Scope of Project

Definition of Dutch RAF/FAA Aviator, Time Frame, Geographical Frame, The Others - a perspective on all losses, Causes of death versus causes of crash, The men and the machines. Motivation of project, Trying to lift some of the fog of war, The moral obligation, Let bygones be bygones - but who has gone by?, Why bother?, Numbers and fates, Methods and tools, Finding data, Archives, literature, web, finding eyewitnesses, finding geographical and arachaeological data, finding family archives, where are the RAF commissioned aviator paintings?, Checking data, data enhancements based on evidence or assumptions, data reductions, analysing data, crash data analysis, circumstances of crash analysis, circumstances of death analysis, presenting data, headstone photography, uncertainty margin, production tools, language chosen, aircraft nomenclature, text censoring by Dutch Government, Claims, Failures in project

1. Description of a chapter of the Dutch RAF/Fleet Air Arm episode

The Royal Air Force is, of course, that part of the British armed services chiefly concerned with flying. However, the British Royal Navy also conducts flying, in this case with the Fleet Air Arm. Dutch personnel served in both. This study does not describe the Dutch RAF/FAA episode. It describes a chapter of that episode, the chapter that describes the fatalities and how these came about.

Author wishes to stipulate that this study could lead to the opinion that Dutch RAF aviation was mostly about suffering losses. That's definitely not the case. Although it is very difficult to measure achievements in an objective way, author has no indication whatsoever that the Dutch performed below the average of the other nationalities involved in the RAF & FAA Wartime effort.

The fatalities in the European theatre involved the crashes of 122 aircraft. Below we shall try to describe as many of these crashes as we can manage in more detail. In 'STEEN' by this author, first published May 2005, the crashes of Rijklof van Goens, Govert Steen, Jan Plesman and Hilbrand Holtrop are described in some to great detail. These descriptions are repeated here, in abbreviated form only, so as to make this study as complete as possible. For more detail about these losses, the reader is referred to 'STEEN'.

It is unlikely that it shall be possible to obtain correct key data about all these crashes. Many crashes took place at sea, no eyewitnesses, and no traces found. Nevertheless, we need to try and do the best we can. Shrugging shoulders cannot be an option.

In the course of research it became evident that a lot of apparently new data can be found, even after sixty years, when returning to the assumed crash sites to find and tap local memory. Author is indebted to all those who cooperated freely, to find and give these scraps of data. All are mentioned below in the chapter 'Acknowledgements'.

Research has led to many minor to major improvements of data available to the public via literature and/or the Casualty Registers of the British Common­wealth War Graves Commission and the Dutch Oorlogsgravensticht­ing. Author has had extensive communications with these organisations when suggesting that they should improve their data on the documented basis of results of new research. Fortunately, and after a less-than-promising start, the OGS and the CWGC have come to be increasingly receptive to such suggestions.

2. Definition of Dutch RAF/FAA aviator

During World War 2, at least 1.674 Dutchmen served with the Royal Air Force or the Fleet Air Arm in the European theatre. Irrespective of their rank and function, they shall here be referred to as Dutch RAF aviators. Where applicable, a distinction shall be made between flying and ground personnel, but Dutchmen who died whilst serving with the RAF or the FAA on the ground or at sea are explicitly included in this study. Dutchmen who died whilst serving in the USAAF would have been included, but author did not find any.

The definition specifies death whilst serving with the RAF or FAA, or after having served with the RAF or FAA, time & place to be defined in the next subchapters. The definition does not specify types of death. Casualties that fell without the involvement of a - crashing - aircraft, are expressly included. Anything less would violate the complexity presented by War, and exclude at least some. None of the casualties deserve to be excluded. Author sees no justifiable difference between death during a crash, or by the hands of captors, or by accident, or disease.

In Defence spheres it is usual to make rather strict distinctions to service and rank. That shall not be done in this study. Ranks and services shall be mentioned, but there shall not be a distinction leading to chapters about service groups, Luchtvaartafdeling (LVA), later the Koninklijke Luchtmacht (KLu), versus Marine Luchtvaart Dienst (MLD) and/or the ML-KNIL, the Militaire Luchtvaart of the Koninklijke Nederlandse Indische Leger. The casualties of one service are as dead as those of the other. Interservice issues should not extend over the graves of the casualties. Thus, casualties suffered by the Marine Luchtvaart Dienst, or its branch under RAF wings, the RNNAS, Royal Netherlands Naval Air Services, are included within the time and area limitations of this study. They shall all be referred to as Dutch RAF, or Dutch RAF/FAA aviators.

Many of the Dutch RAF/FAA aviators did not serve in the Dutch Army prior to, and some not even during, the War. They had the Dutch nationality, and they effectively became Dutch soldiers, by virtue of entering service with the Royal Air Force or the Fleet Air Arm. These men are expressly included in this study.

A small number of Dutchmen died when posted to other units in Europe, after service with a Dutch RAF or FAA unit. These men were posted mostly to the Royal Dutch Navy, to the Bureau Bijzondere Opdrachten, or to KLM. Their losses are included in this study.

Not included are the losses of Dutch military aviators who served in the Pacific Theatre of Operations, meaning mainly the Dutch East Indies and Australia. This distinction follows from nothing but a practical reason, dictated by the sheer size of the work involved. However, if they served in England with the Royal Air Force or the Fleer Air Arm, prior to being send to the Pacific, their names shall be included here. For this last group, completeness is not claimed. See also Subchapter 'The others' below, for information about filling possible gaps regarding this group.

3. Time frame

The period considered is 22 May 1940 up to and including 9 May 1945. On the first date a small number of Dutch military aircraft was flown to France, and then on to the UK. The crew had managed to evade captivity after the Dutch surrender on May 15^th, 1940. Their arrival in England marks the beginning of the episode of Dutch military flying in World War 2 under the wings of the Royal Air Force.

The second date marks the liberation of The Netherlands. This date is more arbitrary. The liberation of Holland was not entirely the end of Dutchmen flying in the Royal Air Force or the Fleet Air Arm. Activities continued until the Dutch East Indies were liberated too. Author considers these activities as belonging to the Far East episode of Dutch military flying. That episode is not studied here; it would require a study equal in format as the present one. That's just too much for one book.

Dutchmen wishing to fly with the RAF were entering a foreign military service. That could be considered as treason under normal circumstances. In the special circumstance of a Dutch Government in exile in London, a solution was found by the Dutch Ministry of War by granting the men permission in writing to enter the British forces. Formally, this permission would have to be revoked after the Liberation, but author did not find a document in which that was done. Either for individual Dutch RAF aviators or for all. That too makes a choice for a date ending the episode arbitrary. Author choose 09/05/1945 as an earlier date would exclude Dutch RAF loss of life, which was also abundant in the first months of the final year of the War. Obviously we did not want to leave out those losses. Furthermore, loss of life of Dutch RAF aviators after 09/05/1945 did not occur as a result of battle. In any case, loss of life of Dutch aviators, still in RAF service after 09/05/1945, is summarized in a separate Chapter. This was done because any schematization includes the risk of leaving out the cases at the edges of the schedule, cases that have a good chance of not being mentioned anywhere.

Graph 1. Fatalities amongst Dutch military aviators, period 1913-2007

The graph shows the number of fatal casualties amongst Dutch military aviators versus the year, period 1913-2007, covering all Dutch military services that flew aircraft into combat, or that trained for this. The total number is 1.283.

A division into the World War Two period and the episodes before and after, shows the following results:

All losses mentioned in the table above are directly related to military flying. The numbers span all Dutch military flying services, LVA, MLD, NL RAF, RNNAS including those who flew with the FAA, ML-KNIL, RNMFS, and Klu.Table 1. Dutch military aviators fatalities, 1913-present

Another 626 Airforce personnel were lost 1913 to 2008, by causes outside of the definition used for the Soesterberg Monument, see Appendices 3, Monuments.

Of the 703 fatalities in the 1940-1945 period, 38 fell during the May 1940 air War over Holland, 226 fell in Western Europe as Dutch RAF casualties, 17 fell in Western Europe serving with other units after they had flown with the Dutch RAF, 33 fell during training in Canada and the United States, and 361 were lost in the South-East Asia area, the last in a period extending to 15/8/1945, the date of Japan's surrender. The other 28 were lost in 1945 after 9/5/1945, Western Theatre, and 15/8/1945, Eastern Theatre, respectively. The Dutch RAF/MLD/RNNAS/FAA episode, Western Theatre, described here, in short the Dutch RAF episode, therefore amounts to 226/1.283 is 18% of all losses of Dutch military aviators ever. These casualties fell in a period of five years, on average 45 per year. The average goes up to 141 per year, if all Dutch military aviation casualties of WW2 are considered. The Dutch RAF episode is not the only period in which heavy loss of life of Dutch military aviators was suffered. But the numbers make it clear that it was a most hectic, and therefore historically important, episode. It stands out as a dramatic period, and as a period that is highly in need of a description made clearly more accurate and complete than currently available via literature.

The numbers given above can be confusing, due to the various Dutch military flying services that came into existence as a result of the following factors:

1. Historic events, including the World War 2 period in which the Dutch were partially dependent on the British Royal Air Force.

2. The Dutch inclination to divide organised life up into many parties.

Matters were complicated even further by the delegation of personnel from one service to the other. These complications are likely to be part of the explanation why the production of a complete and accurate Roll of Honour for the Dutch Airforce has proven to be such a difficult task.

In Subchapter 5. below more perspective on losses, grouped by services, periods and theatre of operations, is offered.

Geographical frame

The study is limited to Dutch RAF or FAA aviators who were lost in the European Theatre of Operations, including the seas surrounding Europe. An even greater number of fatal casualties amongst aviators was suffered by the Dutch in the Far East Theatre of Operations. In fact 361 versus 226 losses, or 60% more losses in the East as compared to the West. But describing these also would be just too much for a single study. However, fatalities suffered during Dutch military aviator training in Canada and the USA during World War 2 are mentioned, as these men were training to become operational in either Europe or the Far East, and as they, as a group, did not receive abundant attention in literature either.

Hitler’s order for Operation Seelöwe the planned invasion of Great Britain. It was not to be, as the aerial offensive against Britain failed.

What the previous picture did not show: the obelisk erected by the French on Cap Blanc Nez commemorating victory in the First World War. At the front a shot-up chimney of one of the German WW2 observation bunkers. Cap Blanc Nez 070315-13

The others - a perspective on all losses

As stated before, the Dutch military aviation effort in World War 2 was greater, in terms of casualties, in the Pacific Theatre of Operations than in Europe. A full survey of all Dutch military aviation casualties has not yet been published. Several attempts by Ministry of Defence staff to produce a loss list are on record with the Nederlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie (NIMH) in Den Haag. The culmination of these is an oversized book, of which two copies were made. One is held by the NIMH, the other is on display in the Military Aviation Museum, Soesterberg, NL. Losses are grouped by the day. Each day, a page is turned, showing the losses through the years on that day.

A special section on the Soesterberg Memorial is included in the Archive. See Table of Contents.

Book of Remembrance in the Military Aviation Museum, Soesterberg. In the background are the various services in which Dutch aviators went to battle, mainly the Marine Luchtvaart Dienst (MLD), Militaire Luchtvaart van het Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger (ML-KNIL), Royal Air Force (RAF) and the current Koninklijke Luchtmacht (KLu) MLM 080403 Gedenkboek 3

Book of Remembrance, turned open on April 5 MLM Gedenkboek 2

Amazingly, none of these lists is complete and accurate.

The full picture can be approached, not achieved, via the following published literature, that offers extensive loss lists, that are however limited in time and place.

1. Molenaar, F.J.; 'De Luchtverdediging in de meidagen van 1940', Den Haag, 1970, for an extensive account of the Air War over Holland in May 1940.

2. Wittert van Hoogland, René; 'Het vergeten Squadron', Franeker, 1976, reprint Amsterdam, 1983, for a Roll of Honour of Dutch military aviators who fell in the Pacific area during World War 2. This list is far from complete. Author gives additions in one of the Chapters below.

3. Floor, Harry; 'Gedenkrol van de Koninklijke Marine 1939-1962', Stichting Het Veteraneninstituut, 2004. Author shall give additions for the period 1917-2007 in one of the Chapters below.

4. The online Casualty Register of the Oorlogsgravenstichting. Unfortunately, aviators cannot be approached in this database without having a name in the first place. Furthermore, the OGS holds an enormous amount of records, but the set is not entirely complete. An estimated 4% of the military aviator casualties is not on record with OGS. See a Subchapter about that matter at the end of this study.

Next to this literature, the scraps found in the archives are essential if one wishes to approach the full picture. We may never be sure that we have found the names of all the casualties.

Commodore-vlieger b.d. Steve Netto has taken the initiative to erect a Monument in Soesterberg, carrying all names of Dutch military aviators killed from the very start of military aviation in 1913, to the present. For this a complete and accurate loss list was needed. Author became heavily involved in the production of that list, with full support from the NIMH. This list is published below. And of course on the Soesterberg Monument. However, the definition used is such that several hundreds of military aviators are excluded. Their names are also given in this study.

With this we believe to have produced a Roll of Honour that is as complete as we could make it at the time of writing. One hundred percent completeness shall not be claimed. History is likely to continue to surprise us with bits of data that were unseen earlier.

Table 2. This table shows the numbers of all fatal casualties of Dutch Military Aviation, from the very beginning to 2009. 'Binnen def' = inside definition, meaning names approved by MinDef as appropriate for rendering on the Soesterberg Monument. Their sum is 1.213. However, another 636 Air Force personnel died during or in the line of duty. All names & circumstances, as far as known, are given in this study.

Graph 2. The division in time of all fatal casualties suffered by the Dutch Airforce, as per the 'Soesterberg definition', and including those who were considered to be 'outside definition'

The 'Soesterberg definition' basically means fatal losses directly related to service flights.

A special section in the Archive is dedicated to the Soesterberg Monument. See Table of Contents.

The Dutch Airforce developed via various services:

LVA = Luchtvaart Afdeling - when flying was still an Army service.

NL RAF = the Dutch RAF episode, here excluding the RNNAS, MLD & FAA losses.

KLu = Koninklijke Luchtmacht, the Dutch Airforce as of 1945 in the West, 1952 in NEI.

ML-KNIL = Militaire Luchtvaart van het Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger

RNMFS = Royal Netherlands Military Flying School, training in the USA during WW2, mostly for service in the East. NL RAF aviators trained in England and some also in Canada.

MLD = Marine Luchtvaart Dienst.

RNNAS = Royal Netherlands Naval Air Services, the semi-independent MLD under the wings of the Royal Air Force. MLD personnel flying with the British FAA (Fleet Air Arm) is included. The name RNNAS was used during the 320 Sqn Coastal Command days, and gradually disappeared when 320 Sqn became part of Bomber Command.

RNEIAF = Royal Netherlands East Indies Air Force, the semi-independent MLD under the wings of the Royal Australian Air Force.

Figure 1. Dutch Airforce development through time and circumstance

The Nationaal Indië Monument 1945-1962 in Roermond Roermond 080322-4

The Monument with its various sections commemorates the about 6.200 casualties of the Dutch Armed Forces that fell in that period in the Dutch East Indies. The Monument was erected as an initiative of Kol. b.d. J.W. de Leeuw, and revealed 07/09/1988. The Stichting Nationaal Indië Monument 1945-1962 operates a website: www.nim-roermond.nl. Via this, a register of names can be ordered. Requests for the register, both from author and from Steve Netto, did not meet with a response. However, cross-checks were possible as author had photographed at the spot earlier the relevant pages in the register grouped by service units. The registered ML-KNIL, KLu and MLD personnel amongst the casualties amount to 60. They come from ARVA 6 & 17 Sqn (Artillerie Verkennings Afdeling), the Centrale Vliegschool, 321 Sqn, 860 Sqn, and MLD/NNG (Nederlands Nieuw Guinea). A count limiting definition is not applied to the Roermond Monument.

In our count, periode 1945-1952, the ML-KNIL and MLD casualties in the East amount to 70, with another 98 who died from causes not directly related to flying. In the MLD period 1952-1962 in Asia, we count 53 casualties within the Soesterberg definition, or 65 in all. Total 1945-1962 is 123 within the Soesterberg definition, or 233 when counting all. That's about four times as many as known via the Roermond Monument.

This means that ongoing research continues to bring new information to light. It is rather sad that an enormous effort is needed to try and produce a complete and accurate Roll of Honour.

Part of the Roermond Nationaal Indië Monument, the gallery with the names. Casualty names are engraved on 18 triangular aluminium columns. Names in alfabetical order, with surname and first name letter only. A detachable panel is used for updates and corrections. Roermond 080322-4

Causes of death versus causes of crash

Fatalities amongst the Dutch RAF/FAA aviators are usually associated with aircraft that crashed. Author sees reason for a distinction between causes of death and causes of crash, as several of the Dutch RAF/FAA aviators were killed without having crashed.

Crash causes are usually describes as either flying accidents or the results of enemy action. From this follows the usual distinction between aircrew loss causes:

KIA – Killed In Action

MIA – Missing In Action

KIFA – Killed IN Flying Accident

This widely used scheme ignores the aircrew who went missing as a result of flying accidents – MIFA.

These schematics do not describe the real causes of death. As the real cause in most cases is fatal trauma as a result of a crash or of enemy fire, or drowning as a result of a crash landing at sea, the KIA/MIA/KIFA scheme could be seen as adequate.

However, several of the Dutch RAF/FAA aviators who were lost died in different ways:

DSAG – Died as a result of a Service Accident on the Ground. The airman was killed on his own base, as when hit by a rotating propellor.

DWH – Died of Wounds at Home. Wounds sustained in aerial combat, including Flak hits, but the aircraft did not crash.

DWO – Died of Wounds in Occupied territory. Wounds sustained in aerial combat, including Flak hits, after which the airman parachuted out, to die of wounds later. The aircraft crashed, but the crash itself did not cause the death. Death usually came about as a result of severe burns, exposure, and the lack of medical attention on the ground.

EXEG – The airman was EXEcuted by the enemy on the Ground, after a succesful emergency landing or parachute jump.

EXEC – The airman was EXEcuted by the enemy in a Concentrationcamp, in one of the many ways employed by the Germans, and that included torture.

DMT - Died as a result of medical treatment, such as an inoculation.

DOA - Died as a result Of an Accident, such as in traffic, or 'friendly' fire.

Complications do not end here. How to classify the death of a captured aviator, who disappeared into the sea when the Japanese ship that was to carry him to a concentration camp, was torpedo'd? How to classify airmen that died during a bombardment of their airfield? How to classify an airmen who died in the blast of his exploding aircraft, and whose remains could not be found? Technically, in this last case, the casualty should be classified as MIA. But if the site of the crash is well-known, and if the cause of the disappearance of the body can be understood as known too, as in a crashed aircraft in which the bomb load exploded, then we shall be satisfied to classify these casualties as KIA rather than MIA.

Author shall not insist on introducing the new causes of death categories mentioned above. To keep it simple, only the categories KIA, KIFA, and MIA shall be used. An aviator who died in a concentration camp shall be categorized as KIA. His death came about as a result of action against the enemy, even if that action did not lead to his death during that action. Same for an aviator who went missing after the ship he was on was torpedo'd. He shall be called MIA, even if the action that he performed against the enemy did not lead to his MIA status straight away.

In the few cases that cannot be described with the KIA/KIFA/MIA shorthand, a fuller description of the cause of death shall be given.

The men and the machines

The point of the chapter above is that causes of death and of crash do not always coincide. Literature is very often oriented towards the aircraft. This study wishes to be oriented towards the men, not their machines. The machines are the tools with which the men had to make do. As such they are highly important, and a writer should try to understand the tiniest technical detail. That's part of the effort to make sense of it all. But the machines were tools used by men, in a conflict between nations and ideologies.

It is tempting to reduce that conflict to technicalities. 'The' Spitfire turned a bit tighter, and 'the' Focke Wulf climbed a bit faster, but such matters would be elements of an understanding of specific historical events, not to be confused with a full understanding of these events, let alone of generalized historical events. Please refer to the chapter on fatal crash causes, for some of the multitude of human factors, that all should also be elements of any understanding of the subject matter.

Motivation of project

1. Trying to lift some of the Fog of War

The project was undertaken, when the author found out that many of these bits of Dutch history are shrouded in mystery. A comprehensive, complete and accurate survey could not be found. Scraps of information could be found in a few unpublished sources. In many cases, sources were deviating from each other, a strong indicator that crash tales were delivered to us on the basis of rumour rather than research. Research shall obviously not change the tragedies of the past. But at least we can try to get the facts right. Author believes that to be fitting to the memory of those who gave their lives. This alone is already a full justification for this study. The result is unlikely to be easy-reading. So be it; author did not seek to write a flashing and exciting novel. Others have done that already. The facts should also be given, made as hard as we can get them.

2. The moral obligation

1. Towards remembrance

The burning of books, Nürnberg, 1933. The Nazis sought to eradicate, by all means, spiritual and intellectual heritage they did not like. Source: Nürnberg Dokumentations-Zentrum

Burning books was done on a monthly basis, in several of the major cities in prewar Germany. 'Das war ein Vorspiel nur, dort wo man Bücher verbrennt, verbrennt man am Ende auch Menschen'. Heinrich Heine

Remarkable early insight by Bertold Brecht, 1933, reproduced on a wall in Mauthausen Concentration Camp, Austria.

1. Although names of Dutch RAF aviators who were lost appear on three dozen Monuments in seven countries, there is no Monument for these aviators as a group, let alone one with all their names on it. This study carries the ambition of being a written Monument for this group.

A small Monument for the 14 RAF aviators buried in Leeuwarden Northern General Cemetery, seven of whom could not be given a name. The white pebbles on the ground in front of the graves carry the word 'Peace' in twenty languages. Leeuwarden 070713-4

Children react in different ways to the presence of War graves. Some in awe, some not at all. Vredenhof Cemetery, Schiermonnikoog, NL, 080529-18

2. Towards the missing

2. The Dutch did not undertake any action traceable in archives or otherwise, to find out what had happened to the lost ones. No systematic research has been undertaken to try to find back men and aircraft missing-in-action across the borders of Holland. This work was left to the British, who produced mostly summary statements about crash circumstances. The full crash reports, if made at all, and the reports of the post-War British Missing Research & Enquiry Service, have not yet been found in the relevant Dutch archives. None of the specialists known to this author has seen such reports. The summary statements, that vary widely in degrees of accuracy, and that were delivered over language barriers, have produced more confusion than knowledge.

Furthermore, there has been no systematic effort to recover men and aircraft from the seas. Neither by the British, nor by the Dutch. This is in clear contrast with the ongoing American effort to bring back lost ones. To author this is unacceptable. To put it sharply: shrugging shoulders about the missing is immoral. That leads to the systematic goal of this study of finding back at least some of the lost ones. Starting with those lost over land, as these cases can be considered relatively easier than the cases of those lost over sea.

The statements above apply to Dutch RAF or FAA aviators lost outside Holland. The statements do not apply to the sterling work done by the Dienst Berging en Identificatie KL, regarding aircraft wrecks found in the soil of The Netherlands.

Climbing Coopers Hill towards the Runnymede Airforce Memorial. More than 20.000 Commonwealth aviators who went missing-in-action, are remembered by name here. A few of the Dutch RAF aviators are mentioned here too, but Allied nationalities outside of the Commonwealth are mostly absent. Runnymede 080127-2

3. Let bygones be bygones – but what has gone by?

The proverb 'let bygones be bygones' seeks to express that matters that have taken place in the past, should be left to rest. It expresses a sentiment that can exist amongst those who were there when events described here took place. This sentiment could be applied to the current study by some. The sentiment is motivated by piety for the lost ones. No doubt about this motive, in the case of the surviving Dutch RAF aviators, who were touched in a most personal way by the loss of collegues and friends. The other motive for the collegues is that some Dutch RAF aviators are said to have made fatal mistakes. Nobody likes to talk about that. However, below we shall present several cases in which the mistake-verdict is either without justification, or just far too simple to describe the reality of the time. Matters should be placed and seen in the circumstances of the time. This shall yield a clearly better view on those 'bygones'.

The piety motive is also used on official levels, meaning the civil servants who were there too. In their case, we are not always sure about the sincerety of the motive; it may mask indifference. In any case, this study is explicitely written also for those who do not, and cannot, know what the 'bygones' are, that are said by some people to be better left in peace. A decision to let matters rest can only be taken if these matters are known and understood as fully as possible. Author feels that it is most inappropriate to state that some Dutch RAF aviators died in some place as a result of some cause, without giving it an effort to clarify the three 'some's, call this piety, and be done with it. This will not do.

Remains of World War Two are still found everywhere across Europe. Dunino Airfield 080205-7

4. Why bother?

Nowadays, in the year 2006, hardly a day passes in which the number of casualties of war violence is lower than the number of Dutch RAF/FAA aviators lost during the entire Second World War. A sinlge crash of a civilian aircraft could easily produce the same amount of fatal casualties. Under such circumstances the losses of the Dutch RAF/FAA aviators could be seen as of very minor importance. However, author wishes to reverse that argument. Because of the ongoing slaughter, it is so easy to forget the sacrifices made in the past. If we forget, then we cannot learn from history. The matter is not trivial. It is about the taking of human life by other human beings. The number of lives lost in accidents with civilian airliners is irrelevant in this statement.

Sieg Heil at the Zeppelintribune, Reichsparteigelände, Nürnberg, Germany, before the War. This is not den Gleichtritt der Stiefel, these people are the people, civilians. Source: Nürnberg Dokumentations-Zentrum

On May 8^th, 2005, a wreath of flowers was laid at a small WW2 Memorial along the canal in Apeldoorn, in celebration of the liberation of Apeldoorn by Canadian forces, 60 years ago. A few days later, some-one had thrown the wreath into the canal.

WW2 Memorial, stone table at the left, at the waterlock in the Apeldoorn canal, 20/5/2005. Apeldoorn sluis 050520-1

Discarded wreath in the waterlock, flowers washed out. A symbol of chickenbrain ignorance. Apeldoorn sluis 050520-4

Flowers for Allied aircrew can be targeted too:

Monument for the crew of Stirling N3654 LS-B of 15 Sqn, shot down and crashed 10/5/1941 in Opmeer (NH), wreck salvage operation completed 10/10/2003. This revealed the remains of six of the seven men crew. They were buried 11/5/2004, in a joint grave, next to that of their pilot, W/C. H.R. Dale, with full military honours at Bergen General Cemetery. The single coffin was carried by six members of the current No. 15 Squadron of the R.A.F.

The flowers placed here on Liberation day, 5/5/2007, were demolished by vandals. After the city had placed new flowers, these were demolished too.

Surfing the Web, we found similar cases of vandalism against War Monuments or graves. Perhaps two dozen cases on a yearly basis, in only The Netherlands. We did not investigate this situation in other countries.

Author believes that getting the facts, and getting these right, is a prerequisite to remembrance, and to learning the lessons of the past. Author believes that this is still very much needed. It is unlikely that the present study shall reach the chickenbrains that threw away the flowers in Apeldoorn, or that demolished the flowers in Opmeer. Nevertheless, we need to do what we can. The issues were, and are, life or death, liberty or slavery. Even wreath-throwing youngsters should realize that indifference could result into slavery. A price they cannot possibly wish to pay. That can be avoided only by learning, and then by acting accordingly.

3. Numbers and fates

Numbers and fates of the Dutch RAF/FAA aviators were as follows:

Table 3. Numbers and fates of Dutchmen serving in the RAF or FAA.

The number of Engelandvaarders amongst the survivors is likely to be far too low. This was not investigated in depth.

Sources: see lists in Appendices

4. Methods & tools

1. Introduction

A few pages are dedicated to methodological considerations. Author believes this to be appropriate, in the light of the rather vast confusion that comes to us via existing sources. Being careless about investigative methods is likely to produce, or to prolong existing, confusion. It is author's explicit aim to do away with such confusion as far as possible. Trying to lift some of the Fog of War.

2. Finding data

1. The studyroom

Archives, literature and the Web

This study is following routine procedures for investigations into history. These include extensive searches in literature and in government archives, and searches for, and when found in, family archives. Several of these have been found. These family archives had usually not been used for research purposes before. Such archives were occasionally found to hold photographs, that contradicted previously written history.

Research in archives abroad has quite often been done by local aviation archaeologists. They are aquainted with local circumstances, leading to easier access to such archives. Their contribution to the data presented here has been substantial.

The Web has been most instrumental in finding data. However, hardly any of the thousands of documents processed for this study was found in the Web. Internet was instrumental in finding directions that lead to such documents. On the other hand, the online availability of data from the Commonwealth War Graves Commission and the Dutch Oorlogsgravenstichting, has been most helpful. However, these sources are to be viewed with a critical eye. See Appendices 7, chapter 3 and 4, for a comparison of CWGC and OGS data with results of this study.

It is the expressed aim of this study to present at least a portrait photograph of all men lost. This aim was not achieved, but many portrait photographs were found. See Appendices 7, subchapter 5, for a list of the portraits that had not been found when this text was closed.

2. The seemingly obvious source that could not deliver

The Royal Air Force produced Accident Cards, on which details were noted of aircraft crashes and other aircraft accidents. These cards are sorted by major aircraft type, and then chronological to the date of the accident. The cards were transferred to microfilm. The films are, by appointment, accessible to the public, at the RAF Museum, Hendon, London.

It was assumed that this database would generate a vast amount of data relevant to this study. In fact, the number of cards held by the RAF Museum is utterly overwhelming. Still, as a result of an efficient data organisation, specific cards can be found quickly. Author has searched for the accident cards of the following aircraft. These aircraft were selected as there were bits of information missing. It was hoped that the cards would fill in the blanks.

1. Spitfire Mk. IIa Nr. P7774, No. 611 Sqn, P/O. A.E. Pennings, shot down and lost 28/04/1941 in the Westerschelde River, pilot MIA.

2. Tiger Moth, No. 1 EFTS, Lac D. Sajet, crashed 16/06/1941 near RAF Hatfield, Hertfordshire, GB, pilot KIFA.

3. Spitfire Mk. IIa Nr. R7349, No. 611 Sqn, 1Lt Vl Wnr T.F.A. Buijs, shot down and lost 24/06/1941 in The Channel near Gravelines, Nord, France, pilot MIA.

4. Spitfire Mk. Vb Nr. W3227, No. 611 Sqn, Res 2Lt Vl J.W.Y. Roeper Bosch, shot down & crashed 21/10/1941 near Berck-sur-Mer, Pas-de-Calais, France, pilot KIA.

5. Miles Master or Spitfire, No. 57 OTU, Sgt. P.J. van Boxtel, crashed 28/10/1941 near Kinnerton, Flintshire, GB, pilot KIFA.

6. Spitfire Mk. Vb, No. 57 OTU, P/O. H.W. Pronk, crashed 02/11/1941 Kinmel Park, Bodelwyddan, Denbighshire, Wales, GB, pilot KIFA.

7. Spitfire Mk. IX, No. 129 Sqn, F/O. H.F. Buiskool, crashed 13/02/1944 near Peterhead, possibly Waughton Hill, Aberdeenshire, GB, pilot KIFA.

8. Spitfire Mk. XIV Nr. NH700 VL-B, No. 322 Sqn, F/O. J.W. van Hamel, crashed 11/04/1944 Simonside Hills, near Tosson Farm, Rothbury, Northumberland, GB, pilot KIFA.

9. Spitfire Mk. XIV Nr. RB141 VL-L, No. 322 Sqn, F/Sgt. H.C.A.J. Roovers, lost 02/05/1944 in The Channel between Cherbourg, F, and, more likely, the Isle of Wight, GB, pilot MIA.

10. Spitfire Mk. V Nr. BM645, No. 53 OTU, F/O. E. van der Zee, crashed 03/03/1945 near Hibaldstow, North Lincolnshire, GB, pilot KIFA.

11. Spitfire Mk. XVI Nr. RR240, No. 322 Sqn, F/O. J. Vlug, aircraft hit by enemy Flak 05/03/1945, force landed OK, but pilot was found dead in the cockpit between Xanten & Uedem, Germany, KIA.

12. Spitfire Mk. XVIe Nr. RR205, No. 322 Sqn, F/Sgt. S.D. Lazarus, aircraft exploded in the air 19/03/1945 , premature bomb explosion presumed, between Schijndel and 's-Hertogenbosch, or East of Rosmalen, Brabant, NL, KIA.

13. Mosquito Mk. XVI Nr. MM131 XD-J, No. 139 Sqn, pilot F/Lt. A.A.J. van Amsterdam, aircraft shot down by enemy nightfighter Me.262 on 27/03/1945, pilot parachuted out unhurt, and must be assumed to have died or have been killed on the ground, navigator S/Ldr. H.A. Forbes RCAF, DFC - safe, POW in Stalag Luft 1 Barth-Vogelsang, but escaped and joined the RAF again. Pilot KIA.

14. Spitfire Mk. XVI Nr. RK891, No. 322 Sqn, W/O. H.C. Cramm, hit by enemy Flak near Zutphen, crashed 30/03/1945 Almen, NL, Dorpsstraat near Nr. A 153, or, more likely, Nr. 53, pilot KIA.

15. Spitfire Mk. XVI Nr. RR249, No. 322 Sqn, F/O. A.A. Homburg, shot down by enemy Flak 01/04/1945 in a meadow North of the Oude Veenweg, Azelo, Ambt Delden, Overijssel, NL, pilot KIA.

Of these 15 fatal crashes, six took place over England or Scotland, with no enemy that could prevent or interfere with an investigation. Of these six incidents, only one aircraft accident card could be found: of the crash of Daniël Sajet. It is understood that investigations are virtually impossible at sea when there is a War going on (crashes nrs. 1, 3 and 9), or in enemy held territory (crashes 4 and 11-15, even if these crashes took place very shortly before the Liberation of that area). Cards for 14 out of these 15 fatal accidents either do not exist, or did not survive, or are mislaid. As several cards were found, describing minor landing and taxying accidents involving No. 322 Sqn Spitfires, and as Daniël Sajet crashed virtually on his home base, it is assumed that accident cards were filled in when the aircraft was readily available at base. Anything more remote than that was not recorded on these cards. For information about such accidents we need to turn to other sources, and that would first be the Squadron Operations Record Book.

Hendon Reading Room staff was surprised with these results, and felt that the outcome should have been better. However, better results were not obtained. Author noticed many accident cards involving aviators with a Polish, French or Belgian nationality. As stated, minor accidents involving Dutch RAF aviators were present too. So the information gap has a systematic cause, not bias against the Dutch or anything like that. It was noticed that, once again, the loss of F/Lt. André van Amsterdam did not lead to a paper record that can be found today. He is arguably the most lost one of the Dutch RAF aviators who went missing-in-action.

Author's search list was originally much longer than these 15. However, in the Hendon Reading Room it became evident that there was no point in looking for cards for aircraft that crashed either at sea or in enemy held territory. This discovery holds a warning for literature about the subject, that is based solely on archive research.

Research could not be limited to archives and literature. Field research gradually developed into a major source of information. Field research was done in directions and with methodes described below.

3. Field research

1. Finding eyewitnesses

As the period investigated is 62 to 67 years ago, one can still hope to find a few eyewitnesses. Several have been found worldwide in the shape of aviators who were up there too, but for obvious reasons they represent only a fraction of the total number of Dutch RAF aviators who survived the War. Usually, if at all possible, these survivors were interviewed over prolonged periods of time, often by means of email. In several cases this led to very-late-debriefings on fatal incidents. Other eyewitnesses were found by going to the assumed crash sites, and talk to elderly locals, mostly farmers.

Their testimonies are presented here, and most eyewitnesses have checked and approved their statements as given below. Eyewitness reports tend, after 60 years, to be less than 100% accurate. Author has pointed to statements that are or seem questionable. Nevertheless, the eyewitness reports have given new and meaningful insight into courses of events in many cases.

2. Finding geographical and archaeological data

Author has tried to find and visit all crash and burial sites on land. It has been found that this very basic method usually generates new information. Such information ranges from finding the correct site names, to finding actual crash sites that were not reported upon before. A few corrections of actual burial sites came about as well. Several parts were found of the aircraft involved, parts in the hands of private collectors who had not reported upon this before. All sites, graves and artefacts found were photographed. These photographs are reproduced below.

The travel involved amounts to an estimated 80.000 km. The harvest would have been a lot better, if this effort was given say 30 years earlier. So be it.

3. Finding family archives

Family archives have usually been major sources of information about the lost son. Unfortunately, in only a minority of the cases a sizeable family archive has been found. More usually the family information was limited to basic data and a few photographs. Information coming from private sources include data found in the scrapbooks and/or the memory of collegues and friends of the aviator who was lost. In all, these private sources have contributed substantially to the data presented in this study. Methods used to find such private sources can be summarized with the phrase 'intensive and extensive worldwide communications'.

4. Where are the RAF commissioned aviator paintings?

The Royal Air Force employed artists who painted portraits of RAF aviators, including several of the Dutchmen. After the War, these paintings were offered to the Dutch. Some ended up on walls of Dutch Airforce buildings. It is reported by Rob Venema of the Stichting Militair Vliegend Personeel 1939-1950 that some were purchased by ZKH Prins Bernhard, who offered the paintings to the families involved. With this, the number of 63 is mentioned. So far, author is aware only of the ownership history of the portrait painting of Govert Steen, donated by the Dutch Ministry of Defence to the Steen family shortly after the War, and then by the family to the Military Aviation Museum (MLM) in Soesterberg in 1992, where it is now in storage. This means that the whereabouts of possibly dozens of these paintings is currently unknown. The MLM has been asked 27/03/2008 if it has any more of such portraits in storage, or if the whereabouts of other portraits are known. On 21/04/2008 Marieke Martens, historian at the MLM, answered that the collection only holds the portrait of Steen. The whereabouts of other portraits are unknown to the MLM.

Author invites all readers to share data, so that at least a photoreproduction of such a painting can be made visible to the public.

3. Checking data

1. Checking statements with local data

Statements in archives and/or literature were, as far as possible, checked on the geographical locations mentioned in these statements. This very basic technique has produced quite a few surprises. The results are mentioned in the 'data confusion' entries in the crash fact sheets below. The technique has been instrumental in pointing to confusion, for instance over crash sites, in archives and/or literature, and in trying to remove that confusion. It seems that several earlier authors have reported about sites, without ever bothering to check their statements with data that could have been found on the spot. There is no point in repeating the confuzed data presented as facts by others. Such laziness is easily recognized if foreign place names are spelled incorrectly. Author believes that a dilligent researcher should always ask 'really?', or 'is that a fact?', and then go out there to try to find data that allows a distinction to be made between opinion and fact. The reader shall please forgive if these statements appear to be philosophical. Author believes that these statements are very basic when it comes to a philosophy of the science of history.

2. Checking statements with specialized knowledge

Statements delivered via literature, or verbally by eyewitnesses, have been screened and checked to the best of our ability. This included checks with special fields of knowledge, such as navigation, or munitions, whenever relevant. Author believes that it is essential to the understanding of history, to understand highly specialized technical detail as well. The actors at the time had to make do with those technicalities. Failure to understand these means a programmed failure to make sense of it all. Failure to understand the so-called small points must lead to a repetition of earlier ill-informed opinions, which is exactly what this author does not want to do. In practice this means questioning each and any statement, delivered anywhere, official documents not excluded, and getting all possible help to get that job done. If it is about flying, ask those who actually flew the machines involved. If it is about ammo, ask those who really know that field. If it is about identification of corpses, ask those who are specialized in that. That's the modus operandi, that hopes to bring together the knowledge from a multitude of fields.

Author must assume to have been unable to implement this systematic approach everywhere for the full 100%, as following earlier opinions is tempting and easy. Author hopes to have been sufficiently sceptical of anything delivered via literature or otherwise, and welcomes any correction or criticism of the statements made in this study.

3. Official versus true statements

Statements found anywhere, are evaluated in the light of as much specialized knowledge as could be mustered. Official documents are not excluded from this procedure. The fact that a document is official, does not neccesarily mean that the contents of that document are true, accurate and complete. That would be nice, desirable, and quite in line with how officials like to see matters. Author shall present numerous cases in which official statements have been found to be in error. Author shall present a few cases in which the contents of official documents are motivated by politics rather than truth. Author shall present the politics of the day behind these truth-bending exercises. Now, 62 to 67 years later, we are interested in earlier presentations of the truth of the time, but also and most of all in the truth independent of that time, as far as we can uncover it. And besides that, officials are human beings. They make mistakes. And they produce statements with the quite understandable aim to close cases rather than to get to the bottom of the matter. The problem is that official mistakes tend to persist officially almost indefinitely. This is the tunnelvision of officialdom, that is in the way of a correct representation of historical facts. Facts emerge from investigations and logic, and not from statements that were copied and copied again, introducing inaccuracies and mistakes over barriers of language and time, and then given the odor of truth via an official seal. This study is, although it is screened by the Dutch Minister of Defence, not an official document.

4. Official data reductions and enhancements

Quite often, when comparing source data with later official data, we came across deviations from the source data. These deviations are of two types: reductions and enhancements. Author mentions this as a critical note to the usual official position that they need to guard the 'purity of the data'. This argument is used to dismiss data improvements suggested by non-official parties. Below examples are given of officially interpreted rather than pure data. It demonstrates that officials do in fact interpret data, rather than deliver it to us in its pure form. There is nothing wrong with that, as long as we are aware of it. The problem is that data is delivered to us with a purity claim, without mention of interpretative intervention, let alone with the argumentation that led to that intervention. The interpretative action may have taken place decades ago, and nobody recalls the whom, how and why. However, to make sense of it all, we need to be aware of such data treatments. This means that we need to be on the lookout for 'how', even if we can only guess about the 'whom' and 'why'. The 'why' may be a perfectly valid argumentation, but there is nobody who can give us that argumentation. The 'why' may also be clumsiness, or even laziness in some cases.

1. Data enhancements based on evidence or assumptions

Post-War data enhancements are frequent. They come about as a result of investigations, either by the Missing Research & Enquiry Service in the 1945 to early Fifties period, or by private researchers in later years. These data enhancements are based on evidence. However, there is another type of data enhancement, not based on evidence but on assumption. In Texel Den Burg Cemetery three of a five men crew of a Hampden bomber, that crashed in the Eendracht Polder on Texel, were identified and buried. Their names are in the Wartime cemetery register. After the War, the Commonwealth War Graves Commission saw reasons to place headstones for the other two crew too, and called the five headstones a joint grave. The reasoning is likely to have been as follows: all five perished within one aircraft. There is no report that crew members baled out before the crash. Hence the erection of the two additional headstones is justified via the assumption that the remains of these two crew had to be present with the remains of the three men that could be identified. The CWGC chooses a moral rather than a scientific position, in the duty of remembrance.

This assumption-based data enhancement technique is not followed in all cases. Of the crew of Halifax NA508, that crashed on 17/06/1944 in South of Amsterdam, The Netherlands, only J.P. O'Meara could be found & identified, in the early fifties. Several years later, body parts were found of the rest of the crew. These were buried in a joint grave, one headstone only, placed next to the headstone of J.P. O'Meara in Bergen op Zoom Canadian War Cemetery. This joint grave does not carry the names of the individual crew members. Furthermore, they are still listed as MIA in the CWGC database.

2. Data reductions

The original Wartime data can nowadays come to us in a shape that reduces the information that was available originally. This can come about as a result of the following:

1. The filing system does not allow the full data to be accessible. What we find in the online Casualty Registers of CWGC and OGS is a summary of data available to these organisations. Bodies of airmen that fell in occupied territory, can have complex histories of burials and reburials. Such data is usually not reflected in the Casualty Register record. Where the body was found is never mentioned. This additional information, vital for MIA-research, is 'buried' in the archives of CWGC and OGS. Accessibility of that archive is very limited, especially to civilians. We hope for data disclosure in the future.

2. Post-War MR&ES and CWGC teams saw reasons to deviate from the data found in the cemetery register. Several unknown servicemen, that washed ashore on the Isle of Texel, were positively identified as airmen or sailors, as evidenced by the cemetery register. However, they received CWGC headstones on which they are mentioned merely as 'soldiers'. It is unclear why the CWGC did not follow the data collected by the local authorities.

3. Data reductions can come about as a result of the apparent wish to resolve ill understood technicalities by avoiding them. When author suggested to OGS to change the fuzzy aircraft nomenclature in the Casualty Register into a more consistent one, OGS responded by deleting the aircraft serial number in several cases.

4. Analysing data

1. The logical process of elimination

Logic obviously plays a key role in the analyses given. The basic inferencing rules have been complicated quite often by the 'possibly' and 'probably' moderating statements. This situation is quite the same as the situation in which the Dienst Identificatie en Berging (DIB KL) saw itself placed after the War. Rather than producing a treatise on the logics used, the process can be summa­rized with the term 'elimination'. For the DIB this worked, as an example, as follows:

If the bodies of a four men crew are found, of which three could be identified, then it can safely be assumed that the fourth is the fourth crew member with whom the aircraft took off on its final flight.

An example of author's use of the process of elimination:

If four bodies could be taken out of an aircraft wreck by a civilian on land, and if the statement to that effect is true, then it follows with reasonable probability that the aircraft crashed on land, that it was not on fire on the ground, and that it did not smash to bits or was swallowed by the soil as in a vertical dive into soft ground.

2. Crash data analysis

Het door de bronnen gegeven materiaal is geanalyseerd. De gebruikte methoden zijn voer voor historici, en daarom hier apart gezet. Enkele redeneerregels zijn op het bronmateriaal toegepast, in afwachting van nader onderzoek. De regels ontstonden tijdens de analyse van het bronmateriaal. Dat wil zeggen dat elk van deze regels minstens één keer aan de orde kwam naar aanleiding van het bronmateriaal. De regels zijn toegepast om twee redenen:

1. Het zo hier en daar invullen van blanko posities in het gegevensbestand, en wel met een grote mate van waarschijnlijkheid dat het ingevulde historisch korrekt is.

Dit is materiaal voor een methodentwist tussen historici. De keuze is tussen de posities van een archivaris van officiële dokumenten, en die van een rechercheur. De legitimatie voor de hier gekozen positie is dat bij dergelijke gegevens, zeker in het geval van vermissingen, vaak niet kan worden verwacht dat er ooit een glashelder, waarheidsgetrouw en akkuraat officieel dokument zal kunnen worden gevonden. Voor zover er officiële dokumenten zijn, dan blijken die regelmatig het normale menselijke gamma van onvolkomenheden te vertonen. Er is hierboven gekozen voor een zo juist mogelijke weergave, en niet voor een officiële weergave die met redelijke zekerheid minder, of zelfs niet juist is. De stelling is dat een blind vertrouwen in officiële dokumenten minder produktief is dan het beschouwen van zulke dokumenten met een kritische blik. In de omgang met diffuus historisch materiaal heeft gezond verstand een plaats.

2. Het zichtbaar maken van belangrijke afwijkingen in de gegevens van de verschillende bronnen, om toekomstig onderzoek enige richting te geven.

Hieronder een overzicht van die redeneerregels. De konklusies ervan vervallen op de momenten dat de resultaten van voortgaand onderzoek dat per geval nodig maken. Veel verwarring wordt gegenereerd doordat bronnen vaak niet helder vermelden of een gemelde plaats de crash van het toestel, of het overlijden van het bemanningslid, betreft. OGS vermeldt konsequent de plaats van overlijden, zoals de OGS die kent.

1. General

1. Bronnen zijn niet beperkt tot officiële. Een bericht van een ooggetuige kan niet terzijde worden geschoven als en omdat zo'n bericht niet in officiële dokumenten is vastgelegd. Waar het om gaat is de historische juistheid van een bewering, gedaan door welke bron dan ook, en niet om een hiërarchische status van die bron of bewering. Het authoriteitsargument heeft geen logische geldigheid. Authoriteiten kunnen zich ook vergissen. Zij kunnen zelfs redenen hebben, of hebben gehad, om de feitelijke toedracht van een situatie in officiële dokumenten te verzwijgen of te maskeren. Het geeft te denken, dat er archieven zijn, die decennia lang gesloten worden gehouden. Die archieven blijven gesloten om de privacy van eventueel nog levende personen te waarborgen. De eventueel door die personen gemaakte fouten blijven aldus buiten publiek zicht gedurende 75 of 100 jaar, afhankelijk van de lokale wetgeving. En na die periode kunnen er geen ooggetuigen meer zijn, met wier hulp een en ander zou kunnen worden geverifiëerd. Met andere woorden, er moet nu gehandeld worden, geroeid met de riemen die we hebben, ook al blijven sommige bronnen ontoegankelijk.

2. Als een vlieger, die te boek staat als behorend tot een operationeel Squadron, omkwam met een trainingstoestel, dan is dat niet onmogelijk, maar wel onwaarschijnlijk. Zeker in het geval van een vlieger die kort tevoren in dienst van de RAF was gekomen. Dit leidde ertoe dat enkele vliegers hieronder na nader onderzoek konden worden vermeld met de juiste trainingseenheid. Zij kunnen, wanneer zij langer in dienst waren en bij wijze van gevechtspauze, tijdelijk gedetacheerd zijn geweest als instrukteur bij zo'n trainingseenheid. Of zij kunnen een toevallig beschikbare trainer hebben gebruikt om ergens een vat bier te gaan halen. De toenmalige werkelijkheid was menigvuldig.

3. In de bronnen is er ruis inzake de exakte datum van sommige crashes.

Nachtelijke bombardementsvluchten verliepen vaak van een avond naar de ochtend van de volgende dag. Als in het Operations Record Book van het Squadron geen exakte tijd van een crash vermeld wordt, dan kan de ene bron de dag van de avond vermeld hebben, en de andere die van de volgende ochtend. Ook hier is nader onderzoek gedaan om zoveel mogelijk helderheid te verkrijgen.

4. Als bij één crash vier bemanningsleden omkwamen, en als bij één van hen het vliegtuig bekend is, en als er geen informatie is over een ander toestel dat met die drie anderen op dezelfde plaats en datum en tijd is gecrasht, dan is het toestel ook voor de andere drie bemanningsleden bekend.

5. Een toestel kan niet twee keer crashen in zee of in vijandelijk gebied. Na het verloren gaan van een toestel kan eenzelfde soort toestel bij hetzelfde Squadron met dezelfde roepletters in gebruik zijn genomen. Dat toestel kan echter niet hetzelfde serienummer hebben.

2. Place of crash analysis

1. Als de bronnen bij één crash bij een of meer bemanningsleden een sterk afwijkende plaats van de crash aangeven, dan kan er slechts één plaats de juiste zijn. Sterk afwijkend zijn vermeldingen die niet kunnen worden begrepen als de verwarring die kan ontstaan als één bron het gehucht waar de crash plaatsvond meldt, en de andere een grotere plaats in de buurt.

2. Als één bron een exakte plaatsaanduiding voor een crash meldt, en de andere een algemene zoals 'boven zuidoost Engeland', en als er geen aanleiding is om die exakte aanduiding te betwijfelen, dan wordt die hieronder als de meest juiste opgevoerd.

3. Als een bron als plaats van neerstorten de plaats van het doel van een bombardementsvlucht meldt, dan kan dat geheel juist zijn. Niettemin is er reden voor twijfel. Doelplaatsen staan doorgaans in de ORB's en de Casualty Files, crashplaatsen lang niet altijd. Voortgaand onderzoek heeft inmiddels naar boven gebracht dat in meer dan de helft van het aantal tot heden nauwkeuriger onderzochte crashes de in de verlieslijsten en de literatuur gemelde crashplaatsen onnauwkeurig of ronduit onjuist zijn. Dat betekent ook dat het gros van de in deze tekst aangegeven crashplaatsen wordt gegeven onder het voorbehoud van een latere revisie, die door voortgaand onderzoek nodig kan blijken.

4. Ook hier geldt, dat een redeneerregel vlot achterhaald kan worden door de resultaten van nader onderzoek. Als voorbeeld de crash van Mitchell FR146 van 320 Squadron, op 26 november 1943. Bemanning Kok, Overwijn, De la Haije en Koning. Verschillende bronnen melden verschillende plaatsen voor de crash: Biville (Haan), Cherbourg (OGS voor De la Haije, maar daar werd zijn lichaam in eerste ronde begraven), Martinvast (Bosch en OGS voor Kok, maar dat was het doel van de missie) en Beaumont-Hague (Huard). Deze plaatsen zijn verspreid over Normandië. Voor deze verwarde data viel nauwelijks een redeneerregel te formuleren. Gelukkig waren er ooggetuigen. In werkelijkheid kwam het toestel neer in een veld 600 meter oost van het veel zuidelijker gelegen Tréauville. In die plaats werd op 8/5/2004 een Monument onthuld, met de namen van de vier bemanningsleden erop, en de namen van acht andere geallieerde vliegers die in twee Mitchells op dezelfde dag bij dezelfde plaats omkwamen. Een motor van Kok's Mitchell werd in de 90-er jaren opgegraven, en is door de gemeente Tréauville behouden. De details en de foto's staan in het hoofdstuk over de crash van FR146.

Source: Mickaël Simon, in talloze emails

3. Place of death analysis

1. Als de bronnen bij één crash bij een of meer bemanningsleden een sterk afwijkende plaats van overlijden aangeven, dan is dat niet onmogelijk. Immers, een of meer bemanningsleden kan of kunnen per parachute uit het toestel zijn gekomen, en op aanzienlijke afstand, te lezen als tot zo'n 10 kilometer, van de crashplaats zijn overleden. Of dat ook nog waar is, zal echter uit nader onderzoek moeten blijken.

2. If a fighter pilot, or one or more of the crew of a bomber, is reported to have died far, meaning more than 10 km, away from the assumed crash site, and not in a hospital, then there is reason for suspicion. Then either the assumed crash site is grossly incorrect, or the crash site should be understood as the site of an emergency landing, at which the pilot or crew may or may not have been captured, to be killed elsewhere.

3. Als een bron een meer exakte plaatsaanduiding van overlijden meldt bij één van de bemanningsleden bij een crash die vanaf geringe hoogte plaatsvond, dan kunnen de meer algemene plaatsaanduidingen bij de andere bemanningsleden in diezelfde bron worden gekorrigeerd naar die meer exakte toe. Voorbeeld: crash 10 mijl noord van Terschelling na aanval op een Flakschip vermeld bij een van de bemanningsleden. Plaatsvermeldingen zoals 'bij de Noordhollandse eilanden' en 'in de Noordzee' bij de andere bemanningsleden kunnen dan met grote mate van waarschijnlijkheid worden gekorrigeerd naar '10 mijl noord van Terschelling'.

4. Circumstances of crash analysis

The methods described above have led to more than a few deviations from previous writings about this bit of history. Crash circumstances could be reconstructed, or reconstructed better than before, by analysing the bits of data found in various ways and places. Author has found that the official verdict of a pilot making an error that caused his death, was often unjustified. Producing more crash data leads to more knowledge about the crash circumstances. When there is more to know, then the final verdict should be postponed. Please also see the chapter on crash causes. There may not have been time for such fine points when the War was ongoing. But this is a good time to take that time.

5. Circumstances of death analysis

When aviators died outside of their aircraft, meaning outside of the immediate vincinity of the wreck of their aircraft, then there is reason to ask how they died. At wreck sites, death is the result of fatal trauma received during the impact on land or water, during a fire or fuel explosion directly after impact on land, or during a failed forced landing. Death could also have come about as a direct result of enemy fire whilst still airborne. In other cases there is reason to question the cause of death. Did the aviator who parachuted out receive fatal injuries inside his shot-up aircraft, or was he executed on the ground? We shall try to find evidence that can shed light upon such cases.

5. Presenting data

1. Structural

Each lost aviator is given at least a page in this document. The least we can do. That page holds key data, which includes crew data when applicable. This produces some redundancy in the text, but author feels it to be appropriate to place the aviator who was lost together with his crew that usually was lost too.

The text has been structured into logical chapters. It has been made accessible with an extensive table of contents at the front, and with indices at the rear. The hope is that this study, via the means described in this chapter as well as the contents, shall become a work of reference.

2. Pictorial

Whenever available and relevant, photographic evidence has been reproduced below. Some of the Wartime photo's or photonegatives were retouched, to deal with the scratches of time. Same for portrait photo's, that had to be isolated from poor to modest-quality group pictures. Author tried to make photo-impressions of crash sites as these are today, so that at least an image could be attached to the name of a location where Dutch RAF aviators died or vanished. In case of crashes at sea, this resulted in sea panoramas with no obvious crash location, which depicts rather well the facts of the time, as the sea in its vastness swallowed most of the aircraft and men without a trace.

More than 230 maps were made, indicating sites or circumstances that are relevant to the events described. Quite a large amount of effort went into the search for portrait photographs of the lost aviators. We apologize to the families involved if we were unable to find a portrait of their lost one. Obviously we are most interested to receive such portraits, which, for safe keeping for posterity, shall also be added to the collection of the Nederlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie.

About headstone photography

In view of the varying quality of headstone photo's made available via the Web, by for instance the Oorlogsgravenstichting, author offers the following guidelines for this seemingly straightforward, but nevertheless specialized type of photography. These guidelines have been followed in the current study.

1. The camera should be level with the center of the headstone. That means kneeling down, even if that would amount to an enormous lot of physical exercise. Photo's taken from a standing position, looking down upon the headstone, express laziness and disrespect. Those who have to shoot thousands of these pictures for a living, for instance in the service of the War Graves Commissions, could develop instruments for survival, such as very low tripod mounts with very high view finders, or 45 degrees lens mirrors.

2. Headstones should be completely visible; no tops shaved off.

3. Headstones should be vertical rather than oblique, but 100% verticality is not called for. Shooting from close-by, without a technical camera, or a tilt-and-shift lens on a single lens reflex camera, usually produces some distortion of the perspective, such as top of the headstone a bit wider than the bottom. Although this can be compensated with image processing software, author feels that such imperfections are immaterial. And in fact impractical, in view of the vast amount of work involved in getting the pictures in the first place, and then processing them.

4. Text on headstones should be completely legible. That means pushing to the side any flora that hides part of the text, without damaging that flora. It should be remembered that, in the case of those buried as unknowns, the text on the headstone is either all data, or a summary of it, that is available about the burial. Text at the bottom of a headstone, meaning the text wishes of the family, if any, need not be entirely readible. Although recording these texts is desirable, they do not add materially to the data about the casualty.

5. Flora can play havoc with autofocus cameras in which this mode cannot be switched off.

6. Direct flashlights can play havoc with headstone engravings with poor contrast under poor light conditions. Oblique flash, or none at all, and then increasing the ISO 'film' sensitivity, is advised for most cases. 'Film' in brackets when digital cameras are involved. Increasing the ISO sensitivity from 100 to 400 ISO in digital cameras in theory increases the digital noise in the picture. But in headstone photography that hardly shows up. The increased ISO sensitivity delivers a better focus value, and/or a better shutter speed.

7. The casualties fell in all seasons, and death is cold. Author sees no need for a restriction to bright and sunny summer photography. The same is valid for shots against the sun. As headstone photographers usually have to travel vast distances, sometimes getting somewhere at the end of the day, and as headstones are never arranged in a uniform way that shows up nicely at a specific, and the same, time of day, the contingencies of what is found on the spot are belonging to real life as much as the events that caused these graves to be.

We want to capture the image and record the data, in a respectful and technically sound way. But surgical precision and uniformity is not called for. Author has shot over 5.000 pictures of headstones of WW2 aviators, all in some way relevant to the story of the 242 Dutch RAF aviators who were lost. Pic sharpness, composition, and value as a document are the things that matter.

3. Textual

In the crash investigations reported upon here, a diary technique of reporting has been used, as it has been used in author's 'Steen'. The reader is presented with facts as hard as they could be found, mentioning their sources, and estimated degree of hardness whenever there is room for doubt. This does not make for easy reading, as in a novel. Author did not wish to produce a novel. Romanticism has no place here. Some authors have exploited the losses of others, even of their next of kin, for their personal glory or other gains. Author shall not present names with this statement, and has no patience with this type of motivation to publish. The statement is given so as to increase awareness for published rubbish, which stands in contrast to writings about bits of history that were researched in depth.

Jan Kloos pointed out that this work, in the much earlier version he had seen, was lacking in 'narrative content'.

Source: Jan Kloos, email 29/4/2007

I had a response:

Over de narratives: dat voel ik heel best, en ik wil er wel iets over zeggen:

1. Ik was er niet bij. De narratives die ik geef zijn die van hen die er zèlf over kunnen spreken. Als ik er geen sappig verhalend proza van maak, dan doe ik dat weloverwogen vanuit een terughoudendheid die ik juist en passend vind.

2. Het aantal oorspronkelijke narratives is groeiende in 'Lost'. Je hebt een volstrekt achterhaalde versie gezien. Er zijn nu 2.045 pagina's met 2.250 foto's en afbeeldingen.

3. Ik erger me te pletter aan schrijvers die verhalen vertellen op een wijze die impliceert dat ze erbij zijn geweest, terwijl dat niet zo is. Da's wellicht goed voor de kassa, maar dat is dan tevens het eigenbelang, over de rug, en zelfs over het leven, van de beschrevenen heen. Onder meer Nico Geldhof doet dat regelmatig. Niet zuiver, niet goed, niet mijn ding.

4. Mijn opzet is en was om eerst de feiten zo goed mogelijk in beeld te krijgen. Aankleding van het kale feitenmateriaal met narratives, naar mogelijkheid, is stap drie.

5. Stap twee is en was om de feiten in te bedden in een systematische samenhang, met als doel om een historisch zo korrekt en helder mogelijk perspektief te schetsen. Daarom dus grote hoofdstukken over bijvoorbeeld Engelandvaart, ongevalsoorzaken, MIA-research.

6. Stap vier is om aan de verslaglegging van de verliezen een timeline toe te voegen. Voorbeeld: 2TAF opereerde veel in Noord Frankrijk, tegen 'special construction works', in voorbereiding van de invasie. Die dingen zijn allang beschreven; ik herhaal op bescheiden schaal voor de volledigheid. Dit kan narrative genoemd worden, maar dan van een soort die ik met een gerust gemoed voor eigen rekening kan nemen.

4. Graphical

A choice was made to keep the layout sober. The word processor used, Microsoft Word 2003, is probably not the best tool to produce an interesting layout. More importantly, the subject does not call for a flashy presentation. We have nothing to sell. We wish to present data, embedded to a relevant degree in a fitting historical perspective. Photographs shall not be partially obscured by text fields, they shall not be of post stamp size, and they shall not be converted to greyscale to keep the cost down. The background colour shall be plain white. The use of coloured text fields shall be very limited. These are usually designed for the reader who reads bits of text only, in a haphazard way.

5. The final shape

Gradually is became clear that the sheer size of this study prohibited conventional publication in book shape. Fortunately the digital age enables publication in other, far less expensive, shapes. And that brings new freedom to authors. There is no longer an editor who looks at a 'manuscript' with a budget in mind. We can do away with very small print that should keep the page count down. We are not restricted to a few pages with photographs only. The use of colour photographs is no longer more expensive than the use of greyscale ones. The contents can be updated very easily, making revised future editions the thing to be expected.

The digital age even allows for new magic, such as moving text, moving images, and interactivity. Author has not used such new tools, as too flashy for the subject matter.

The drawback of a publication in digital shape is that we are unsure if such a publication shall still be available after say half a century. The technology of today is unlikely to be the technology availabe then. A conventional book has a good chance to survive, even centuries. However, anybody who reads this, and who has sufficient paper and ink, and most of all a mountain of patience, can print this document to obtain a hardcopy.

6. The uncertainty margin

It has been very difficult to obtain solid facts about Wartime crash circumstances. Especially about crashes that took place at sea or in occupied territory. Reconstructions of events in this study, or reasoned approximations of these events, are sometimes based on the statements of a single eyewitness. When ten or more eyewitnesses could be found, it became evident how time has played with the memory of many. Therefore, again, the expressions 'possibly' or 'probably' had to be used a lot in the analyses given in this study. Author feels that it is better to report, with all due reserve, on what has been found, rather than to refrain from reporting entirely because the evidence is flimsy. A report, made as accurate as possible at the time of writing, is preferable to incorrect information, or none at all, especially in the case of the many that vanished without a trace.

The uncertainty margin would probably be smaller if the work reported upon in this document would have been continued for say five years. The choice is between publishing too soon, and never publishing at all, because this work can never be called entirely completed. It is hoped that this publication shall find the readers that can contribute to the data.

The reader is advised that sources are usually mentioned for statements given. When in doubt, please consult author. Contact details are given in Appendix 6.3. All data is presented as preliminary, pending better and more accurate information.

7. Production tools

1. Photography

Author's pictures were all shot with either the good old Canon EOS1 or the more flimsy Canon 300D, using the 17-35mm 2,8L or 28-135 3,5 IS lenses. Image scans were made with a CanoScan Lide 35 scanner, whilst 35mm negatives were scanned with a Nikon Coolscan III film scanner. All image processing was done via Photoshop 5.5, the best software ever encountered by this author. Good tools are essential. Unfortunately the Canon 300D camera malfunctioned after about 7.000 shots. The shutter got stuck, which could be repaired in the field with a Swiss Army knife, and the autofocus system stopped functioning. Never travel far without a backup camera body. A Canon 350D took over, and did very well, especially with the incredible 10-22mm lens. A Canon 10D was used as a backup. As a results of the high speed of development of digital photography, a Canon 450D was added, with the remarkable Sigma 18-250 OS lens. One lens that covers virtually all reporter's needs. A few shots in this study were taken with a 'Bigma' 50-500mm lens.

As a result of the vast distances that had to be covered to get local data and photographs, some shots had to be taken in less-than-ideal light conditions. Some headstone photographs had to be taken in the late afternoon directly against the settling sun, or in the early morning with sharp shadows from neighbouring headstones. Both situations beyond the capabilities of a flashlight. Grey shots taken in low light winter time, are included on purpose. Much of the Dutch RAF action took place well outside the clear blue sky season, and quite a bit of it took place at night. Several of the photographs were actually taken in the dark, with tripod and very long exposure times. Presenting only pictures of the holiday resort type would generate the wrong message.

2. Data processing software

All data was processed and organized with unsurpassed Microsoft Excel, leading to text that was written in a serious struggle with Microsoft Word, versions 2000 and 2003. In the end Word did the job, mostly, but graphics handling leaves a lot to be desired.

Author feels that these modern tools allow a productivity that would be utterly unthinkable in the typewriter days. This is to be seen as a background why data matches that are made now, were not made earlier. Previously, it required the researcher to have all bits of data in his or her brain, to be able to come up with matches and mismatches. Good brain exercize, though. Now matters can be stored and retrieved with the help of an electronic memory. That makes it easier for the physical brain to trace matches and mismatches amongst the tens of thousands of bits of information. Author has used that strategy a lot, to find mismatches and therefore matters that required deeper investigation.

3. Navigational tools

Geographical navigation and site definition were done using a MIO 269 navigator, with MioMap CE version 1.0, December 2004 software, that is in definitive need of improvement. The system broke down on many occasions, requiring a time-consuming reset. Very inconvenient when there are no places to park the car. But, when it worked, it was a great time saver, and a much safer way of navigating as compared to consulting maps all the time.

In February 2008 the MIO was replaced by a TomTom One XL, a dramatic improvement on all counts. It never failed, and it has good software and support.

Author obtained many small scale maps locally, whenever that served the purpose of visualisation of events.

4. Archaeological tools

On site investigations usually did not involve digging into the ground, as that usually had been done before. The Jan Plesman case is the exception. In this case tools included aerial photography, earth magnetometry, ground sample taking with a foldable ground drill, and even sniffer dogs trained on the smell of British WW2 aviation fuel came into the picture, but in the end the dogs were not used.

5. The role of the Web

The world wide computer web has been a source for scraps of information. However, most of the documents that were relevant to this study, come from archives that have not, or not yet, been made available online. Nevertheless, the Web has been the most important channel for communications. Via the Web, communications were so much faster than they would have been in the paper mail days.

Furthermore, the Web enabled fast checks of data with the online Casualty Registers of the Oorlogsgravenstichting and the Commonwealth War Graves Commission. This has been done for all of the over 2.000 casualties mentioned in this study.

8. Language chosen

It was decided to write in English rather than Dutch. Many Dutch RAF aviators who survived, did not return to Holland, or left the country a few years after the War. Most of the emigrants went to Canada, the United States, or Australia. All countries where English is the main language. Their offspring was raised with the English language; many of them have little or no knowledge of the Dutch language. The use of English enables the surviving US & UK collegues of the Dutch RAF aviators to read this text too. And quite the same for those in France, who were touched by events described here. Meanwhile, literal quotations are given in the language of origin, as well as in a translation into English by the author of this study. Whenever possible, these translations have been checked and approved by the persons quoted.

Names of places are given as these are spelled locally. Anything else creates confusion. We have seen quite enough of that.

9. Aircraft nomenclature

Vliegtuigen zijn vermeld met modelnaam, modelnummer, serienummer, roepletters, bestaande uit de Squadronkode van 2 letters en een letter voor het toestel, alles voor zover bekend. Voorbeeld: Spitfire Mk. Vb, Nr. BM300 DV-G, en niet Spitfire M.K.V.B.G. of andere varianten. Mk. = Mark; modelnummers volgens de Engelse konventie, dat wil zeggen meestal in Romeinse cijfers, met zonodig een kleine Arabische letter om een bewapeningsvariant aan te duiden. Voorbeeld: Spitfire Mk. Va is de Mark V met acht .303 machinegeweren, de Mark Vb heeft vier 20mm kanonnen, de Mark Vc heeft vier .303 machinegeweren en twee 20mm kanonnen. Bij sommige toestellen komt daar nog een door Squadron of piloot gegeven eigennaam bij, zoals 'Ockenburg'. De namen van de oorspronkelijke fabrikanten, zoals in Supermarine Spitfire, zijn weggelaten.

5. Text censoring by the Dutch Government

Author was given access to several Dutch archives, that still have access restrictions. Many documents could be seen, but were not allowed to be copied. Access was granted after written and signed declarations, that the text would be presented to the Dutch Minister of Defence, and the Head of the Nationaal Archief respectively, for scrutiny, prior to publication. Failing to comply with that, could be seen as a breech in national security, for which the highest penalties have been cemented into Dutch law. There was apprehension on author's side, as quite a few times in this study the Government could not be depicted in a brightly shining rôle. But the information in the archives was in potential important enough for author to risk it and surrender this bit of independency. Quite a bit of effort has gone into saying what needed to be said, but doing so in a way that would not offend the powers that be too much. Readers should please appreciate this, even if they disagree with statements presented here. Not a single line in this study has been written in a hasty and careless way.

6. Claims

1. Achievements

Author believes to have contributed the following to the understanding of this specialized section of history:

1. A clearer sight on the volume of Dutch RAF involvement. In earlier publications this volume has been estimated as 250 to 700 men. Author has identified 1.373 Dutchmen who served with the RAF, European theatre only.

2. A clear sight on the losses sustained by this group, and how these losses came to be.

3. A demonstration that about half of the losses of Dutch RAF aviators came about as a result of flying accidents, with no enemy in sight. A third of these fatal flying accidents were in fact mid-air collisions.

4. A strong case for the hypothesis that Rijklof van Goens did not ditch and die for lack of fuel, but was shot and killed by friendly Flak. A loss that was programmed by the circumstances of the time. The loss cause has been covered up for 60 years.

5. A reconstruction of events that led to the loss of P/O. Govert Steen, shot down by an enemy fighter whilst flying as tail-end Charlie on a course against which the pilots had protested. The assumption that P/O. Steen's Spitfire crashed in The Channel close to Octeville-sur-Mer, directly North of Le Havre, had to be confirmed.

6. The reconstruction of what probably happened to P/O. Bill Rowell, British, listed as MIA, but shot down and initially buried in Edreville, France, same day and mission as when P/O. Steen was lost. A collateral find.

7. Clarification of many crash sites of Dutch RAF aircraft in Northern France, and in the UK. Some of these crashes were reported to have taken place at up to five different places. Explanations for this massive confusion, and maps of the actual crash sites, are given.

8. Finding the exact crash location of many Dutch RAF aircraft that crashed on land in Holland and abroad, usually with the help of local crash eyewitnesses. Two crash sites of Allied aircraft in France, aircraft that flew in the same group as 320 (Dutch) Squadron, were pinpointed as a collateral find.

9. The removal of Res 1Lt Vl P. Huiskes from the Loenen Vijfluik, commemorating the Engelandvaarders who were killed. Mr. Huiskes actually survived the War.

10. Addition of Engelandvaarder Sgt A.M. Heijblom to the Loenen Vijfluik. The arrivals in England of the Dutch RAF aviators and possible Engelandvaarders H. Jongman and E.J. Baron van Nagell are still under investigation.

11. A strong case for the hypothesis that the Hamilton of Silverton Hill crew did not crash and die, but emergency-landed succesfully in occupied territory, after which the crew was captured and executed. Hamilton and Kuijpers, who are listed as MIA, may be buried as unknowns in Bayeux British War Cemetery or elsewhere. As it stands, the evidence for their possible burial is still too flimsy to request a forensic investigation of the contents of certain graves.

12. A case that two of three men missing from FR174, the Van Dieren Bijvoet Mitchell, may actually still be buried as unknowns in Cherbourg Communal Cemetery, probable grave numbers are given. At the time of writing, a request for a forensic examination of the contents of these graves has been forwarded to the Commander in Chief, Royal Dutch Air Force, and the British Ministry of Defence.

13. Two cases of one British and one New Zealand aviator who may be buried as unknowns in Cherbourg Cemetery, France. Cases were persented to the CWGC and the MoD, and are under investigation. Again, collateral findings.

14. The presentation of German Wartime documents, showing that several Dutch RAF aviators, killed over enemy-held territory, were in fact identified by the Germans. This data was assumed to be correct by the Allied Grave Services, when these became operational in liberated areas and after the War.

15. A demystification of the deaths of Sergeants Bootsma and Heijblom, who were most probably killed by an 'ordinary' German anti-personnel mine on Achmer airfield, Germany. The suggestion made elsewhere, that they died as a result of their own fooling-around, could not be substantiated.

16. A new perspective on the RAF crash explanation for at least one fatal crash, stating that 'pilots failed to keep adequate lookout', when in fact the aviators could not see anything at all, either by eyesight or by instruments.

17. A new perspective on the RAF crash explanation of 'premature explosion of bomb load', when it has to be assumed that the aircraft was actually hit by Flak. See the 'Manderfeld file'. RAF bombs did not explode prematurely.

18. A new perspective on the dangers of very close formation flying, leading to many collisions, both with bombers and with fighters, also leading to severe collateral damage in, or loss of, bombers when the neighbouring aircraft exploded after receiving a direct Flak hit.

19. A perspective on RAF treatment of the aviators who appeared to be unable to take the stress of combat flying. They were let off the hook. This most intelligent and humane RAF position has probably saved lives.

20. Bringing together portrait photographs of the lost aviators. At the time of writing, 170 of the 242 aviators lost could be given a portrait photograph. The search for more and better photographs continues.

21. Obtaining photographs of headstones and cemeteries, of and in which Dutch RAF aviators were and/or are buried. This included many out-of-the-way places.

22. Author has mapped the commemoration of the Dutch RAF aviators lost. Some are commemorated on one or more Memorials, most are not commemorated on or with any Memorial at all. A Memorial for the group does not exist.

23. Author has mapped the volume of decorations received by the Dutch RAF aviators lost. They, most often posthumously, received only about half the volume of decorations as compared to those who survived. Many, after two to three years of service in Wartime, and ending up dead in the process, did not receive any decoration at all. The men in question are no longer alive to bother about that. But decorations also serve the purpose of telling something to families and posterity.

24. Author has put into perspective the huge price paid by members of 320 (Dutch) Squadron, that amounted to about 62% of all losses of Dutch RAF aviators. Meanwhile, author has demonstrated that 320 Sqn safety record was good. This means that the many losses suffered by this Squadron came about as a result of very intensive operational flying.

25. Retrieval of parts of Dutch RAF aircraft lost, in the hands of private collectors in Holland and abroad, and one part secured from France for museum display in The Netherlands.

26. The finding of many hundreds of previously unknown photographs and documents in family archives, all annotated and presented to the Dutch Airforce Historical Branch for conservation for posterity.

27. The finding of three hitherto unknown Monuments in France, two of these erected by local initiative shortly after the War, and one much later, in 2004, to commemorate the death of Dutch aviators at or near the site.

28. The finding that RAF Air Historical Branch is, 'for the purety of the records', not interested in anything but official RAF data, even if it has to be assumed that this data is incomplete or even in error. The Air Historical Branch is an archive, not an institution that embraces research into history.

29. The finding that English Heritage (EH), the UK organisation that manages all sites of historical interest in the UK, has no information on file about aircraft wrecks in UK coastal waters, although this is clearly stated to belong to EH's field of operations. EH has produced extensive surveys of historical artefacts on land, including artefacts dating from WW2. EH has even classified historical aircraft as to their rarity, making these wrecks more or less candidates for a salvage mission. Spitfires are not rare; dozens are still flying today. Author pleads that the aviators lost in Spitfires, or in any other type of aircraft, were very rare indeed. They were unique individuals. EH's classification of human remains, lower on the scale than military hardware, is painfully technocratic.

The coastal sea areas remain a field for paperwork statements rather than actions. Author's detailed report on the location of an unexploded V-1 flying bomb, that ditched very close to the shore off Dover after being damaged by AA-fire, did not receive any response. A V-1 may not be rare and therefore of historical interest. But the persisting presence of its warhead of 830 kg of high explosives should interest some-one.

30. A strong participation in the erection of a Monument for all Dutch military aviators who were lost, 1913 to the present, with all names on it. Author expressed in 'Steen', 2005, the wish for a Monument for the Dutch RAF aviators who were lost. In 2006, KLu Commodore b.d. Steve Netto, former fighter pilot, took the initiative to erect on Soesterberg Airforce Base, a Monument for all KLu aviators lost from 1945 to the present. In very close cooperation with author, the scope of this Monument was expanded to include the losses of all Dutch military flying services, all periods. Author contributed the World War Two loss data, and pleaded that losses of the Marine Luchtvaart Dienst should be included. After initial reluctance, the idea was soon adopted by the highest levels of the Dutch Airforce. The end result was an expansion of the Monument from under 300 names to over 1.200, with about 700 more names in the Monument's register. The last being names of casualties from the flying services, that died of causes that were not directly related to flying operational sorties. With this, and as a result of private initiative, Holland finally has erected a Monument for its lost military aviators, of the type already present in the other Allied nations. The support from the highest offices, i.c. General Dick Berlijn, Chief Commander of all Dutch Armed Forces, has been vital and first class.

More could have been achieved, if more time and funds had been available. They were not. This is what we could do. Author likes to believe that results are worthwhile as they are.

2. Failures

Author claims to have tried, but failed to achieve, the following:

1. Author has not been able to get OGS to change the multitude of data bits in the OGS Casualty Register, regarding the Dutch RAF aviators, that contain errors or contradictions. This is in part due to the fact that OGS shall stick to what is stated in official documents, even if the original data source for those documents is the enemy in Wartime.

In one case so far, author insisted that OGS would correct what was in fact Nazi data. Possibly because this was about author's grandfather, strong words were met by OGS with an instant correction. In another case it became evident that OGS did not share paperwork it actually held, and even produced statements that were in clear contradiction to the contents of that paperwork.

However, OGS has in fact demonstrated a responsiveness to suggestions for improvements. See the chapter on this in one of the annexes.

2. Author has not been able to get CWCG to change errors in its online data. A case substantiated with a load of official documents received no response from CWGC, nor a visible correction in CWGC's online database. However, as time progressed, the CWGC demonstrated an increased willingness to correct minor errors, such as in the spelling of names of places.

3. Author has not been able to get CWGC to add the 80% of the lost Dutch RAF aviators to its database. CWGC states that these men fall outide the scope as they were not nationals of the Commonwealth, which is true. Meanwhile, CWGC has listed about 20% of these men. Adding the others would correct this inconsistency, to say the least.

4. Author has not been able to obtain any information from CWGC, OGS, RAF AHB or the Dutch Salvage and Identification Service, regarding identifications of Dutch airmen directly or longer after the War, men that were initially buried as 'unknown'. Author has to assume that such identifications were merely or mostly a paperwork matter, called the logical process of elimination, that failed if there was unsufficient paperwork of whatever origin. This opinion was substantiated by a review of the contents of the 1945 to 1960 archive of the Dutch Salvage and Identification Service.

5. Author did not receive a single bit of useful information from the Instituut voor Maritieme Historie, the Dutch Navy Historical Branch, that holds a vast amount of material about 320 and 321 Squadrons and their aviators. Requests, if answered at all, were met with 'have not', 'cannot' and 'will not' statements. The only exception is information requested about the vessel 'Albatros', that was called 'Flying Officer Steen' for a very short period after the War. IMH produced nice but useless information about another vessel with the name 'Albatros'. This study would undoubtably have been much richer in photographs, had we received a more forthcoming treatment from the IMH. Author wishes to make the point that material held at the Nederlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie (NIMH), into which the IMH merged in 2005, is not private but public material. The public pays for all this. Author finds it rather shameful, that in a work of this size, so many of the lost men obtained only a blank cadre for a portrait picture.

6. Author has been unable to find any evidence of RAF or Dutch Airforce postwar research into causes of crashes, that took place in occupied territory outside of The Netherlands.

7. Author has been unable to find any evidence of Dutch Airforce or Government activity to search for aircraft and men, lost abroad over land in RAF service. Author did find an official statement, that the Dutch would sit back and wait for the British post War Missing Research & Enquiry Service (MR&ES), to come up with results. It seems that the Dutch are still sitting back. If MR&ES findings were 'case closed as unsolvable', then that seems to have been taken by the Dutch as the final verdict. In any case, MR&ES reports could not be found in any of the relevant Dutch archives, and none of the persons with relevant specialized knowledge, contacted in Holland, had ever seen such MR&ES reports. Such reports about the Dutch RAF aviators MIA over land could also not be found in the National Archives, London, that does hold a sizeable amount of MR&ES material. We have reasons to believe that these reports do exist, in the RAF Archive in Hayes, that remains closed to the year 2040. The reports of the Grave Registration Units (GRU) and the Grave Concentration Units (GCU), whose work preceded that of the MR&ES, were, after two years of asking, declared to be present in the archive of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, where these cannot be accessed with any ease.

8. Author has been unable to find any evidence of searches for Dutch RAF men and aircraft lost in the open seas, either by the British or by the Dutch Government. Author did receive official statements from both countries that such searches have not been undertaken. Meanwhile, both countries use the expression 'field graves' or 'sea(mans) graves' to mask indifference about the whereabouts of these graves with piety.

9. Author has been unable to get any-one to move and try to find the wreck of F/Lt. Jan Plesman's Spitfire and his mortal remains. Probably lost Southwest of Hazebrouck, France, and not Northeast of St. Omer, as stated everywhere on the basis of a less than accurate remark in the Squadron's ORB. The diplomatic representation of the Dutch Air Force in France was engaged, and assistance was promised, even if only to retrieve documents from French archives, but this assistance never materialized. However, Albert Plesman, Jan's brother, after conversations with author, managed to interest the top management of Air France-KLM in the matter. AF-KLM did send out a team to search in both the St. Omer and the Hazebrouck areas. This resulted in the discovery and recovery of a German fighter aircraft and pilot in the search area calculated by author. Unfortunately, cooperation turned out to be a flow of information, author to the French, one direction only, which was not quite the way to achieve real progress. Then author took seriously ill, which brought the project to a halt on this side. Hopefully merely a pause. Author intended to present the arguments leading to the statement that the Jan Plesman case is not a hopeless one. What is needed is some more effort in the field; everything has been prepared for that.

The RAF 322 (Dutch) Squadron Fighter Command motto 'Niet praten maar doen', 'Act, don't talk', seems to come from an entirely different era.

Photo Dick Breedijk