Operation: Training

Date: April 09/10, 1944

Unit: No. 625 Squadron

Type: Lancaster III

Serial: ND407

Code: CF-S

Base: Kelstern

Location: Night training, crashed at Base on return.

Pilot: P/O Harold Winder
Fl/Eng: Sgt R.J.I. Wood?
Nav: F/Sgt G.R. Edwards?
Air/Bmr: F/Sgt R.G. Barnes?
W/Op/Air/Gnr: Sgt J. Wright?
Air/Gnr: Sgt G.M. Canning?
Air/Gnr: Sgt G.D. Sutherland???

INTRODUCTION:

From the Squadron ORB it appears P/O Winder and his crew were posted from 1656 HCU to No. 625 Squadron RAF Kelstern on March 31, 1944 to start their tour of operations.

Normally rookie crews were provided a one to two weeks window to prepare for the rigours of night combat conditions over Occupied Europe. This included ground lectures on emergency situations and escape strategies, dinghy drills and flight exercises to familiarize with local landmarks, cross country navigation and bombing practice. Then it was time to face the reality of the task at hand—bombing Germany.

It was during a night training exercise that P/O Winder and his crew came to grief. On the evening of April 9/10, he misjudged his approach, too high and too hot, touched down long and overshot the runway. In the resulting crash two of the crew sustained injuries and ND407 was damaged beyond repair and never flew again as an entity. She had served her crews well, bringing them home from some of the most dangerous German targets: Brunswick, Berlin (4), Leipzig, Schweinfurt, Stuttgart and the infamous March 30/31, 1944 Nuremberg raid.

This type of accident was not uncommon for rookie pilots adjusting to the vagaries of night flying, particularly with landings. Decreased visual clues to judge height and distance resulted in spatial disorientation impairing the pilot’s decision of when to flare for the landing or execute a go-around if there was insufficient runway to stop. If uncertain the wise pilot flew another circuit to avoid a high stall onto the runway or overshooting it.

It would be nine days before the abbreviated Winder crew would be deemed fit to be placed on the Battle Order for the 18/19 April bombing raid on Rouen. Presumably in the interim P/O Winder would have had some intensive dual night circuits to ensure he was confident with his night landings.

F/L D.M. Blackmore would take a mixed bag of nine for this second ‘dickey’ trip:

Captain/Pilot: F/L D.M. Blackmore
2nd Pilot: P/O H. Winder
Fl/Eng: Sgt G. North
Nav: F/Sgt G.R. Edwards
A/B: F/Sgt R.G. Barnes
2nd A/B: F/Sgt R.W.B. Medway
W/Op: Sgt J. Wright
M/U/G: Sgt G.M. Canning
R/G: F/L D.W. Webber

18.4.44 Lanc III ND613 Up: 2210 Down: 0222 Rouen, uneventful op.

However, it is significant that ND613 landed eight minutes before P/O J.P. Cosgrove and his crew in ME734 joined the circuit at Kelstern and were on their final approach to land, when they were bounced by a German intruder, crashing in flames within the aerodrome perimeter. There were no survivors from this popular crew. It is quite likely that F/L Blackmore and his crew were witness to this incident as they had time to taxi to their dispersal, deplane, waiting for transportation. As Russell Margerison recounted in Boys at War this was one of the most demoralizing events of his operational tour. He witnessed the attack and crash from his
mid-upper turret in the circuit. ME734’s rear gunner was a close acquaintance.
https://aircrewremembered.com/cosgrove-joseph-patr...

Five of ND613’s crew included P/O Winder and his original crew.

We know this flight would be the last the P/O Winder crew would participate in as a combat unit. The Squadron ORB Movements section for May 1944 notes the following postings:

P/O H. Winder to 11 Base wef 18.5.44
Sgt G.M. Canning to 11 Base wef 18.5.44
F/Sgt G.R. Edwards to ACDU Chessington wef 20.5.44
F/Sgt R.G. Barnes to ACDU Chessington wef 20.5.44
Sgt J. Wright to ACDU Chessington wef 20.5.44
Sgt K.G. Rhodes to 11 Base wef 18.5.44. See below*

RAF Kelstern Lancaster flyover 2023

We could not locate a record for the posting of Flight Engineer, Sgt R.J.I. Wood and suspect he was one of the Winder crew injured in the April 9/10 1944 training accident. His name was found in the No. 625 Squadron DIARY by Eric Thale. The name in the ORB is illegible but a close fit.

It is apparent from these postings that three members of this crew had had enough after surviving a crash-landing and witnessing the fate that two thirds of them would be confronted with. Life was suddenly a vital entity to be savoured for to years come. LMF could impact a single crew member or impact the entire crew, depending on a multitude of circumstances.

In the case of the Winder crew, two contributing factors resulted in three of them choosing to take the LMF option.

Another situation comes to mind wherein a mid-upper-gunner made the decision after witnessing a single traumatic event. During the stop-and-go, taxi parade waiting for the green flare to depart during daylight, he watched in horror as the distracted pilot of the trailing Lanc continued to roll forward. Before he could rectify the situation his prop had ripped to shreds the tailplane of the land Lanc ahead—including the rear turret and gunner. Shaken to the core, the mid-upper reported to the Gunnery Leader, threw down his flight gear and told him he would never fly again. He never did.

On occasion it would take time for the strain of combat stress to reach the boiling point. This could happen towards the end of a crew’s tour of operations and might be a compound decision of the entire crew. An example of the ‘crewing up’ strategy at work, in reverse, with the crew electing to pull the plug as a unit: we train together, fight together and if necessary die together, but not always—there were exceptions.

F/Sgt R.H. Wintle and his crew arrived at 625 Squadron two days before the Winder crew, from 11 Base on March 29, 1944. To the best of our knowledge this crew consisted of:

Pilot: F/Sgt Wintle
Fl/Eng: Sgt G.C. Whellens
Nav: Sgt H.E. Frogson
A/B: F/O J.S. McHale
W/Op: Sgt T. White
M/U/G: Sgt R.E. Way
R/G: Sgt G.D. Sutherland?

It appears rear gunner, Sgt Sutherland, was the original one with P/O Winder’s crew until their night training accident. With the breakup of this crew he was ‘adopted’ as the permanent rear gunner of F/Sgt Wintle’s crew for the remainder of their tour.

*It is noteworthy Air Gunner 1522850 Sgt K.G. Rhodes was posted to 625 Squadron on 31.3.44, from No. 1662 CU. We suspect he replaced Sgt Sutherland as rear gunner for the night training flight of April 9/10, 1944.

The Wintle crew would endure a challenging tour that pushed them to the brink. One can be quite certain that they were not alone as the Squadron’s losses mounted with the demands of precision bombing supporting the advancing invasion forces.

It is unusual F/Sgt Wintle and his crew would start their tour of operations without the customary second ‘dickey’ initiation trip:

1. 10.4.44 Lanc III ED398 F/Sgt R.H. Wintle and crew Aulnoye… P.F.F. marking was good and many explosions were seen in the target area.

2. 11.4.44 Lanc III LL894 S/L G.R. Ross DFC Captain/Pilot, F/Sgt Wintle 2nd Pilot, Sgt J.G. McMahon rear gunner Achen… The attack seemed to be very successful.

3. 18.4.44 Lanc III ND639 F/Sgt Wintle and crew Rouen. Landed 34 minutes after ME734, P/O Cosgrove and crew were shot down in the circuit by a German intruder.

4. 20.4.44 Lanc III LM317 F/Sgt Wintle and crew Cologne. u/e op.

5. 22.4.44 Lanc III LM317 F/Sgt Wintle and crew Dusseldorf. u/e op.

6. 24.4.44 Lanc III LM317 F/Sgt Wintle and crew Karlsruhe. u/e op.

7. 26.4.44 Lanc I DV278 F/Sgt Wintle and crew Essen. A large amount of flak was experienced over the target, also many fires were seen burning as the aircraft turned for Base.

8. 27.4.44 Lanc I DV278 F/Sgt Wintle and crew Friedricshafen. u/e op.

9. 3.5.44 Lanc III LL894 F/Sgt Wintle and crew Mailly le Camp…Owing to bad work of the M.C. the bombing was very haphazard, and the results not too good from the report by the members of the crew. (Triple Squadron Loss)

10. 7.5.44 Lanc III LM427 F/Sgt Wintle and crew Bruz. u/e op.

11. 9.5.44 Lanc III ND619 F/Sgt Wintle and crew Melville. u/e op.

12. 11.5.44 Lanc I LL897 F/Sgt Wintle and crew Hasselt. u/e op.

13. 21.5.44 Lanc III LL956 F/Sgt Wintle and crew Duisburg. Nothing of importance occurred.

14. 22.5.44 Lanc I LL956 F/Sgt Wintle and crew Dortmund. A very satisfactory attack.

15. 24.5.44 Lanc I LL956 F/Sgt Wintle and crew Le Clipon. u/e op.

16. 6.6.44 Lanc I LL956 P/O Wintle and crew Vire. u/e op.

17. 7.6.44 Lanc I LL956 P/O Wintle and crew Forêt de Cerisy. u/e op.

18. 10.6.44 Lanc I LL956 P/O Wintle and crew Acheres. (Triple Squadron loss!)

19. 12.6.44 Lanc I LL956 P/O Wintle and crew Gelsenkirchen. u/e op.

20. 14.6.44 Lanc I LL956 P/O Wintle and crew Le Havre. The attack was a great success from reports by the crew.

21. 15.6.44 Lanc I LL956 P/O Wintle and crew Bologne. u/e op.

22. 22.6.44 Lanc I LL956 P/O Wintle, F/O W.E.B. Mason 2nd Pilot, Sgt Frogson nav and Sgt Sutherland rear gunner. Reims. u/e op.

23. 24.6.44 Lanc I LL956 P/O Wintle and crew Les Hayons. u/e op.

24. 25.6.44 Lanc I LL956 P/O Wintle and crew Leigescourt. u/e op.

25. 29.6.44 Lanc I LL956 P/O Wintle and crew Siracourt. u/e op.

26. 2.7.44 Lanc I LL956 P/O Wintle and crew Oisemont Neuville. u/e op.

27. 4.7.44 Lanc I LL956 P/O Wintle and crew Orleans. u/e op.

28. 5.7.44 Lanc I LL956 P/O Wintle and crew Dijon. u/e op.

29. 12.7.44 Lanc I LL956 P/O Wintle and crew Tours. u/e op.

30. 14.7.44 Lanc I LL956 P/O Wintle and crew Revigny. Mission abandoned and bombs brought back as ordered by Master Bomber. Landed at Base. Very disappointing trip.

RAF Kelstern from the air in 2023

The Squadron’s ORB would provide the evidence that this last mission was the one that broke the camel’s back. A review of the missions flown for the months of July and August 1944 indicate that this crew had flown their last mission as a team. A review of the movements for the months of July and August 1944 show the following postings:

F/E 1591654 Sgt G.C. Whellens to A.C.A.C. Brackla wef 21.8.44
Nav 1577937 F/Sgt H.E. Frogson to No. 18 O.T.U. wef 31.7.44
B/A J23134 F/O J.S. McHale to No.16 O.T.U. wef 27.7.44
W/Op 1439917 Sgt T. White to No. 18 O.T.U. wef 31.7.44
A/G 1825535 Sgt G.D. Sutherland to A.C.A.C. Brackla wef 21.8.44
A/G 1164020 Sgt R.E. Way to A.C.A.C. Brackla wef 21.8.44

It is interesting to note no posting is recorded for P/O Wintle.

Perhaps most illuminating is the list of postings out of the Squadron for August 1944. Out of a total of forty-five airmen posted from the Squadron, twenty-three (51%) were destined for A.C.A.C. (Aircrew Allocation Centre) Brackla. These airmen had decided they had had enough, choosing to live out their lives, and not be snuffed out by the carnage of war. They were not cowards but had seen enough to comprehend the raw statistics indicating that their chances of seeing the end of a tour of ops, hovered in the 30% range.

The senior staff of Bomber Command had lost their confidence with the focus on bomb tonnage dropped trumping the welfare of these young airmen. Decisions by the powers that be to introduce the hoax of ‘scarecrow’ shells, the milk-run ops counting as only half a mission, precision bombing at low altitudes in clear conditions or moonlight and returning to Base with a full bomb load on board, tipped the scales. The risks of this form of Russian Roulette were simply too high—it was time to go home while they still could.

At this point of the war, the concept of crewing up took on a new meaning. Crews as a unit were deciding they had done their bit and it was time to move on. P/O Wintle and his crew are a case in point. For two crew members this was their thirtieth, magical last op, only to return to Base with a full bomb load and an op that might not count. Too much to take.

It appears P/O Wintle and his crew discussed and decided they had fulfilled, or nearly so, their contract of thirty ops. For three the war was over—there was no turning back. They languished at RAF Kelstern for over a month as senior staff decided their fate. The other three elected to continue their air force careers with postings to training units. This suggests the RAF senior staff showed compassion in allowing this crew to tour expire as a combat unit with several of them short at least one op to fulfill the contract of thirty missions.

In dealing with cases of Lack of Moral Fibre (LMF) it is impossible to overlook the divide of handling aircrew officers versus the regular ranks. It is virtually impossible to locate an officer’s posting to an ACDU (Air Crew Disposal Unit) or ACAC unit. For some reason they were immune to the label of LMF and quietly posted to administrative roles. Airmen of lower ranks were not as fortunate, stripped of rank and aircrew status, and on occasion humiliated in front of the entire squadron.

The majority of these airmen labeled LMF were not cowards but had exceeded their personal psychological thresholds to compensate for the relentless stress of combat and constant risk of sudden, traumatic death with each op. They had witnessed the loss of their Squadron mates and realized that sooner or later their luck would run out. The defence mechanism that it could only happen to the other guy and not me, eventually lost its lustre. They were just as vulnerable and they would not survive playing this form of Russian roulette.

As Russell Margerison prophesied, the witnessed destruction of ME734 by many of the Squadron’s personnel would have a significant impact on Squadron morale. A seed that would germinate into the massive exodus of airmen in August 1944—due to LMF and not tour expiration. During their three month tour, the Wintle crew had participated in or witnessed the loss of ME734 and the impact of three of the Squadron’s multi-loss raids, Mailly-le-Camp, Achères and Vierzon—three ‘milk-run’ targets. In addition they had been exposed to the ‘scarecrow’ shell hoax and ordered to return to Base with a full bomb load. With this in mind it is not surprising this crew unanimously decided to terminate their tour when they did, on the verge of tour expiring— survival mode. ‘Crewing up’ enabled this crew to make a tough decision that possibly saved their lives. They realized the greater threat of senior staff flawed leadership. Bomb tonnage out trumping aircrew welfare. They were now aware of this and governed themselves accordingly. For many the only sane option was going LMF. The Squadron movements for the month of August 1944 are graphic evidence of the state of aircrew morale. We do not have access to the ORBs of other Bomber Command squadrons but suspect 625 Squadron was not alone with this percentage of airmen selecting the LMF option.

It was interesting to research the fate of those chosing the LMF route and those chosing to continue their contract of thirty ops. Not surprising, there were no fatalities in the former group. However, the three who chose the latter course died at the predicted rate. P/O H. Winder would survive the war.

Sadly, Air Gunners F/Sgt Canning and Rhodes, and F/O Robert Bruce Melville, Wireless Operator, would lose their lives during a day raid on Agenville, France. Their No. 166 Squadron Lancaster III, NE170, AS-I was shot down by heavy flak over the target. Pilot; F/O F.E. Elliott RCAF; Flight Engineer, Sgt J.H. Comley; Navigator, Sgt N.W.L. Linton and Air Bomber, F/Sgt Oliphant RCAF, all survived as evaders.

No. 166 Squadron Lancaster III NE170, AS-I

BURIAL DETAILS:

F/O Robert Bruce Melville died August 31, 1944. Age 28. Buried at Fillievres British Cemetery, France, Plot 1. Row D. Grave 1. Son of Charles A. and Winnifred H. of Midland, Ontario, Canada.

Left: F/O Robert Bruce Melville J18235. (Courtesy of LAC/Ancestry.ca, All Canada, World War II Records and Service Files of War Dead, 1939-1947 Results)

F/Sgt Geoffrey Maurice Canning died August 31, 1944. Age 19. Buried at Fillievres British Cemetery, France, Plot 1. Row D. Grave 3. Son of Maurice and Jane Canning of Redditch, Worcestershire. His epitaph reads:

He died
That others might live.
Lovingly remembered by
Dad, mum, Betty and Dot

F/Sgt George Rhodes died August 31, 1944. Buried at Fillievres British Cemetery, France,
Plot 1. Row D. Grave 2. Son of E. and Lily Rhodes, of Diggle, Yorkshire. His epitaph reads:

At rest.

DECORATION SUGGESTIONS by author

We realize this is a thorny issue and understand only two of the Wintle crew fulfilled their contract of thirty ops, without one early return. We feel flexibility and compassion are in order with this crew who had reached their anxiety threshold of the fear of a traumatic death.

1316882 P/O G.C. Wintle: DFC
1591654 F/Sgt G.C. Whellens: DFM
1577937 Sgt H.E. Frogson: DFM
J23137 F/O J.S. McHale: DFC
1439917 Sgt T. White: DFM
1164020 Sgt R.E. Way: DFM|
1825535 Sgt G.D. Sutherland: DFM

J18235 F/O Robert Bruce Melville: DFC
1819894 F/Sgt Geoffrey Maurice Canning: DFM
1522850 F/Sgt George Rhodes: DFM

LACK OF MORAL FIBRE (LMF): PART 2

Part 1 is included in the addendum of the archive report on the loss of 625 Squadron’s ME684:

Talismans, Lack of Moral Fibre (LMF) and Criteria for Decoration Suggestions
https://aircrewremembered.com/clark-norman-arthur-...

This provides an introduction to combat neurosis and the layman’s term Lack of Moral Fibre (LMF). In summary any airmen exposed to repeated combat exposure could only tolerate so much stress and anxiety before psychologically decompensating. A spectrum of examples are included in the text of this ND407 archive report. Every individual was different and the breaking point unpredictable. Rare individuals appeared to be immune to the stresses of combat, thriving on the adrenalin rush of near death encounters. At the time we identified

W/Cdr Leonard Cheshire VC OM DSO and 2 Bars DFC, as the sole example of an airmen being awarded the VC for surviving four tours of ops. In the interim we have discovered a second airmen who exceeds the combat experience of W/Cdr Cheshire—F/O Doug Cameron DFM MiD, with four tours and a total of 122 ops! Taking into account our decoration suggestions we feel F/O Doug Cameron VC DFC and Bar DFM MiD, is deserved. His remarkable operational career is covered in the archive report for the loss of Lancaster ND811, S/L Bazagette and Crew, and he is given special mention in the Squadron Heroes section of 625 Squadron References.
https://aircrewremembered.com/bazalgette-ian-willo...
https://aircrewremembered.com/625-squadron-referen...

In November 2020, Dan Ellin, archivist for the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive at the University of Lincoln, published in the British Journal for Military History a very informative article: ‘A ‘Lack of Moral Fibre’ in Royal Air Force Bomber Command and Popular Culture’.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/363214419...

This comprehensive treatise covers this derogatory term from its introduction on March 21, 1940, to discuss the increasing number of airmen who refused to fly on operations to inclusion in current popular culture.

…”Aircrew were expected to be the pinnacle of society and the military hierarchy however, and in 1939, the RAF was unprepared for neuropsychiatric casualties or men who refused to fly. By 1945, medical professionals were more inclined to accept that everyone had a limit to their endurance. However, there has been a further, significant paradigm shift since then. Rather than the individual being at fault, the primacy of a traumatic event has become established in both the medical profession and in popular understanding. It is now accepted that anyone can succumb to trauma and since the creation and popularisation of the diagnosis in the 1980s, LMF is often recalled in the context of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)…

Medical officers were to refer individuals to specialists at RAF hospitals. From there airmen could be returned to duty, be admitted for convalescence or invalided from the service. The RAF was under the illusion, that as an elite with a high proportion of officers, aircrew would not be too susceptible to stress, but after some squadrons experienced unsustainable losses, they found this assumption to be false…

On an operational station, it is likely that only senior officers knew the content of the letter regarding LMF, and it must be remembered that the guidance on LMF was altered throughout the war. It also meant different things to different people. Senior officers often believed LMF required a medical diagnosis, while the RAF’s medical consultants and some Medical Officers were determined to ensure that LMF was an executive and not a medical matter. However, the distinction between LMF and psychoneurosis was never resolved. Medical Officers were caught in the middle of the conflict, while RAF personnel and members of the public were left to rely on rumour and speculation for their understanding of LMF.

Both psychological illnesses and a lack of discipline were thought to be influenced by issues of class and an individual’s inherent weakness of character…Wartime psychiatry rested on the belief that some people were predisposed to mental breakdown through inherited or acquired characteristics. The RAF’s medical consultants believed that non-commissioned officers (NCOs) broke down more frequently because of these fixed and ‘inherent qualities’. In the previous war, officers were diagnosed with anxiety while similar symptoms displayed by other ranks were interpreted as hysteria…

…The treatment aircrew received varied between stations and depended on the senior officers’ interpretation of the procedure. The disproportionate number of NCO cases may partly be explained because senior officers could not observe aircrew in the sergeants’ mess: consequently, they were less able to offer advice, prophylactic treatment or rest. Often, neither Medical Officers, nor Commanding Officers wanted to be responsible for the process…The management of LMF cases was inconsistent throughout the war and across different stations. However, many of the beliefs about LMF were consistent with what the aircrews themselves understood about LMF, then and decades later. LMF was equated with fear, cases occurred in ‘epidemics’ and effective leadership was believed to help reduce the likelihood of occurrences.

…Historians have used sources about the medical treatment of neuropsychiatric patients by the RAF, but while the consultants and Medical Officers had a role to play, LMF was not a medical diagnosis. The problem was, and remains, a matter of definition. It relied on senior officers making a judgment about the motives, morale and mental health of an individual. Some aircrew who refused to fly flagrantly disobeyed orders, while others were suffering from neuropsychiatric disorders. Unfortunately, there was never an effective administrative procedure in place to make a distinction between the two…

Aircrew were seen by neuropsychiatric specialists at Not Yet Diagnosed Neuropsychiatric (NYDN) centres. They were based at RAF Hospitals, and led by a neuropsychiatric specialist, provided for both in and out-patients. An article in the British Medical Journal claimed that every new patient was ‘reviewed completely and anew’. However, the psychiatrist, Eric Jewesbury, stressed the importance of the opinion of others. He wished that the staff on stations had the confidence to shorten the tours for some aircrew without referring them to specialists… Medical professionals like Jewesbury and Stafford-Clark refused to label aircrew as LMF, and the numbers assessed by Jewesbury suggest that many station Medical Officers felt the same. Airmen who were not given a medical diagnosis were attached to RAF Uxbridge, RAF Eastchurch or, after October 1943, to the Air Crew Disposal Unit (ACDU), for an executive decision…

…Airmen sent to the ACDU were not treated harshly or hastily and were not all found LMF. Some were downgraded medically, while others were Court Martialled. Personnel were also interviewed by Wing Commander Lawson and his importance in LMF process is clear. Lawson highlighted that the treatment of airmen varied throughout the war and at different stations…Reflecting on the airmen interviewed, Lawson believed that most were happy to be removed from flying ‘whatever the consequences’, and many were relieved to be able to discuss their fears. He maintained that many classified under the memorandum ‘accepted the decision without demur’ but that ‘all those who resented the decision’ were found to be ‘medically unfit’. Some men were more upset to have a medical diagnosis than to be labelled LMF, and while many were not concerned about the loss of rank, all mourned the loss of their flying badge.

Oral histories and victim narratives

…Seven interviewees describe the LMF ritual that occurred on other stations, but only three claim to have personally witnessed the humiliating stripping of rank and badges. Charles Green recalled a gunner who refused to fly after being ‘hose-piped’ by night fighters

…this air gunner came in and he was ruddy crying. Absolutely crying. A bloke. You know. And he was trembling all over and he was saying, “never again. I’m not going never again. Never again.”…Everybody was talking about it…Then one day we were called out on parade…Everybody on the parade ground. And they marched this lad out, air gunner, and stripped him of his, stripped him off of his, he’d been court martialled ‘cause he wouldn’t, wouldn’t fly again.

And they stripped his tapes off and his brevet off and everything…they were that ruddy cruel but I know they marched him off and that was it.

Conclusion

During the war, the different versions of the Air Ministry’s waverer letter were open to interpretation. Working together, the Commanding Officer and Medical Officer were entitled to categorise an airman as LMF, but most tried to avoid making such a decision. The waver letter was amended throughout the war, and its interpretation varied from station to station depending on the senior officers’ beliefs and style of leadership. The LMF ritual was performed at some stations, but it was not part of official policy and far more men were passed to a NYDN centre or ACDU for assessment. Senior officers were keen to remove suspect aircrew from the station as quickly as possible to avoid any contagion. This also contributed to aircrew’s suspicion of the RAF’s psychiatrists and their mistaken understanding of the classification as a medical diagnosis; it fed the rumours of LMF. Once someone was removed from operations however, a considerable effort was made to rule out a medical reason why they should not fly before their brevets were taken from them…

From over 125,000 aircrew in Bomber Command, only a tiny percentage were removed from flying in any of the three categories. More aircrew were removed from flying duties during training - but stories of aircrew who were washed out during training are not as useful to either the wartime narrative of LMF or the post-war victim narrative of a draconian policy…

Veterans reiterate the rumours they heard about LMF during the war and embellish their tales with information from popular history and cultural sources, but they have no idea what happened to their colleagues after they disappeared. Airmen ‘disappeared’ from bomber stations for many reasons during the war. Men were sent on leave, they were attached or transferred to other squadrons, or posted away after completing their tour. Some were sent to NYDN centres for assessment, a few were LMF and of course, many failed to return from operations…The rumours of what happened to airmen after they disappeared were almost as effective as actually witnessing a ritual parade. These horror stories reinforced the procedure as a deterrent to prevent airmen from refusing to fly. They continue to be repeated by surviving veterans. Although it was an indeterminate category, LMF has solidified since the war to become an important part of the history of Bomber Command.”

Dan Ellin

This brief summary does not do justice to this excellent article. Those interested are encouraged to read the entire content on the link noted above to the online PDF.

REFERENCES:

625 Squadron ORB
CWGC Website
‘A ‘Lack of Moral Fibre’ in Royal Air Force Bomber Command and Popular Culture’ https://www.researchgate.net/publication/363214419...

CO-AUTHORS

John Naylor:
You have done an excellent job here in the enlightenment of LMF. I do remember Dad talking about it, quite often in his later years, and saying how unfair it was. He had known the toughest and bravest men you could ever wish to meet, that in the end, after witnessing the most horrific scenes and encountering consistent VERY close brushes with death, just could take no more. I feel they were very harshly and unfairly judged, and you have explained the many inconsistencies in the interpretation of just what LMF was.

Maureen Hicks
Roy Wilcock
Mike Edwards
Kelvin Youngs Photo-editing

Submission by Dan Ellin and Jack Albrecht.

October 28, 2023

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