Extract from 'Twin Wellington Collision over Prestwood, 1944' a report by Derek Sadler

83 OTU RAF Peplow operated Vickers Wellington Mark10 bombers, the use of these aircraft by the main force of Bomber Command in the UK had ceased by the end of 1943 and were essentially restricted to OTUs. On the night of Friday 25 August 1944 two aircraft took off and were airborne one minute apart to practice a night exercise termed a 'bullseye'. This involved a cross country flight incorporating several different turning points that could be situated anywhere in the UK and was meant to give trainee crews experience that would bind them together into a cohesive unit. Along the route they would probably make a dummy bombing attack on a specified town.

The first Wellington HF517 was piloted by Flying Officer Erik Michielsen (Dutch) and the British crew consisted of Pilot Officer Ronald Junor (navigator), Pilot Officer John Sutherin (Air Bomber), Sergeant James Clarke (Wireless Operator), Sergeants John Butterfield and Gerald Callow (Air Gunners). The second Wellington MF589 was piloted by Flying Officer Elwood Smith (Canadian) and crewed by four Canadians Flying Officer Vernon Bolton (Navigator), Flying Officer Norman Cousins (Air Bomber), Sergeant James McMurtrie (Air Gunner), Sergeant Raymond Sander (Air Gunner) and one Englishman Sergeant John Poston (Wireless Operator).

At 1.25am on the 26 August these two aircraft collided over Prestwood and fell as burning disintegrating wrecks into the village. Of the twelve crew members, eleven were killed, the survivor Pilot Officer Junor was found wandering in adazed condition in Lodge Wood. In the official report following the collision the conclusion was ' failure by both crews to keep an adequate look out'.

2. The Engelandvaarder

The title of Michielsen's book 'Tegen de vlagen van den oostenwind', 'Against the blows of the Easternwind' would, at the time, be instantly understood by many. 'Easternwind' stands for the Germans, that had invaded from the East, and author expresses his resistance against that. However, the symbol has a second meaning that is in conflict with the first. Easternwind usually brought periods of one to a few days of calm water on the North Sea, desparately needed by those who sought to escape from Holland to England in flimsy vessels. Michielsen and friends made three attempts in the late summer of 1940 to escape by sea. In one of these, they were shipwrecked shortly after a very difficult departure from the beach at Noordwijkerhout. This was caused by the elements, that were hoped to be favourable enough, but were not. Especially their meticulously prepared catamaran-like twin canoo arrangement required the calmest of seas, if they were to survive. As favourable weather hardly ever came, and as the Germans grew more aware of such ventures over time, the odds decreased even further. Every attempt, even the failed ones, that came to the notice of the Germans, led to measures to counteract the Engelandvaarders who wanted to take to the sea. In Michielsen's original estimation, an escape by sea depended 80% on brains, and 20% on sweat and toil. He gradually realized that chance was a factor too, and in fact one of a magnitude that made any such calculation void.

Michielsen came close to several attempts to escape by aircraft send over from the UK, but this route proved to be very restricted in the amount of passengers that could be taken. In fact such travel arrangements were ruled out after the dramatic events on the Tjeukemeer in the night of 15 to 16 october 1940. Michielsen was at the shore of the Tjeukemeer that night, hoping that the aircraft would have a place for him. But already the rowing boat employed to deliver the passengers to the center of the lake, could not hold him as an extra passenger. See Chapter 3.21, Loss of Hudson Mk. III Nr. V9036 NO-O 'Makassar', Dolman crew, for more details of this failed attempt to escape. Michielsen barely escaped captivity on this occasion.

In the end, Michielsen decided to go the land route.

3. Crash site confusion

Map 90. Mr E.F.K. Michielsen's crash site confusion

The father of Mr. Michielsen reported in 1952 to OGS that he had spoken with the survivor of this crash, Mr. R.S. Juno. He indicated the crash site as near Thornhill airfield.

Source: J.J. Teeuwisse, OGS, dd. 15/7/2005.

The postscript in 'Tegen de vlagen van den Oostenwind', most likely written by Erik's father, mentions 'Thornhill' near Shrewsbury in Wales. This postscript is reproduced below.

Source: Mr E.F.K. Michielsen, 'Tegen de vlagen van den Oostenwind', Leiden, 1945, p. 347

An airfield by that name did and does not exist in the UK, so we feel safe to assume that RAF Tern Hill was meant, 5 miles NW of Child's Ercall, and indeed close to Shrewsbury. Tern Hill is also seen spelled as Ternhill.

Erik werd in den nacht van Zaterdag op Zondag 26 Augustus 1944, bij een nachtelijke oefenvlucht, met zijn Wellington-bomber boven het militaire vliegveld Thornhill bij Shrewsbury in Wales, door een ander oefentoestel van achteren geramd, zoodat de staart afknapte en hij met zijn 3 mede-inzittende Canadeesche collegas, neerstortte en den dood vond. In Eriks toestel, dat door hemzelf bestuurd werd, bevonden zich geen andere Hollanders. Eriks begrafenis vond plaats om half 4 op de begraafplaats Brookwood op den 31 Augustus d.a.v. en was door de R.A.F. keurig verzorgd, al wisten de meeste vrienden van Erik op den dag van de begrafenis nog niet dat hij omgekomen was, terwijl anderen door dienst verhinderd waren hem de laatste eer te bewijzen. H.M. de Koningin zond haar adjudant Jhr. Beelaerts van Blokland, Prins Bernhard zijn adjudant Baron Tuyl van Serooskerken. De Minister van Oorlog, Jhr. Van Lith de Jeude zond Majoor Silbiger, terwijl de R.A.F. vertegenwoordigd was door lt. Van Rossum. Verder waren aanwezig de Majoor-aalmoezenier Pater Monchen (ook een Engelandvaarder en vriend van Erik), eenige meisjes-kennissen van het Hollandsche Vrouwencorps en namens zijn afwezige familie de heer W. v.d. Stadt, manager der Ned. Handel Mij. te London. Acht onderofficieren van de R.A.F. fungeerden als "pallbearers" en een sergeant blies de "last-post". Bovendien had de Koningin aan Ds. Van Dorp, die zijn standplaats in London heeft, doch die sinds de invasie ook als vlootpredikant optreedt, verzocht de grafrede te houden.

Note that not 3 Canadian crew, but 4 British died with Mr. Michielsen in Wellington HF517. When Erik's father wrote the text above, in 1945, and also in 1952, when he spoke with OGS, he did not and probably could not have the correct information about the place where his son had died. He trusted the survivor of the crash with his information. But the two Wellingtons actually collided over Lodge Wood, North of Preston, Buckinghamshire, with wreck parts coming down in the village.

Poem by Erik's father, published in Mr E.F.K. Michielsen, 'Tegen de vlagen van den Oostenwind', Leiden, 1945

Picture taken from the edge of Lodge Wood, near Honor End Lane, looking towards Prestwood. In the sky above the two Wellingtons collided, debris of the aircraft raining down in Prestwood, whilst the sole survivor, R.S. Juno, was found walking dazed in Lodge Wood. Prestwood 070126-1

4. Crash site data

Map 91. Prestwood, Buckinghamshire, crash area of Mr E.F.K. Michielsen The Wellingtons collided in the Prestwood area, parts raining down into the village. The only survivor was found in Lodge Wood, NW of Prestwood.

5. Burial site confusion

Michielsen's grave location in Brookwood Military Cemetery row 21/D counts as 14, not 17 as mentioned by CWGC in 2003 and OGS in 2004. When this was pointed out to OGS, a reply dated 15/7/2005 was received, stating that the CWGC would be asked to clear this up. No word on the subject was received after that from either OGS or CWGC.

Rechecking matters in Brookwood on 07/01/23, author found the first grave positions in row 21/D to be empty. Possibly as a result of grave relocations or, more likely, as a result of burying right to left, whilst numbering left to right.

The burials to the right of Michielsen, R.F. Recabarren & J.D. Cowley, are mentioned by CWGC as 21/D/18 and 21/D/19. Graves in front of these are mentioned as 21/C/17 to 21/C/19. In other words, the position indication 21/D/17 for Michielsen is correct. Rechecking again with the CWGC online database, it was found that at some time between 7/2005 and 2/2007 the CWGC had changed the grave position indication into 21/D/14.

The OGS obviously did not obtain feedback from CWGC, and maintained 21/D/17 as the position.

A similar situation appeared to be present fo the grave of E.E.G. de Preter. He is unknown to CWGC. OGS in 2004 mentions his grave as 23/D/17. On the spot the grave seems to count as 23/D/9. This was communicated to OGS in July 2005 too. This time, OGS changed its data to 23/D/9. But when author checked the position indicators in January 2007, of the graves around De Preter, it was established that 23/D/17 is correct, when accounting for the unused grave positions in this row.

Author apologizes for having created confusion, rather than pointing to and clearing up of such, and is amazed to see that the very one time that CWGC has changed a bit of data in its records as a result of author's actions, this in fact produced an error.