave 4, with the remainder of his crew.

(ADD PHOTO #14) Helleland Churchyard, Norway. Courtesy of CWGC.

A similar edict would be issued by Hitler, following the D-Day invasion, applied to bomber crews baling out over enemy occupied territory. To the best of our knowledge no Squadron crew members were murdered.

However, 625 Squadron’s airmen KIA would reflect the losses by other squadrons of Bomber Command. From the seventy-four Squadron losses, 524 airmen would ‘fail to return’. This was composed of 389 KIA, 47 POWs, 16 evaders, 12 injured, 47 safe and 13 unknown (POW or evaders).

Of the 389 KIA, they represented the following national air forces:

RAF/RAFVR - 297 (includes 3 Canadians, 1 American, 1 South African and 1 British West Indian)
RCAF - 58 ( includes 1 American)
RAAF - 32
RNZAF - 1
USAAF - 1

For various reasons it was not unusual for individuals from other nationalities to enlist with the British or Canadian air forces. This was an option for Americans before the attack on Pearl Harbour and some countries did not have an air force. Some Canadians had parents who were still in England and elected to enlist with the RAF of the RAFVR. JEA

PHOTOGRAPHS AND MAPS

1. Target and Crash Site. Courtesy of Kelvin Youngs
2. PB413 Crash Site. Similar dynamics. Courtesy of David Langner.
3. ME676 Crash Site January 2025. Courtesy of Peter Blythe.
4. Local Map of ME676 Crash Site. Courtesy of Peter Blythe and Bexhill Museum.
5. ME676 Crash Report. Courtesy of Peter Blythe and Bexhill Museum.
6. ME676 Details of Occurrence. Courtesy of Peter Blythe and Bexhill Museum.
7. ME676 Form 78.
8. ME676 Form 1180, Part 1. Courtesy of Peter Blythe and Bexhill Museum.
9. ME676 Form 1180, Part 2. Courtesy of Peter Blythe and Bexhill Museum.
10. Berlin Airlift Record. Courtesy of Peter Blythe Collection.
11. F/L R.L.S. Hathaway, second from left. Courtesy of Peter Blythe Collection.
12. R.G. Hoffman headstone. Courtesy of Peter Blythe Collection.
13. Airmen’s Obituaries Book Two by Jay Iliff.

14. Helleland Churchyard, Norway. Courtesy of CWGC.

REFERENCES:

625 Squadron ORB.
Peter Blythe Collection.
http://number59squadron.com/berlin_59/nominal_roll/memorial_hathaway_rls.html
Bexhill Museum.
Aircrew Remembered Archive Reports.

CO-AUTHORS:

John Naylor
Maureen Hicks
Mike Edwards
Kelvin Youngs, photo-editing.
Philip Townsend

Submission by Peter Blythe and Jack Albrecht.

At the going down of the sun, and in the morning we will remember them. - Laurence Binyon
All site material (except as noted elsewhere) is owned or managed by Aircrew Remembered and should not be used without prior permission.
© Aircrew Remembered 2012 - 2025 Last Modified: 13 March 2025, 03:26