625 Squadron Loss Statistics

Update 13 July 2026

The data in this update includes information provided by Theo Boiten as he was researching to expand the two volume version of his Nachtjagd War Diaries (NWD), into the multiple volumes of the Nachtjagd Combat Archive Series (NCA). This correlated with the time frame the 625 Squadron Project’s authors were chronicling the Squadron’s 74 aircraft lost, with Aircrew Remembered archive reports. The majority of Squadron archive reports have been completed and we now have access to the cause of loss for the remainder.

In the process Theo has enabled us to move 27 of the previous Squadron losses from the Unknown category to the Night Fighter (NF), Flak (F), Night Fighter/Flak (NF/F) and Night Fighter/Collision (NF/C) files. The net effect was to reduce the Unknown file number from 39 to 13, the Night Fighter file ballooned from 17 to 39, and the Flak file from 2 to 6. We have added an additional category to include a number of miscellaneous losses that do not fit with the others.

Here is a list, in chronological order, of the 27 Unknowns that now have an identified cause of loss. F designates a Flak caused loss. Those without a noted cause are Night Fighter losses. A couple of exceptions are noted:

JA714, ED321, DV392, JB122, ME588, LM384, ME684 (F), ND636, ME731, LM515, LL894, LM427, ND742, LM139, ED938 (NF/F),

PB126, ND459, LM163 (F), ME733, LM512 (N/F/Collision), PB154, PD388, PB158 (F), NG240, PD375, NG324, RF145.

Summary of 625 Squadron's 74 aircraft that failed to return

1. Night Fighter/Intruder*: 39, (*ME734)

2. Flak: 6, (ND461, JB743, LM163, PB158, ME684, PD204)

3. Night Fighter/Flak: 2, (ED938, ND459)

4. Collisions: 3, (ND637, LM512 N/F attack caused collision, LM691)

5. Engine fires, Fuel Starvation, Mechanical failure and Landing accidents: 6 (W4999, ED951, ND407 Training, ME676, LL956 and NN699)

6. Unknown: 13 (W4833, ND596, LM674, LM103, PA174, LM731, NG239, NG238, NG294, NF996, NG267, NG169 and NG237)

Note: ND596 was previously noted as LWT.

7. Lost Without a Trace (LWT): 4 (DV364, LM168, PB531 and PB556 Training)

8. Friendly Fire: 1 (PB815)

Solo Aircrew Losses without Aircraft Loss:

1. Rear Gunner, F/Sgt F.P. Adams A434217 RAAF, 11/6/44, died from injuries sustained when his turret separated from the fuselage on the landing rollout, post raid.

2. Bomb aimer, F/O D.N.A. Cooper 154093, 21/2/45 was killed outright when he was struck by an explosive projectile while on an operation as Navigator of S/L Douetil’s crew, JA862.

3. W/O F.T. Price 1509811 died on 19/4/45, as a POW, following injuries sustained during a Typhoon attack near Gresse.

These results bring into focus the chances of a crew falling due to one of the two dreaded foes, night fighter versus flak. It is now apparent the former was six and a half times more likely to be the cause of a crew failing to return from an op.

Claim figures for Bomber Command aircraft as published in the Nachtjagd Combat Archive

We are grateful to Theo Boiten for sharing his claim figures of Bomber Command aircraft over the course of the war from his recently published Nachtjagd Combat Archive (NCA) series:

'I can give you the following statistics from the NCA series, these are now slightly outdated as I have identified an estimated 150 new Flak claims over the past few years since the completion of the NCA series:

The Nachtjagdverbände achieved an estimated 5,942-6,000 aerial victory claims (or Abschüsse) in the Reichsverteidigung on the Western Front, mainly against RAF Bomber Command. Furthermore, twin-engine Nachtjagd crews achieved approximately 137 American heavy bomber Abschüsse and six escort fighters shot down in daylight in the West during 1943-44. The Luftwaffe and Marine Flak arms achieved an estimated 2,105 Abschüsse at night in the West against RAF Bomber Command, at least 585 of which were either shared with or contested by Nachtjäger. An estimated 796 Flak searchlight claims for the illumination and contribution to the destruction of Bomber Command aircraft have been identified during the research of this book. Operating in the East against the Soviet Air Force, Nachtjäger tallied an estimated 724 victory claims and, finally, the Nachtjagdverbände amassed around 234 Abschüsse in the Mediterranean and S.E. Europe.'

Bomber Command aircraft lost due to night fighter activity as calculated by Jack Albrecht and John Naylor taking into account Theo Boiten's results:

1. Nachtjagdverbände: 6,000 approx.

2. Luftwaffe/Flak/Nachtjagdverbände contested and corrected for 12.5% flak losses: 2105-263=1,842. (from 8:1 ratio night fighter:flak or 0.125)

3. Med., S.E. Europe: 234.

4. Flak correction as a result of your ongoing research: -150

Grand Total Night Fighter Claims all Bomber Command Theatres: 7926 (approx. 8,000)

Bomber Command Losses:

1. Bomber Command Monthly Losses (Datawrapper): 7,926 divided by 8,325 = 95%.

2. Max Hastings amended to 2022: 7,926 divided by 10,121 =78%

3. 625 Squadron Project Nachtjagd Losses: *53 divided by total Squadron losses 74=72%.

*Note: This figure is an estimate of the figures from the above Squadron loss stats- NF 39, NF/F 2, N/C 1, UN 8 and LWT 3= 53.

With these figures it would be reasonable to estimate the Bomber Command loss rate to night fighters to be:

70-80 % +/- 5% of all Bomber Command losses appears to be within the ballpark for all the Command's squadrons combined, despite our small sample size of ONE squadron. According to Chris Ward we are the only ones who have taken the time to provide updated, refined Squadron's loss statistics. However, if anything our results skew the loss rate toward the lower end of the scale.

On arrival at an operational bomber base rookie crews usually had a period of grace before the reality of ops to become oriented with the hectic ebb and flow on an operational base. During this time it soon became apparent the life span for many had been reduced to a matter of weeks and their chances of surviving their first tour of ops was roughly one in three. This was driven home when they were required to complete their wills and draft a final letter to their loved ones before departing on their first mission over enemy territory. And at this point there was no turning back.

The Secret Weapon System- Schräge Musik

Unfortunately, it would not be until war’s end when Bomber Command survivors and senior staff were finally confronted with the weapon system combination that accounted for the vast majority of Nachtjagd claims— two years after its introduction to the night war over Occupied Europe: SN2 Airborne Interception Radar and Schräge Musik (SM) cannons. SN2 was the equivalent of night vision goggles until visual contact was established and SM was a single 30mm or pair of 20mm cannons mounted to fire from the near vertical position into vulnerable, ventral underside of a bomber, preferably into the engines or wing petrol tanks. The interception from below, with a slow formation climb into attack position was usually unwitnessed, and the close range, brief seconds firing attack, with tracer-less ammunition, was usually sufficient to send a four-engine bomber and crew down in flames in a matter of seconds. A petrol tank or bomb bay explosion could occur at any moment leaving crew members insufficient time to clip on a chute. They were doomed. Failure of a main spar would usually take a little longer to unfold but would have a similar outcome with immediate spin development, centrifugal force pinning crew members, until structural failure or impact. Those who had had a chance to clip on their chutes still had a fighting chance, if ejected by the explosion and capable of pulling the ripcord, or the rare situation in which the explosive force automatically deployed their chute.

This tactic was referred to as the Tame Boar strategy, incorporating twin-engine aircraft equipped with SN2 and SM, vectored into the bomber stream. Once established in the stream, akin to a shark among a school of fish, could continue to deal death and destruction until fuel and/or ammunition became limiting factors. On the other hand, Wild Boar tactics involved mostly single-engine aircraft carrying out visual interceptions over the target, limiting their exposure time to the bomber stream.

As expected the number of Tame Boar claimants greatly exceeded those of the Wild Boar crews.

Although the majority of bomber crews were unaware, their chances of returning to base after interception by an experienced SN2/SM equipped crew were almost nonexistent. Under these circumstances the customary corkscrew maneuver was essentially useless. All the Nachtjagd crew had to do was stay out of visual range, but within SN2 range, and wait for the enemy aircraft to resume straight and level flight before resuming another interception.

Perhaps most disheartening was the fact a bomber crew was not safe in the dark of night, in the middle of a cloud deck. In the hands of an experienced Nachtjagd crew, under such conditions, they could stalk and destroy a four engine bomber with a brief burst of cannon fire—unseen and unsuspected.

Halifax MZ422:

https://aircrewremembered.com/mather-gordon-s.html

A summary of the development and history of this ingenious weapon system is included as Addendum 3 in the archive report on the loss of LM513, 1st Lt Max Dowden and crew:

https://aircrewremembered.com/dowden-max-eugene-1.html

Theo Boiten’s background information on the combat introduction of Schräge Musik

'The Schräge Musik weapons system was first used on operations on 29/30 March 1943 when a pilot scored the first victory with these weapons. On the 17/18 August 1943 Peenemünde raid the SM weapons system for the first time several pilots scored (multiple) victories with the system. There was not a standardised interception with the SM weapons, but most pilots used it to ignite the wing fuel tanks in either the port or starboard wing which was invariably enough to seal the fate of the bomber.'

It is our belief that the prevalence of SM increased exponentially following the Peenemünde raid and by war’s end equipped the majority, if not all, Nachtjagd aircraft.

Countermeasures

By mid-1943, following the Peenemünde raid returning crews and aircraft provided testimony of a weapon system incorporating an attack from the vulnerable, ventral position. This resulted in RAF senior staff and intelligence officers introducing various experimental modifications to counter this threat.

John Naylor has researched several of these weapons to thwart such an attack:

Ventral Turret History

I have been looking at this. Ventral turrets had been thought about from the beginning of the war. The first was the K Type that was fitted to a few of the early Halifax Mk1s', but was a complete failure, and withdrawn soon after.

Then came the Nash and Thompson FN17 Ventral Turret. This was power operated and fitted to Armstrong Whitworth Whitleys. Again, this was a failure! There was poor visibility for the gunner, and along with extra drag, decreasing the aircraft speed, it had a tendency to extend downward on its own, without any crew input!

Next came the Nash and Thompson FN21. This was tried on the Avro Manchester. It weighed a quarter of a ton and slowed the aircraft by 15mph. Although it gave a good field of view, it was not liked by the gunners, and was withdrawn from use!

This was followed by the Nash and Thompson FN25. It was cylindrical in shape, and was fitted to Mk 1 Wellingtons. However, again, poor visibility and the drag effect ensured it was withdrawn from use very early in the war.

It is not well known that the original Lancaster design incorporated a ventral turret, the Nash and Thompson FN64. However, its use was discontinued, after being fitted to a number of early Mk Is. It was a weird contraption where the gunner sat facing the rear and sighted the target through a periscope sight! The twin browning turret was hydraulically driven, but suffered from poor vision due to the periscopes limited vision.

It was only in early 1944, with the advent of the 'Schräge Musik' being introduced by the Luftwaffe, that Bomber Command had another go at protecting the underneath of the Bombers by using the new Preston Green Mk II ventral turret. This was fitted to the Halifax Mk. III, originally with a single .50 inch gun but later 2 guns were installed. Used mostly by the Canadians in 6 Group RCAF, and a few RAF Squadrons in 4 Group, it was quite successful, using a reflector sight.

It is here that I feel that Bomber Command could have perfected this turret and made it standard protection on ALL of the four engine 'heavies'. It seems, you will see my attached statement from 'Bomber Command Operations Manual', by Haynes, that H2S appeared to be more important, and this ventral turret took second place! Your theory about the unnecessary waste of human life was indeed a crime that should never have happened.

A little more attention to perfecting this Preston Green turret could no doubt have saved countless lives!? JN

408 Goose Squadron RCAF, Lancaster II, Linton on Ouse. Courtesy of John Naylor. Lancaster at War 5 -Fifty Years On by Mike Garbett and Brian Goulding.

Ventral turret profile mounting. Courtesy of John Naylor. Lancaster at War 5 -Fifty Years On by Mike Garbett and Brian Goulding.

Ventral turret manned. Courtesy of John Naylor. Lancaster at War 5 -Fifty Years On by Mike Garbett and Brian Goulding.

An AGLT (Airborne Gun Laying Turret) had been tested in the ventral position on a Halifax Bomber, but was found to be wanting in reliability and ease of operation. However, a further AGLT fitted to the rear turret with its own radar detection scanner, gave a much more level of success, if used in the proper manner, with the aid of the other crew members.

It was first used on the Darmstadt raid of 11/12 September 1944 by 49 Squadron. (It was by then fitted to all Lancasters, and included Z Equipment that gave a 'friendly' signal to all 'Village Inn' aircraft).

This was very successful, and was borne out by F/O Leslie Hay of 49 Sqn in PB354 on this very raid. His description of how it saved the lives of he and his crew from certain death is testament to its inception. Though after the war, it was deemed not very effective, Leslie Hay has disputed this, and said that the tests that were carried out were flawed, and should have been done in actual combat conditions!

With this in mind, had the Authorities continued with the AGLT Ventral turret, together with 'Village Inn', then many lives would have been saved, instead of trying to quantify the added navigation and target improvements that had been endowed on H2S! JN

Airborne Gun Laying in Turrets (AGLT)

The use of Village Inn

11/12 September, 1944; DARMSTADT:

The previous 5 Group operation against Darmstadt had failed, but this raid proved to be a devastating success. The awful power of the bomber was well demonstrated in this outstandingly accurate and concentrated attack. The 226 Lancasters used the 'spokes of a wheel' method in which each aircraft was given a different direction of attack on the markers, and would then undershoot or overshoot the markers by a given number of seconds. Because of the extensive fire destruction and heavy casualties, the German authorities considered the attack on Darmstadt to be an extreme example of R.A.F. 'terror bombing'. As far as Bomber Command was concerned, this was an important railway communications target.

5 Group suffered the loss of 12 Lancasters and their crews. For 49 Squadron, this operation was of particular importance, for it saw the first operational use of 'Village Inn'. 49, who had pioneered the development of the AGLT system were given the opportunity to be the first squadron to use it in combat.

Throughout Bomber Command, all aircraft had been fitted with "Z" equipment which would transmit the infra-red 'friendly' signal to any 'Village Inn' Lancasters they might come across.

Order of Battle for the night’s operation was posted just before lunch; the 9 aircraft (all 'Village Inn' equipped) detailed were as follows:

PB300 S/L Lace
PB355 F/O Burns RCAF
PB373 F/L Lee
PB361 F/O Alty
PB361 F/O Parkin
PB700 F/O Russell
PB349 F/O Furber
PB354 F/O Hay
PB369 F/O Mallinson

All 49's aircraft carried out successful bombing attacks and returned to Fiskerton without loss by 02.39hrs. At interrogation it was revealed that two crews had made enemy contact using their A.G.L.T. equipment and subsequent combats with enemy aircraft ensued.

What follows is a quite remarkable account, given by F/O Leslie Hay or 'Uncle Will' as he became known within the squadron, who was piloting one of these Lancasters. He describes in detail the actions as they occurred during that Monday evening in September 1944. The Lancaster concerned was a Mk III, PB354 EA-G for George. The crew consisted of; F/O L.J. Hay Pilot, Sgt F. Green flight engineer, P/O P.W. Smith navigator, W/O H. Jenkinson, wireless operator, F/Sgt A.E. French mid/upper gunner, P/O A.J. Mackay, bomb aimer and F/O J.S. Hall the rear gunner.

Uncle Will' continues:

'Briefing was particularly careful because of the circumstances surrounding the trip. Each aircraft was briefed to lag behind the bomber stream and stacked in echelon upwards as if we were late trying to catch up. These were usually the aircraft that the fighters were able to pick off. We were given individual heights to fly and I found that I was right at the back, the uppermost aircraft. I must say that I wasn't keen on being in that position. It seemed too much like being a staked out goat waiting for the tiger, and would probably be the first to get picked up. There was the possibility that there would be some genuine late comers -there generally were -and their infra red identification or "Z" equipment as it was called was not working.

To overcome this we were briefed not to open fire this side of 3 degrees east (the other side of Paris) unless we identified the aircraft visually as an enemy. We had to be absolutely certain that we were not shooting down our own bombers. It was a bit hair-raising as it seemed to me that we had to leave so much to chance before we could get to grips with anything that might come up. We could only wait and see what happened.

We took-off (21.02hrs) as usual, but later than the other squadrons, trailing behind by working on a time basis, to Reading then the coast - guns tested - bombs fused. Here we go!

We had hardly crossed the French coast when our wireless operator reported that his radar screen (Fishpond) showed that two aircraft were at 2,000 yards and had been there a little while. The rear gunner was unable to pick them up at that range so we just waited. They then moved closer to about 1,500 yards and the rear gunner got them on his radar, their blips sounding on our intercom, but no "Z" equipment was flashing. The night was dark, no moon, but visibility was quite good. We had not expected two aircraft like this and were a bit apprehensive, so I climbed 1,000ft -they followed. I altered course 30 degrees -they followed. With a further alteration of 60 degrees to bring us back to track, they stayed with us. They must be enemy, but we had no visual identification as per briefing and it seemed to me that we must wait, take the first attack and try avoiding action. At least we knew they were there and we were ready for them. We hadn't long to wait, they drew apart - difficult, whichever side we took the avoiding action we were meat for the other one - but they didn't know we knew that they were there. Wireless operator -"Coming in from starboard quarter level, 1200, 1100, 1000, 900, 800, (the blips were now rapid) 700." I turned into the oncoming aircraft and dived. A few moments later, mid-upper said in his best Cockney accent "I've got him -he's a 188, just gone over the top of us."

We breathed again -now we were ready and straightened out. There was no time lost. Wireless operator reported that the other was coming astern, '1000, 900, 800, 700' I dived to port and the rear gunner opened fire and, almost immediately, the enemy dropped back to 1,500yds it seemed to me like the proverbial scalded cat. He never got near us, certainly not within 600yds and was obviously hit.

The two aircraft then flew behind us, close together. (Interesting to think how they were able to locate each other -presumably using us as a reference point) we assumed their R.T. was red hot and wished that we could hear their conversation. In time they were joined by a third fighter and all three flew in a triangle (reported by the wireless operator working on Fishpond).

This was real trouble. They then spread out and proceeded to make a series of attacks on us, the wireless operator reported movements, I was working a continuous corkscrew and the rear gunner beat off every attack. It was just as we had practiced so many times over the friendly fields of Lincolnshire.

They attacked again and again, the rear guns were almost out of ammunition with only two guns left firing. I told the bomb aimer to take the ammunition from the front guns to the rear which he endeavoured to do but as he was moving about and therefore not on intercom and could not hear my commentary, he had no knowledge which way I was going to throw the aircraft. Also he was not on oxygen and the floor was strewn with spent shells, but he got the ammunition to the rear just as the fighters after making an attack from 450 yards, broke off 400 yards and abandoned the engagement. We assessed the situation. No damage -as far as we knew - and the guns were reloaded. However, we were disappointed. Why had we not shot any down?

We didn't know it then, but next day when we tested the aircraft we estimated that the probable cause was the ranges sticking due to humidity which meant that the cone of fire did not centre on the enemy. The navigator reported that there had been ten attacks in twenty-nine minutes, and immediately gave us a new course for the target. It has ever since been a mystery to me how he did this. I had been throwing the aircraft all over the sky to evade the enemy, although it was a controlled corkscrew, to the crew it must have seemed like a matter of hanging on and the navigator must have hung on by his eyebrows as he used his hands to hold onto his maps, charts, set squares, rulers, pencils etc.: I never did find out. Darmstadt was reached on time and the raid was very concentrated. Being last in, the barrage put up was murderous. Back at base we were greeted by an eager group of radar mechanics and although we were puzzled and elated, we knew that 'Village Inn' worked and it gave us great confidence. It is now a matter of record that after the war, tests were made but the device was abandoned as not being very effective.

I can vouch the inaccuracy of that and suggest that they should have tested it in actual combat -they might think otherwise!'

Records show that the combat took place between 23.00hrs and 23.29hrs on the outward leg. The Lancaster had been flying at 16,500ft; all three enemy aircraft were JU 188’s.

The second AGLT contact took place just after midnight; F/O Gordon Burns RCAF (PB355) and crew flying at 16,000ft picked up an unidentified enemy aircraft on 'Village Inn' at 1,200yds astern and up. The enemy closed rapidly to 800yds whereupon the rear gunner, Sgt Ken Robinson, opened fire. Fire was maintained until 500yds then F/O Burns put B-Baker into a corkscrew port, heading for the darker sky. The enemy aircraft followed through the corkscrew, but at 600yds it broke away to starboard and was gone. It had been an auspicious introduction into combat for 'Village Inn'. Training within the squadron continued with extreme confidence and enthusiasm.

AGL(T). Courtesy of Wikipedia.

...Initially, ranging information was provided only at the transmitter situated in the navigator's compartment and was read off to the gunner over the intercom, the gunner using foot pedals to set the target range on the sight. In production equipment the process was made automatic, the range information being fed electronically directly into the gunsight, with the navigator's 'running commentary' only being retained for the benefit of the rest of the crew. The gunner simply manoeuvered his guns to place the "blip" in the centre of the gunsight's reticule and opened fire when the range was appropriate. Windage, bullet drop, and other factors were already calculated by the gunsight.

An AGL(T) ‘Village Inn’ installation fitted to a Nash and Thompson FN121 tail turret on a 635 (Pathfinder) Squadron Lancaster. The radar scanner housed in the black dome moved in elevation with the four Brownings and detected approaching aircraft. It then fed the direction and range data to the navigator who coordinated the gunners response. Note how the central Perspex panel of the turret has been removed to give the gunner a clearer view when training his guns.
Courtesy of John Naylor, via RAF Bomber Command Operations Manual by Haynes.

Village Inn AGL(T) Scanner Diagram. Courtesy Wikipedia.

AGL(T) mounted on the rear turret of the Lanc on the right during Operation Exodus. Courtesy of Wikipedia.

For those interested in more information on AGLT see: https://bombercommand.wordpress.com/the-village-inn-460-squadron/

Feedback from Theo Boiten

No, I have never read an account/seen a German document of a Nachtjäger being shot down by the ventral mounted guns. The Nachtjäger feared the tail gun position in the RAF 'heavies' as a single and accurate short burst from close range sufficed to shoot down an attacking fighter.

I'm afraid I can't state any percentage of bombers that could have been spared, had Bomber Command developed a standard ventral gun turret, but this would undoubtedly have helped! At least this would have robbed the German night fighters of the element of complete surprise creeping up unseen below the blind belly of the bombers and aiming a burst of SM into the wing fuel tanks.

Correct: these were exploding RAF bombers. (Scarecrow shells)

Scarecrow Shells and Spoofs

Russell Margerison, MUG in Max Dowden’s crew has provided us with a series of events in his book, Boys at War, which provide valuable insight into Scarecrow Shell hoax—aka Spoofs. We are grateful to Maureen Hicks for providing us with the following vignettes that tie it all together.

First is a vivid encounter with a “scarecrow” on the last major Berlin raid:

We got through to Berlin unmolested by fighters, but having had to contend with some very heavy flak in the form of box barrages. This however, whilst being more alarming, was preferable to the deadly and very active night fighters. It was whilst flying through a curtain of flak that Gib and I got a good close look at a “scarecrow” and, as these caused considerable interest back at base, we took careful note of it.

A mammoth explosion on the starboard beam blew us violently sideways, like a dried leaf on a windy day, and there in the cloudy night sky hung a huge colourful lantern, from the centre or which dripped vivid reds, greens, blues and yellows. Oily black smoke rose from the irregular mass. It was so close I felt I could have reached over and touched it. This was a “scarecrow”. I was convinced, contrary to what was believed at base about these things being fired from the ground in order to simulate an aircraft exploding, that in fact it had been dropped from above like some sort of aerial “land” mine, for it certainly was not falling. Max steadied the Lanc and we left the spectrum dripping its colours as if being squeezed by some unseen hand. If the intention was to scare the crews the Germans had succeeded with one of us anyway…

Followed later by reality:

A huge flash introduced a scarecrow in our midst with its black oily smoke and dripping colours. Thank God it was not till after the war that we learned that no such a thing as scarecrows existed, they were in fact bombers receiving a direct hit on their bomb bays…

And finally the real culprits:

Our trek was voluntarily held up for a couple of hours when quite by chance grounded aircraft came into view. The aerodrome was completely deserted of personnel but dozens of Luftwaffe aircraft stood in their dispersal points.

Could we have transferred these planes to England, then and there, we would have had a ready-made museum. We found it quite fascinating climbing in and out of Me109s, 110s, He111s, Ju88s, FW190s and the Dorniers, comparing them with our own aircraft and wondering just what mischief they had been up to. I suppose at the time the most remarkable thing to us was how very similar to our own they really were, though why we should expect them to be different I don’t quite know. It was here we first saw the deadly upward-firing 30mm cannon mounted in the Me110 night fighters - an alarming sight to all of us. If we had but known many lives could have been saved by having the bomb-aimer permanently looking underneath our Lancs.

MH

(You Tube Video: Scarecrow Shells)

https://www.bing.com/videos/riverview/relatedvideo...

Courtesy John Naylor: Email of Nov. 28/25

In 2022, Roddy MacKenzie published, BOMBER COMMAND: CHURCHILL’S GREATEST TRIUMPH

He is to be commended for his research chronicling the Command’s history and its impact on winning the war, emphasizing the
efforts by the politicians and senior staff in creating the second front. He also focuses on his father’s involvement as a RAF Bomber
Command skipper and the profound psychological sequelae it had on him, witnessed by his family on his return home.

However, there was one particular paragraph we were compelled to take exception to, regarding how Command senior staff dealt with the threat of the SM weapon system (page 236, fourth paragraph).

He commends Bomber Command for their aggressiveness in addressing Luftwaffe technological advances. In particular, he states it took three weeks from the discovery of the threat of SM to introduce an H2S modification to counter this weapon system.

As John points out, nothing could be further from the truth!

H2S Modification by Roddy MacKenzie to counter Schräge Musik, by John Naylor

I have looked at this at length, and here is my examination of the H2S scenario.

In his book Roddy describes the improvements made to H2S, that included an addition to the equipment that enabled it to highlight enemy aircraft infiltrating the Bomber Stream.

This was done by an additional radar screen fitted in the W/Op’s position, and called 'Fishpond'. It enabled the W/Op to identify single blips on the screen that were moving about in various directions, these being enemy Night Fighters. The Bomber Stream all appeared larger and static on his screen, whilst flying in formation, so the enemy were clearly identified very quickly.

The idea was that the W/op could give an alert to the Captain and the gunners. Corkscrew maneuvers would be initiated, in order to either give the gunners a target to aim at, or if not, give the Night Fighter the slip! There was some success at this, outside of the run into the target, but once on the Bombing Run, the Bomber had to remain straight and level in order for the B/A to identify the aiming point. The Luftwaffe were quick to pick up on this, and realised that if they came in sideways under the Bomber, there would be little time for them to be detected before unleashing the 20 mm upward firing cannons. This is precisely how my own Father’s LM546 of 625 Sqn, fell victim to 'Schrage Musik’ on 28/29 July 1944.

It is regrettable that too much emphasis was put on this equipment, instead of pursuing the advent of the ventral turret, that could have saved countless lives of aircrew taken away by the 'Schrage Musik' upward firing cannons fitted to the German twin engine BF110, JU88 and JU188 Nachtjäger fighters. JN

It is noteworthy when Arthur Harris was promoted to Commander-in-Chief Bomber Command in February 1942, he convinced Prime Minister Churchill he could bomb the Germans into surrender with the destruction of their capital city. He estimated the cost would be 500 Command heavy bombers and their crews. The Battle for Berlin was carried out between mid-November 1943 and March 30/31, 1944, culminating with the catastrophic Nuremberg raid. The Command would lose 1,128 aircraft over this period and an additional 2,374 before wars end for a total of 3,502 aircraft lost over this twenty month interval— 700% greater than the number predicted— not taking into account the army casualties lost in the ground invasion, with Berlin being the last to fall. A most costly miscalculation.

To put it into perspective, during the five months of the Battle for Berlin, 625 Squadron would lose a total of 22 aircraft and crews (30% of total losses) with 12 (16%) when the Big City was the target on the Battle Order. This would include three of the Squadron’s multi-loss raids (three or greater aircraft lost on a single raid), Leipzig, Stuttgart and Berlin. Over the Squadron’s eighteen month operational history it would suffer a total of seven such catastrophic raids. It is impossible to comprehend the devastating impact this would have had on aircrew morale. Sadly, this would cost the Squadron the loss of two of its Gunnery Leaders, F/L W.D. Crimmins DFC RCAF, rear gunner of P/O Baker’s crew, LM424 and F/L D.W. Webber DFC, rear gunner of F/L Bank’s crew, LM103.

The common denominator for the majority of these losses would have been Nachtjagd aircraft equipped with the SM/SN2 weapon system. They did not stand a chance. The term, cannon fodder, is an appropriate descriptor.

Scarecrow Shell/Spoofs - Did they ever exist?

The critical question: Why would the enemy have wasted energy and resources developing a device that would have been extremely expensive, to mimic an exploding bomber, when they had a weapon system that was doing the job beyond expectation?

We have a quote from a RAF pilot who exemplifies this naivety. Fortunately, the majority saw the light, realizing the hoax for what it was. They knew the real thing when they saw it.

In addition, Russell Margerison’s comments in his book Boys at War, seeing the light on his escape journey, when he came across enemy aircraft armed with the SM weapon system that shot him down.

Also, we have a copy of this pilot’s book in which he describes how Scarecrow shells were made, and refused to believe they did not exist until his dying day.

GHOSTS OF TARGETS PAST: The Lives and Losses of a Lancaster Crew in 1944-1945 by Philip Gray

Philip was a staunch believer Scarecrow shells existed:

Mixed with the internal radio chatter and the external exploding ack-ack shells, a spoof detonated with a helluva bang quite close by. This was a scare device which the ground defences mixed in with their regular shells. It was apparently a thinly encased projectile filled mostly with gunpowder and miscellaneous bits of wire, fabric and other such factory rubbish. The spectacular explosion was relatively harmless, but it did appear remarkably like one of our own bombers blowing up, which was exactly the effect it was meant to convey. The hope was that it would panic the more inexperienced operators in the bomber stream, their alarm causing them to collide with another bomber close by… PG

'Scarecrow shell'. Courtesy of history reviewed. best

Aircrew Startegies

Despite the failure of RAF senior staff’s failure to persevere and develop an effective antidote, most crews developed their own survival techniques to ensure safe return to Base.

Right from ‘crewing up’ it was stressed to all Bomber Command crews their key to survival was camaraderie and teamwork, essential to them forming a tight knit combat team. Each crew member was responsible for the duties of his trade. For the majority this was in effect for most of the op. However, there was one position that required a very limited timeframe, the bomb aimer. Other than the identification of key landmarks and manning the forward turret in the rare event of a frontal attack, his main role was to provide the pilot instructions to maintain track on the bomb run and release the bomb load at the aiming point or ETA.

In the interim he would have been engaged as a lookout for other bombers in the stream and in particular attacking night fighters. As Russell Margerison pointed out, after identifying the threat of Schräge Musik, the bomb aimer should have been actively scanning for the anticipated ventral attack. However, this would have been impossible with his limited field of vision from his nose position. This would have required installation of a modified position in the aft fuselage with viewing ports, providing a field of vision to detect ventral attacks and provide evasion instructions. This could have been done with a minimum of expense, not impacted the bomb load and maximized the scanning efficiency of the bomb aimer. It would have required extra oxygen and intercom connections. He would have occupied this position over enemy territory at the discretion of his Skipper.

Of the four air gunners in a Lanc crew, two were were trained to take over a turret if one of the key marksmen was incapacitated, the bomb aimer and the wireless operator. However, the rear and mid-upper were critical as the only real defence and offence to ward off a night fighter attack. One slip-up and it was game over for the entire crew.

During the early years of the war, air gunners would have been taught a systematic scan of their entire visual field. However, following the Peenemünde raid in May 1943 this scan should have been modified to a brief general scan and then focus below the horizon from astern and abeam—especially below the wing tanks! In addition pilot and gunners should been advised to carry out a periodic bank and yaw maneuvers to view the blind areas below the wings. Prolonged straight and level flight was an invitation for disaster!

Perhaps one of the most graphic demonstrations of the rear gunner’s critical role of to defend against SM, was provided by F/O Doug Cameron DFM during their penultimate raid in August 1944. More to follow on this remarkable airman and his Skipper. https://aircrewremembered.com/bazalgette-ian-willoughby.html

It should come as no surprise Nachtjagd crews accounted for three quarters of Bomber Command losses over the course of the war. Logistics, technology and time of exposure would not dictate otherwise.

Flak concentrations were predictably located in the vicinity of cities of industrial significance, administrative, or historical importance, and bomber stream plots were chosen to avoid them—unless they were the target on the Battle Order. However, the Germans had developed flak ships and trains that were mobile, making it impossible to predict their location on any given night.

This meant the flak batteries could only be effective when the bomber stream passed within their firing range.

On the other hand Nachtjagd crews were mobile and once the stream was located and infiltrated, could continue their attacks until fuel, ammunition or battle damage forced them to disengage. During this time they could inflict incredible damage, on occasion claiming multiple heavies destroyed in a single sortie—more than most flak batteries would claim in the course of the war.

With this in mind bomber crews, in order to survive, had to strategize how best to avoid a Nachtjagd encounter.

The outbound journey and bomb run over the target were when they were most vulnerable to an attack. They were committed to the altitude and course set for the bomber stream. A slow climb en route, with straight and level doglegs to the target, left them exposed and vulnerable to the standard ventral SM attack. They were sitting ducks and left to the mercy of their gunners to detect a Nachtjagd interception, in time to provide their Skipper with evasion instructions. The routine corkscrew maneuver was a sudden, violent affair initiated with a maximum diving turn into the attack. The intent was to increase the angle of deflection and cause the enemy aircraft to overshoot the target, and lose contact. However, for many bomber crews the advantage of SN2 airborne interception radar with the enemy meant this would be a temporary respite.

One raid in particular would provide Bomber Command senior staff with a lesson they would never forget—Nuremberg March 30/31, 1944. Despite requests to cancel from a number of Station and Squadron Commanders, Air Marshall Arthur Harris decided to carry on, regardless of a questionable met forecast, Mossie-recce flight reporting clear conditions over the the extended outbound leg, with a rising moon! In addition, conditions at altitude resulted with the bomber stream leaving signature condensation trails—for bomber crews a recipe for disaster and for Nachtjagd crews combat conditions beyond their wildest dreams.

The outcome was predictable and catastrophic. Of the 795 aircraft dispatched, 95 were lost, 11.9% of the of the force dispatched—the biggest Bomber Command loss of the war. And this did not include the 12 aircraft crashing on home soil or written off due to battle damage.

With this one raid the Command lost more airmen than were KIA serving with Fighter Command during the entire course of the Battle of Britain.

Senior staff and surviving crews were left licking their wounds for some time, and understandably morale was at an all time low ebb.

However, all was not lost. During the post-raid debriefings came the eyewitness description of a Lanc being stalked and destroyed by a vertical firing weapon system. Unfortunately, this incident did not appear to arouse concern and escalating bomber losses continued as the war progressed. This was one year before war’s end. The Commands heaviest losses were yet to come.

It is unconscionable at this point Bomber Command staff, Intelligence Officers and weapons technicians could not come up with the countermeasures to neutralize the SM threat. This could have included the additional role of the bomb aimer as an observer in the rear fuselage, ventral mounted turrets/weapons and/or widespread use of the Airborne Gun Laying Turret.

Sadly, the best they came up with was the Scarecrow Shell/Spoof hoax fooling few and may have resulted in some gunners being less vigilant, paying the ultimate price.

Generally the return leg following the photoflash was less hazardous for a number of reasons. With the bomb load gone and half the fuel burned off the aircraft was faster and more maneuverable in the event of a Nachtjagd interception. There was still some protection in numbers and the comfort of prowling friendly night fighters. By this time the Nachtjagd crews would be experiencing combat fatigue, dwindling fuel and ammo reserves.

It was customary for bomber Skippers to dive to lower altitudes to gain speed and separation from the enemy as quickly as possible. As the war progressed many experienced Skippers dropped as low as the local terrain would permit to minimize radar detection and most importantly protect their ventral soft spot from a SM attack. Navigators would select a course free of built up areas and known flak belts.

From our research it appears 2,000 feet ASL was a reasonable altitude to return over the North Sea, providing the engines were behaving themselves—to avoid a ditching.

However, this exit strategy with a large formation of of aircraft descending randomly to a lower altitude carried an increased risk of mid-air collisions. Survival from such an event, for both crews, was equal to or less likely than a Nachtjagd attack with SM.

We are aware of four Squadron aircraft involved in collisions, with the survival of one crew member from three crews and the fourth returning to Kelstern with all safe, sporting Halifax tailplane fragments wrapped around the leading edge of a wing. Sadly, there were no survivors from the latter crew.

It is noteworthy this collision occurred on the return journey, just off the Danish coast at 2,000 feet ASL. The Halifax had just descended through a cloud layer and in the process of levelling off, when it collided with the prop of an engine, severing its tailplane. In PD376, F/O Chalkley and his crew could only watch in disbelief as the Halifax spiraled out of control into the North Sea.

https://aircrewremembered.com/chalkley-desmond-edward-john.html

https://aircrewremembered.com/butler-brian-leonard.html

F/O Dennis Chalkley DFC. Courtesy of Chalkley family collection.

It takes a moment to calculate the comparable risk of loss due to night fighter versus collision:

625 Squadron: Night fighter losses, 53 of 74 or 72%

625 Squadron: Collision losses, 3 of 74 or 4%

In other words there was eighteen times greater likelihood of crew failing to return from an op due to a night fighter attack, than collision. They were aware of the risk and experienced Skippers would have done anything in their power to minimize it, even if it meant disobeying orders by flying at a lower than detailed return altitude. This would have been a closely kept, crew secret.

During the last two years of the war Bomber Command losses mounted dramatically with the Berlin and Normandy invasion raids. We now know the majority of these losses were due to Nachtjagd operations with an increasing number of aircraft equipped with the SM weapon system.

With the figures now available of the total number of Bomber Command aircraft and crews lost during the course of the war we are now able to estimate 58% of these were lost during the last two years of the war— May 1943 to May 1945.

Bomber Command Monthly Losses—1939-1945

Source: Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany: Volume 4.

Bomber Command Monthly Losses, Day and Night: 1939-1945. Courtesy of Datawrapper.

This graph provides a remarkable, historical chronicle of Bomber Command’s losses over the course of the war, with the ebb and flow with time, as well as the strategic change to night from daylight raids necessitated by unacceptable day losses, and back again with D-Day preparations requiring precision bombing.

The following table provides the annual loss with 1943 broken into three segments to indicate the introduction of the Schräge Musik weapon system in May, and the introduction of 625 Squadron to operations in October:

Date—Day/Night/Total

1939—29/4/33

1940—152/342/494

1941—213/701/914

1942—104/1291/1400

1943 —January-April—40/601/641

1943 May-September (Schräge Musik introduced)—19/972/991

1943 October-December (625 Squadron operational)—0/682/682

1944—224/2349/2573

1945—90/507 /597

Totals—876/7449/8325

We note between May 1943 and war’s end the Command would lose a stunning 4,843 aircraft and crews. In the last two years of the war it would lose 58% of the total lost over the course of the war. We suspect it was no coincidence this was the period in which SM was introduced and increased exponentially until war’s end.

It appears this loss total does not include training or aircraft lost over home soil regardless of the cause. 625 Squadron losses included both.

The Squadron had the misfortune of being operational during the last eighteen months of the war, when the Nachtjagd dominated the night sky over Occupied Europe, with an increasing number of aircraft equipped with this deadly weapon combination, SM complimented by SN2 AI radar—enabling experienced crews to intercept and attack Allied bombers in any weather conditions, day or night.

Our Squadron stats indicated 72% of those failing to return fell to Nachtjagd aircraft, regardless of the weapon system. In other words if this same percentage was applied to all Bomber Command aircraft over the same time frame this would amount to a total of 3,487 falling to the Nachtjagd.

From the stats provided by Theo Boiten we have an estimate of 7,926 claims by the Nachtjagd over the course of the war. If we apply 58% to this number for an estimate of the claims for the last two years of the war, we come up with 4,597 Nachtjagd claims.

However, if we do a similar calculation using the Max Hastings stats we come up with a figure closer to the Nachtjagd claims for the last two years of the war.

10,121 x .58 =5,870 x .78=4,579. In other words a 78% loss rate to night fighters results in 4579 claims, suggesting 625 Squadron was on the low end of the the bell curve and a 78% loss rate is more consistent with the figures provided by Theo Boiten. We note the figures for the Hastings data and 625 Squadron both include training and home soil losses. The total Monthly Bomber Command losses do not include the latter but still provide the data ratio for Command losses during the last two years of the war in which SM took its toll.

One cannot help but ponder the question of how many lives may have been saved if the politicians and Bomber Command intelligence and senior staff had been more proactive in addressing the threat of SM during the last two years of the war.

We are confident of our research of Squadron’s losses due to Nachtjagd combats, and concur with Theo Boiten’s ongoing research into Nachtjagd claims over the war’s course.

With extrapolation we are able to estimate a loss rate of 78% (72-95%) for Bomber Command squadrons over the course of the war—resulting from Nachtjagd combats.

During this time the Command’s senior staff, intelligence officers and politicians were aware of the horrific losses suffered by their airmen. In addition they had access to information that aircraft were being shot down by a weapon system that fired vertically from below, maximizing the vulnerability of the ventral blind spot.

Despite this the best antidote they could conjure was the Scarecrow/Spoof Shell Hoax.

We have highlighted the other counter measures that could have been employed to address this weakness. Sadly, none were introduced long enough to assess their efficacy.

As Theo Boiten has pointed out all it would have taken was a Nachtjagd crew to survive a sudden burst from a ventral turret weapon, for word to spread like wildfire to other crews. In future they would have second thoughts before attempting a similar attack.

Unfortunately, the trial with AGLT and Village Inn was highly successful but for reasons unknown was not pressed into action. This was a brilliant concept that would not have had to be added to every aircraft to be effective. From the description of its use it is apparent this concept totally baffled Nachtjagd crews who encountered it. This was a major oversight by the powers that be.

Even pre-op intelligence briefings to warn crews of SM’s existence and advice to increase their scan of the ventral position, and having bomb aimers occupy a customized viewing position mid-fuselage, would have been monumental in detecting an attack from below and behind.

We do know many senior Skippers were fully aware of this danger and ad hoc developed the return routine of descending as soon as practical to a safe ground hugging altitude, preventing Nachtjagd crews from bringing their SM cannon to bear. It is impossible to estimate how many lives this tactic saved.

Remarkably, the Germans were able to protect the SM secret to war’s end. For reasons unknown no one was able to photograph the vertical mounted cannons to share with RAF boffins. The SM weapon system was almost invisible when mounted in the Me110 variants but was more obvious in the Ju88 and 188s.

Interestingly, a Me110 equipped with SM/SN2 AI radar, accidentally crash-landed due to battle damage, in Switzerland on 27/28 April 1944. This resulted in an international crisis ending with the Swiss blowing up the aircraft with its weapon system, but not before making drawings and taking photos of everything. This occurred a full year before war’s end and Theo is convinced there was no information leak to the Allies. During this time frame the Command would lose a total of 1,846 aircraft during night raids. 1,339 from May-December 1944 and an additional 507 in 1945.

It is now possible to postulate how many aircraft and crews may have been saved if effective counter measures to the SM/SN2 weapon system were introduced during the war’s last two years.

Depending if one is an optimist or a pessimist, here are the figures we arrived at:

Total Bomber Command Aircraft lost on Night Operations—May 1943 to May 1945: 4,510.

Percentage of Losses Prevented— A/C saved/Souls saved in 7 man crew

0%—0

25%—1,128/7,892

50%—2,255/15,785

75%—3,382/23,678

100%—4510/31,570

Obviously we will never know the answer but it provides food for thought of how many lives could have been saved if Bomber Command senior staff and politicians had been more proactive once the threat, SM, was identified, and aggressive counter measures introduced and persevered with—over sufficient time to assess their impact. This would have required a three to six month time frame to assess the result. If this had been done it is reasonable to predict a 50-75% reduction in losses.

It is our belief the earliest and widespread introduction of the Airborne Gun Laying in Turrets (AGLT) weapon system would have had a profound influence on the above to include a category of >75%. This would have been a game changer, rendering the corkscrew maneuver obsolete—dramatically improving an airman's chances of surviving a tour of ops! This would have had the Nachtjagd high command introducing the Scare shell hoax as exploding bombers.

It is most regrettable, the powers that be, could only come up with a token hoax to bolster aircrew morale.

It is noteworthy that of the five co-authors of the 625 Squadron Project, four had a relative fall victim to a Nachtjagd crew flying a SM equipped aircraft. The relative of the other fell to unknown causes. Sadly, only one of the five had survivors—as seven POWs to tell the tale! (Including JN’s father).

Tragically, due to the failure of Command senior staff to identify and appropriately address the obvious threat of the SM weapon system, an unknown number of young men would have their lives cut short. As a result, by war’s end, there would be a lot fewer "young lads” than “old lags” to celebrate the final victory—all due to the emphasis on bomb tonnage delivered over aircrew survivability. This was a truly The Colossal Screwup!

During the decade of research to bring the Project to completion it become apparent a distinct class and rank order existed which was at times unfair, discriminatory and disrespectful. This system applied to promotions, decorations and refusal of airmen to fulfil their contract of thirty ops documented with a target photo (LMF).

For comparison we offer the following examples:

G/C Leonard Cheshire VC OM DSO and Two Bars DFC MiD was a gentleman and a philanthropist. As a Bomber Command pilot he was one of the most decorated airmen of the war. The first DSO was awarded following his heroic efforts to return their severely damaged aircraft to Base after persevering in bombing the target. The VC was awarded in recognition of his completing four tours of operations, not for a single act of valour. This was a unique occurrence.

Over two decades of research we have discovered another RAF airman who we consider to be one of the most under decorated in the course of the war—F/O Douglas Cameron DFM. He started his service career as an other ranks airmen, trained as an air gunner— most appropriate as prewar he was employed as a gamekeeper. He enlisted in 1939 and served with distinction during the entire course of the war, surviving four tours of ops, three with Bomber Command and one with a Coastal squadron—a grand total of 122 missions.

During this time he protected two pilots to survive long enough to be awarded posthumous VCs: F/Sgt R.H. Middleton VC and S/L I. Bazelgette VC DFC. It is noteworthy the latter handpicked F/O Cameron to be his rear gunner for his fourth tour with No 635 Pathfinder Squadron.

It was during this tour he again proved his worth as the crew’s guardian angel. On the return leg of their penultimate, daylight op, aborted by the Master Bomber due to foul target weather, when F/O Cameron proved his weight in gold. On reaching the French coast the two gunners noted they were being ‘escorted’ by a pair of enemy fighters off each wing. Suspecting a decoy situation, F/O Cameron began a continuous scan for the third aircraft coming in from below and tucking under the starboard wing. Simultaneously, he issued urgent evasion orders to S/L Bazelgette, as the enemy pilot fired his SM cannons. Fortunately, only one cannon projectile struck a starboard prop spinner, as the pilot dove 8,000 feet to seek refuge in a cloud deck.

As their Flight Engineer noted, “He saved their lives that day”. Three days later their luck would run out when they suffered major, flak damage resulting in a wing fire and serious injuries to the bomb aimer and the mid-upper gunner. Despite this S/L Bazelgette was able to successfully mark and bomb the target.

However, severe fire damage and reduced to a single port engine, he ordered the crew to bale out, low level, and then attempted a forced landing with his injured crew members. Sadly, they hit a ditch, the aircraft exploded and they perished. Canadian born S/L Bazelgette was awarded a posthumous VC for his actions.

https://aircrewremembered.com/bazalgette-ian-willo...

S/L Bazelgette VC DFC and Crew. Courtesy of Dave Birrell.

F/O Cameron managed to survive the low level bale out and under German machine-gun fire escaped into the forest. He established contact with the French Resistance and rather than evade capture, elected to join the Resistance as a saboteur fighting in civilian clothing. If captured by the Germans this would have meant torture and almost certain execution. With this in mind he had been provided with a cyanide capsule.

He would survive the war returning to his vocation as a gamekeeper, married and had a daughter who he named in memory of his two VC skippers: Margaret Middleton Bazalgette Cameron. He died on February 16, 1994, age 84.

Taking into account Douglas Cameron’s war record including four tours of ops, guardian angel for two VC recipients, surviving a daylight SM attack, and then after baling out a second time, elected to carry out sabotage attacks with the French Resistance, we would suggest the following decorations:

F/L Douglas Cameron VC OM DSO DFC and Two Bars DFM MiD. It is only fair!

In the process of researching the 625 Squadron Project we were aware two members were awarded the Conspicuous Gallantry Medal (CGM) but not a single VC. However, using P/O Andrew Mynarski VC as our gold standard we have identified a number of Squadron airmen who were deserving of this award.

https://aircrewremembered.com/de-breyne-arthur.html

All except one would have been posthumous and all are the result of information that has come to light varying years postwar, without an option to appeal. However, this does not belittle their actions and we believe it is still of value their actions do not go unrecognised. We will attach the pertinent Aircrew Remembered archive reports to allow the reader to make the final decision. They are in chronological order:

1. ND461 843261 Sgt J. Ringwood DFM (age 37), rear gunner: VC.

Note: this loss is under review by the RAF Air Historical Branch. Following this our original interpretation remains unchanged.

https://aircrewremembered.com/cook-roy-james.html

2. ME697 143849 F/O L.F. Medway, navigator, VC; 52312 F/O D.C. Martin, flight engineer VC; J85585 P/O J.G. Johnson, mid-upper gunner, VC; 1391733 F/Sgt W.A.C. Footman, bomb aimer, VC.

Note: this loss is under review by the RAF Air Historical Branch. Following this our original interpretation remains unchanged.

https://aircrewremembered.com/gray-robert-william-...

3. LM513 0.886262 1st Lt M.E. Dowden, pilot, VC; 177085 P/O F.H.R. Moody, flight engineer, VC.

https://aircrewremembered.com/dowden-max-eugene-1....

4. PB126 1378355 F/Sgt R.E. Gledstone, rear gunner, VC.

https://aircrewremembered.com/elmhirst-baxter-john...

5. LL956 J87007 F/O L.A. Hannah, pilot, Immediate DFC; R188356 F/Sgt L.D. Bennett, bomb aimer, CGM.

After discussion with Chris Ward, author of RAF BOMBER COMMAND PROFILES 625 SQUADRON (2025), we were advised this loss did not occur in direct combat with the enemy and a VC was not applicable. However, under the circumstances we believe the rookie bomb aimer risked his life in delaying his bale out until it was too late.

https://aircrewremembered.com/hannah-lloyd-albert....

6. NG240 J41173 F/O J.W. Alexander, pilot, VC (not posthumous).

Without the eyewitness account provided by rear gunner, Sgt Joe Williams, we would not have been aware of F/O Alexander’s life threatening risk taken to save his crew mate’s life.

https://aircrewremembered.com/alexander-james-w.html

F/O Jim Alexander and Crew. Courtesy of the Petrachenko family collection.

We understand some of our arguments compare figures of apples and oranges but believe that our final conclusions regarding the numbers of Bomber Command aircraft losses are credible and reasonable when taking into account Theo Boiten’s total Bomber Command aircraft claimed by Nachtjagd crews.

We have confidence in our stats regarding Squadron losses due to night fighter combats and realize, despite how incredible the number is, it still was on the conservative side, at a 72% loss rate. We estimate the average loss rate for all Command squadrons to be in the 80% range, with some high risk squadrons having as high as an 85-90% loss rate. As Chris Ward has noted we are the only Squadron that has done an accurate calculation of loss causes. Keeping in mind without the insight, wisdom and support of Theo Boiten this would have been impossible. We are most grateful for his support over the years.

Post war intelligence information revealed Prime Minister Winston Churchill was dealing with a stacked deck for most of the Second World War, with an ace up his sleeve almost guaranteeing certain victory: the cracking of the German enigma code by Alan Turing and his team of brilliant minds at Bletchley Park. In the process their research resulted in the development of the modern day computer and worldwide web.

During the course of researching the 625 Squadron Project we have had the privilege to interview many Squadron vets to chronicle their experiences. Each interview concluded with the following question: If you were called on today would you volunteer to do it again? Without exception, the answer was an emphatic and resounding, NO!

625 - An Anomalous Squadron???

The Squadron, a late arrival, was unique in many ways. It was operational during the last eighteen months of the war and over this time lost a total of seven-four aircraft and crews, under the leadership of four Commanding Officers:

W/C T. Preston DFC 01.10.44-26.03.44, a/c lost 22 (3.6/mo) 30% of total losses.

W/C D.D. Haig DSO DFC* 26.03.44-16.09.44, a/c lost 29 (5/mo) 39% of total losses.

W/C I.G. MacKay 16.09.44-18.11.44, a/c lost 9 (4.5/mo) 12% of total losses.

W/C J. Barker 18.11.44-07.10.45, a/c lost 14 (2.8/mo) 19% of total losses.

A brief summary of each S/C/O’s contribution to the Squadron’s success can be reviewed on the 625 Squadron References page:

https://aircrewremembered.com/625-squadron-references.html

It is noteworthy W/C Haig had the highest loss of aircraft and monthly lost rate during his tenure. However, his DSO at the end of his Squadron posting suggests it was most deserved. The citation provides insight into his combat personality: W/C Haig has consistently displayed the highest standards of leadership, skill and gallantry…

Nine times he placed his name on the Battle Order to skipper green crews, always to heavily defended targets. On occasion his crew would include a total of eight or nine crew members. One op, due to severe battle damage to several engines, he narrowly avoided a North Sea ‘diversion’.

We are aware the Squadron had a lower than average loss rate due to Nachtjagd attacks, 72 vs 78-80% loss rate. The majority fell during the Battle of Berlin and D-Day raids, victims of SM. If we apply the latter loss rate then the number lost to Nachtjagd would have been 58-59, not our estimated 53.

If there was one factor responsible for this low loss rate it was possibly the leadership and raw courage of G/C Haig. His impact on Squadron morale would have been immeasurable.

Despite his short tenure with the Squadron, W/C MacKay deserves special mention for ‘adopting’ F/O Hannah’s crew following their bale out shortly after takeoff. He provided them support and guidance to recover from the shock, ensuring they were able to successfully complete their tour of ops.

The Squadron would suffer its fair share of multiple loss raids:

Three or greater losses: 7 (4 crews with the loss of SDF ND975 on the Vierzon raid). 22 a/c.

Two losses: 6, 12 a/c.

In the course of the war the Squadron would lose 34 aircraft and crews on just 13 ops. The majority of these would occur in the seven month period between December 1943 to June 1944—the Berlin/D-Day campaigns. One can only imagine the impact this loss rate would have had on aircrew morale. We suspect if not for G/C Haig’s leadership the loss rate would have been more catastrophic.

March 24/25 1944 proved to be an eventful evening for several reasons. During this final Berlin raid was the first time the bomber stream encountered the jet stream, resulting in navigational errors, scattering and easy pickings for the Nachtjagd. The Squadron would lose three aircraft, the only one to the ‘Big City’ to be so costly.

It was on this evening the Great Escape was unfolding from Stalag Luft III, when air raid sirens for the Berlin raid resulted in a temporary pause in the plan and early detection, after 76 POWs had managed to slip into the night— 73 were captured, of which 50 were shot by the Gestapo. Three succeeded in reaching freedom.

On a bright note, No 115 Squadron rear gunner, F/Sgt Nicholas Stephen Alkemade, would bale out of his burning Lanc, at 18,000 feet, without his chute, and live to tell the tale!

For details go to Addendum 2: The Chop, archive report on LM513:
https://aircrewremembered.com/dowden-max-eugene-1.html

1st Lt Max Dowden USAAF and Crew. Courtesy of the Margerison family collection.

Age extremes and Air Gunners

The Squadron’ youngest airman to be Killed In Action was eighteen year old F/Sgt Roy Gallop, the Pilot of Lancaster JB122, on the January 30/31, 1944 Berlin raid. There were no survivors. Mid-upper gunner, F/O Al Normandin, a ’spare bod’ from W/O Owen’s crew was the only officer in this crew. The seven link chain was broken and this crew manning ND641would fail to return from the multi-loss, Berlin raid noted above.

F/Sgt Gallop would be posthumously commissioned but for reasons unknown his family refused to have Pilot Officer inscribed on his headstone.

The eldest to die was Sgt Edmund Kenneth Day, age 41, married with five children between ages one to thirteen. He was the rear gunner of F/O Seear’s crew in NG169, lost on the March 16, 1945, Nuremberg raid— no survivors, less than two months before war’s end.

We have heard of a rear gunner who was the Skipper of their crew and cannot help but wonder if he was the one. The rest of the crew would have looked up to him as a father figure and done everything possible to ensure his survival.

The Lancaster bomber was designed with one purpose in mind: deliver maximum tonnage to the target, regardless of cost. Aircrew health, welfare and survival were secondary as we have seen. The mid-wing design resulted in a capacious bomb bay, by war’s end capable of a bomb load up to the 22,000 pound Grand Slam. However, this necessitated mods to ensure the maximum takeoff weight was not exceeded. Predictably this included removal of turrets and protective armour, at the cost of aircrew protection.

In addition, this design resulted in the menacing main spar forming an obstruction to free movement in the fuselage, essentially splitting the crew into the five fore and two aft of the spar. In the throes of combat this was often a significant factor on crew survival. When the time came to abandon the aircraft the five up front were expected bale out through the bottleneck of the restricted nose hatch. Any delay due to injury, tangled equipment or an obese crew member was enough to make the difference between life and death. Unfortunately, many managed to bale out successfully but at an altitude insufficient for chute deployment.

The two gunners aft of the main spar had the deck of cards stacked against them. Their sole purpose was to protect their aircraft and crew from Nachtjagd attacks. The rear gunner was the most disadvantaged with the majority of interceptions coming from behind and below. During the last two years of the war, with the increased prevalence of SM equipped, enemy fighters, the first report would come from the mid-upper, of light blue tracer perforating a wing, and almost immediately of a wing fire when a patrol tank was hit by an explosive cannon projectile. By then it was too late, the damage was done and it was a matter of time if they could bale out successfully.

Often the first firing pass was all that was needed. In the process many gunners were killed outright or incapacitated. Those fortunate enough to escape had the ‘luxury’ of jumping from the spacious starboard crew door and the rear gunner had the option of rotating his turret 180 degrees with the doors open and rolling out backwards, providing he managed to clip on his chute. This option negated the risk of hitting the vertical fin on the way out.

It is noteworthy even experienced rear gunners were not immune to the SM attack. The Squadron would have the misfortune of losing two of its seasoned Gunnery Leaders to this weapon system, both on their second tours and DFC recipients: F/L W.D. Crimmins DFC of P/O Baker’s crew in LM424, during the notorious December 16/17, 1943, Berlin raid and F/L D.W. Webber DFC of F/L Banks crew in LM103 during the September 12/13, 1944 Frankfurt raid, cause unknown, possibly SM.

F/L Crimmins DFC Squadron Gunnery Leader 1943. Courtesy LAC/Ancestry.ca

We are aware it was not uncommon for the gunners to form a pact, they would not abandon a gunner partner if he was wounded and unable to bale out. It was agreed they would stick together to the bitter end.

It is believed this situation occurred with the loss of the Squadron’s PB126, skippered by F/L Elmhurst-Baxter during the June 30,1944, Vierzon raid. The two gunners were the only casualties, F/Sgt Adcock, mid-upper and F/Sgt Gledstone, rear gunner. Prior to baling out other crew members noted Gladstone was mobile and uninjured. It is possible he was attempting to rescue or console his injured or deceased partner.

On many occasions other squadrons reported aircraft returning with deceased rear gunners, requiring extrication by ground crew. It is interesting the Squadron never had this occur during its operational history.

However, rear gunner, F/Sgt Adams, of the above crew would die from his injuries after his turret separated during the landing roll, following the June 10, 1944, Achères raid. F/Sgt Gledstone would replace him on the Elmhurst-Baxter crew.

Intruder Loss:

On the evening of April 18/19,1944, P/O J.P. Cosgrove and crew in ME734, returning from the Rouen raid, were shot down in flames on short final by a German intruder. There were no survivors and it was apparent rear gunner, Sgt D.H. Beechey, was taken by surprise, not having a chance to return fire. Witnessed by aircrew and ground personal this was one of the Squadron’s most demoralizing events.

P/O Cosgrove. Courtesy LAC/Ancestry.ca

Double Bale Out Crew

Sgt D.R. Paige RCAF and four of his crew would have a memorable second ‘dickey’ trip with F/O L.A. Hannah and two of his, on the first of two-in-a-day Duisburg raids on October 14/15, 1944. This six minute mission, that would not count as an op, came to an abrupt end just to the west of the departure runway, when LL956 crashed and the bomb load exploded—the result of an engine fire on the takeoff roll. All survived with the exception of F/O Hannah and Sgt Paige’s bomb aimer, F/Sgt L.D. Bennett. The latter was able to bale out but too low for his chute to fully deploy.

F/O Hannah and Crew

This loss would have been witnessed by Squadron mates circling in the vicinity to gain altitude joining the bomber stream. It would serve as a grim premonition of how the vast majority would end their tour of ops, and lives. This second demoralizing event within six months could have been conducive to a flood of LMF candidates, were it not for the ‘cement’ of crewing up.

Seventy-five years later, on October 14, 2019, the citizens of Little Grimsby held a commemoration ceremony paying their respect to the two Canadian airmen who sacrificed their lives.

Four months later on February 23, 1945, F/O Paige and his crew were on the Battle Order to attack Pforzheim. After dropping their bomb load and holding steady course for the photoflash, they were struck by incendiaries dropped from an aircraft above. Wireless operator, F/Sgt J. Bettany, managed to bare-handedly throw a number of them overboard and dowse the fuselage fire. However, a fire near the petrol tank in the port wing was out of control, an imminent threat of exploding the tank or burning through the main spar.

Upon reaching friendly territory, F/O Paige gave the order to bale out. Shortly thereafter, there was an explosion and loss of the wing, followed by the crash of PB815.

The bale out was uneventful, with the sole exception of the navigator, who sprained an ankle. Three of the crew would have the unique distinction of being awarded their second Silver Caterpillar, in recognition of being saved by an Irving chute: pilot, F/O Paige; flight engineer, Sgt R.B. Bennett and rear gunner, F/Sgt J.K. McRorie. F/Sgt Bettany would be awarded the Squadron’s second CGM for his actions. He would return to the Squadron after recovering from his burns but he and the remainder of the crew would not fly on any further op

F/O Paige and Crew. Courtesy of the Bennett family collection.

The Unique Yanks

It was somewhat unusual to have four members of the U.S.A.A.F. serving on a RAF bomber squadron. However, we must keep in mind some members had volunteered to join the RAF to serve with their rank and uniforms, before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour, and were well into their operational training in England by then. The fact they decided to continue along this path speaks volumes for the RAF crewing up concept. The tight bond between crew members out trumped the perks of the U.S.A.A.F., namely food, booze and compassion.

2nd Lt G.E. Wooley USAAF and his all RAF crew were the first to fall in ED951. On December 16/17, 1944, aka Black Thursday, they were detailed to attack Berlin. This inexperienced crew came to grief on the return journey. In the interim, dense fog had enveloped a large portion of bomber country with instrument flying conditions. The pilot, in the process of pushing on to Base, became spatially disoriented and ended up victim of a controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) encounter–with catastrophic results. They crashed and burned at Gayton le Wold, one mile from the aerodrome. Two of the crew died from multiple injuries and burns; the flight engineer, Sgt S.A. Taylor and bomb aimer, Sgt G.A. Draycott. The remainder were admitted to the Louth County Infirmary. Rear gunner, Sgt G.A. Richards, suffering from severe injuries including a compound skull fracture, was placed on the dangerously ill list. They survived but would never fly again as a crew.

Next to go was Squadron stalwart, 1st Lt M.E. Dowden USAAF, and his crew in LM512, on the May 21/22, 1944, Duisburg raid—victim of a Nachtjagd SM attack.

Lt Dowden and his trusty flight engineer, P/O F.H.R. Moody, would maintain control allowing time for their crew to bale out, before crashing and perishing.

We felt both these brave young airmen were deserving of posthumous VCs for their actions. This was not to be as the details of this loss did not come to light until after liberation. However, Chris Ward in his recent RAF Squadron Profile publication dedicated it to this remarkable Yank Skipper!

The other two Americans who served with distinction, managing to tour expire, were; 1st Lt Frank G. Marvin DFC USAAF ASN 0886267 and Ft/Offr T.C. Slade USAAF ASN T223139.

Mid-air Collisions

It was inevitable the milieux of the bomber stream in the night skies over Occupied Europe would be a toxic mix for things going for a ‘bump’. Often on a post raid walk around in the light of day it became apparent aircraft were missing various appendages such as aerials, tail wheels, chunks of a fin, and on at least one occasion the nose and bomb aimer.

The Squadron would have the misfortune of having three of its aircraft fail to return following a mid-air collision, two over Europe and one in the circuit of a nearby aerodrome. S/L C.W.C. Hamilton, pilot of LM691was the sole survivor of twenty-two crew members.

Miraculously, F/O Dennis Chalkley and crew in PD376 would survive their encounter with a Halifax off the Danish coast. Ironically, F/Sgt Chalkley would lose his life post war, when he was involved in a second mid-air collision during a practice formation flight. Sadly, he managed to bale out but did not survive.

The photograph of him demonstrating the amazing resilience of the Lanc with a low, single engine flyover at Farnborough, exemplifies the mindset required to survive on bomber ops: the defence mechanism —it will happen to the others but not to me. I am invulnerable…

Farnborough Low!!!, Single Engine Pass. Courtesy of the Chalkley family collection.

Controversial Losses: ND461 and ME697

Of the seventy-four Squadron losses these two proved to be the most problematic and challenging to research and archive. With documents and information obtained under FOI we are more convinced of our initial interpretations.

With ME697 we are convinced the final moments were the result of a forced landing gone awry, not a mid-air explosion at altitude.

S/L Gray and Crew. Courtesy of the Eileen Edge collection.

With ND461 the lack of information has forced us to accept the eyewitness report of the family living at the crash site, at the time.

P/O Cook and Crew. Courtesy of the Brown family collection.

These two losses exemplify the pros and cons of crewing up and how in the middle of the chaos of an emergency situation, errors can be made and be compounded by miscommunication. We are quite certain these two crews are not the only ones in the entire Bomber Command force who suffered similar losses. Crewing up was a brilliant concept but with some crews the pilot was not the leader and decision maker in a crisis. In some crews this role was taken by another crew member, most often the navigator, but could have been anyone, even the mature rear gunner. We strongly believe this was the state of affairs with ME697’s crew.

Contrary to popular sentiment it is our belief, under extenuating circumstances, these two Skippers perhaps unknowingly baled out, believing the crew members left behind were in the process of going or had already gone. Of the Squadron’s seventy-four losses this would amount to 3% of the total. Common sense dictates this was not a situation restricted to 625 Squadron, but involved every Squadron in Bomber Command. It is our belief these incidents were identified by the senior staff who did everything in their power to prevent this from becoming common knowledge—to the point of invoking the Official Secrets Act. To the best of our knowledge this breach of protocol involved officers but not the lower ranks.

As an example we offer Wing Commander Cliff Alabaster from AIRMEN’S OBITUARIES BOOK THREE by Air Commodore Graham Pitchfork.

W/C Alabaster was a highly decorated bomber captain who flew more than 100 raids with Bomber Command and the Pathfinder Force.

He trained as an observer and joined No. 15 Squadron. On the night of April 3, 1941, they were detailed to attack the German cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Outbound they were attacked by a RAF Hurricane and forced to bale out!

After completing 30 operations he was awarded the DFC. Identified as an outstanding navigator he was sent to Canada to complete a specialist course. On returning to Bomber Command he applied to train as a pilot but his services as a navigator were considered too valuable.

Soon after formation of the Pathfinder Force, he was approached by Group Captain Bennett to be the Force’s navigation officer as an acting wing commander. Six months later he was appointed a flight commander on No. 97 Squadron equipped with Lancasters. Unusually for a navigator, he was appointed as a captain of his aircraft.

During an attack on Cologne their Lanc was attacked by a night fighter, wounding several of the crew in the process. Despite this they pressed on to bomb the target. On the return leg the aircraft became difficult to control and an engine caught fire. The pilot carried out a brilliant landing at a coastal airfield. He was awarded the DFC and Alabaster a Bar to his for his “masterly captaincy”.

After completing a further 30 operations he was awarded the DSO. The citation noted: “His fearlessness and skill have been an important factor in the many successes obtained. He is a most excellent flight commander”.

Finally, his repeated requests to train as a pilot were granted and he completed his training in May 1944. At Bennet’s insistence he returned to the Pathfinder Force, initially on Lancs before converting to Mossies.

In November 1944, he assumed command of No. 608 Squadron, part of the Light Night Striking Force. On completing his 100th operation he was awarded a Bar to his DSO…

As a result we leave it to the reader to decide the most likely outcomes, with the facts presented, and query the rational for the cloak of secrecy over the last seven decades.

In retrospect we believe every squadron of Bomber Command was anomalous in its own special way—akin to snowflakes, fingerprints and genomes.

Feedback from Theo Boiten

I now have had the time to read the completed report and must say that you and your co-authors have done an excellent job. I have found no obvious errors in the text.

Note: Dan Ellin, historical consultant, International Bomber Command Centre, University of Lincoln, is in the process of researching an academic paper on the Scarecrow shell myth. A link will be provided when it becomes available.

ANNOUNCEMENT

625 SQUADRON WEBSITE

With the 625 Squadron Project drawing to closure, we are most fortunate Philip Townsend initiated the 625 Squadron Website several years ago. The site is available to the public and in particular those with a special interest in the Squadron’s history. Philip's connection to the Squadron is through his Uncle, F/O William Parmenas Cameron, Pilot, RCAF who was killed on October 20, 1943. He and his crew were the first operational loss for the Squadron.

The website includes links to the Aircrew Remembered Archive Reports on the 74 aircraft and crew who failed to return, the focal point of the Project. However, the website offers a great deal more, including: crew and aircraft information with numerous photos, sorties information, technical information and documents, access to the Squadron's Detailed and Summary ORB reports, burial locations for the 389 air crew who were killed during service with the Squadron, POW and Evader information, suggested readings and numerous interactive reports that can be used by those accessing the website in order to gain a deeper understanding into the Squadron's operations.

REFERENCES

625 Squadron Project: 2000-2026
Aircrew Remembered Archive Reports
Bomber Command Monthly Losses—1939-1945 (Courtesy of Datawrapper)
Source: Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany: Volume 4
https://cf.datawrapper.de/06qcX/7
AGLT/Village Inn: https://www.49squadron.co.uk/assets/pdf/village_in...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automatic_Gun-Laying...
Bomber Command Losses: Max Hastings amended to 2022
BOMBER COMMAND: CHURCHILL’S GREATEST TRIUMH by Roddy MacKenzie
GHOSTS OF TARGETS PAST: The Lives and Losses of a Lancaster Crew in 1944-1945 by Philip Gray
RAF BOMBER COMMAND PROFILES 625 SQUADRON (2025) by Chris Ward
AIRMEN’S OBITUARIES BOOK THREE by Graham Pitchfork. Pages 244-245.

Roy Wilcock, Text/Photo Editing.

Submission by John Naylor and Jack Albrecht, in memory of those who failed to return and those left behind.

JEA 22.06.2026
JEA 07.07.2026 Text and photo edit
JEA 13.07.2026 Squadron Stats Updated.